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

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
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ALL THE
WORKS
Dowland
OF 4505-3
EPICTETUS,

Which are now Extant ;

CONSISTING OF
His DISCOURSES, preserved by ARRIAN;
IN FOUR BOOKS,
The ENCHIRIDION, and FRAGMENTS..

Translated from the Original GREEK,
By ELIZABETH CARTER.

WITH
An INTRODUCTION, and NOTES, by the Translator.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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THE
DISCOURSES
OF
EPICTETUS.




BOOK III.



CHAP. I.

Of Finery in Dress.

§. 1.  Certain young Rhetorician coming to him, with his Hair too curiously ornamented, and his Dress very fine; Tell me, says *Epictetus*, whether you do not think some Horses and Dogs beautiful; and so of all other Animals?

I do.

VOL. II.

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Are

Are some Men then likewise beautiful, and others deformed?

Certainly,

Do we call each of these beautiful then in its Kind, on the same Account, or on some Account, peculiar to itself? You will judge of it, by this: since we see a Dog naturally formed for one thing, a Horse for another, and a Nightingale, for Instance, for another; in general, it will not be absurd to pronounce each of them beautiful, so far as it is in the Condition most suitable to its own Nature: but, since the Nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful, in a different Way. Is it not so?

Agreed.

Then, what makes a Dog beautiful, makes a Horse deformed; and what makes a Horse beautiful, a Dog deformed; if their Natures are different.

So it seems probable.

For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast (*a*) makes no good Wrestler, and a very ridiculous Racer; and the very same Person who appears beautiful as a Pentathlete (*a*), would make a very ill Figure, in Wrestling.

Very

(*a*) These are the Names of Combatants in the *Olympic Games*. A Pancratiast was one who united the Exercises of Wrestling and Boxing. A Pentathlete, one who contended in all the Five Games of Leaping, Running, Throwing the Discus, Darting, and Wrestling. See POTTER'S *Grecian Antiquities*, Vol. I. ch. 21.

Very true.

What then, makes a Man beautiful? Is it the same, in general, that makes a Dog or a Horse so?

The same.

What is it then, that makes a Dog beautiful?

That Excellency which belongs to a Dog.

What, a Horse?

The Excellency of a Horse.

What, a Man? Must it not be the Excellency belonging to a Man? If then you would appear beautiful, young Man, strive for human Excellency.

What is that?

Consider, when you praise, without partial Affection, whom you praise: Is it the Honest, or Dishonest?

The Honest.

The Sober, or the Dissolute?

The Sober.

The Temperate, or the Intemperate?

The Temperate.

Then, if you make yourself such a Character, you know that you will make yourself beautiful: but, while you neglect these Things, though you use every Contrivance to appear beautiful, you must necessarily be deformed.

§. 2. I know not how to say any thing further to you: for if I speak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away, and return no more.

And if I do not speak, consider how I shall act : if you come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you ; and you come to me as to a Philosopher, and I do not speak like a Philosopher.

(b) Besides: how could it be consistent with my Duty towards yourself, to overlook, and leave you uncorrected ? If hereafter you should come to have Sense, you will accuse me, with Reason :
 “ What did *Epicletus* observe in me, that, when
 “ he saw me come to him, in such a shameful Condition, he overlooked it, and never said so much
 “ as a Word of it ? Did he so absolutely despair
 “ of me ? Was not I young ? Was not I able to
 “ hear Reason ? How many young Men, at that
 “ Age, are guilty of many such Errors ? I am
 “ told of one *Polemo*, who, from a most dissolute
 “ Youth, became totally changed (c). Suppose
 “ he

(b) *Epicletus* had been before considering the Propriety of his own Character as a Philosopher : but, according to Mr. *Upton*'s very probable Conjecture, the Translation must be—would it not be cruel, &c.

(c) *Polemo* was a profligate young Rake of *Athens*, and even distinguished by the Dissoluteness of his Manners. One Day, after a riotous Entertainment, he came reeling, with a Chaplet on his Head, into the School of *Xenocrates*. The Audience were greatly offended at his scandalous Appearance : but the Philosopher went on, without any Emotion, in a Discourse upon Temperance and Sobriety. *Polemo* was so struck by his Arguments, that he soon threw away his Chaplet ; and, from that Time, became a Disciple of *Xenocrates* ;

“ he did not think I should become a *Polemo*;
 “ he might however have set my Locks to rights :
 “ he might have stript off my Bracelets and
 “ Rings : he might have prevented my picking
 “ off the Hairs from my Person. But when he
 “ saw me dressed like a—what shall I say ? — he
 “ was silent.” I do not say like what ; when
 you come to your Senses, you will say it your-
 self, and will know what it is, and who they are
 who study such a Dress.

§. 3. If you should hereafter lay this to my
 Charge, what Excuse could I make ; — Ay : but
 if I do speak, he will not regard me. Why, did
Laius regard *Apollo* ? Did not he go and get drunk,
 and bid farewell to the Oracle ? What then ? Did
 this hinder *Apollo* from telling him the Truth ?
 Now, I am uncertain, whether you will regard
 me, or not ; but *Apollo* positively knew, that *Laius*
 would not regard him, and yet He spoke (d). “ And
 “ why did he speak ? ” You may as well ask, Why
 is he *Apollo* ; why doth he deliver Oracles ; why
 hath he placed himself in such a Post as a Prophet,
 and the Fountain of Truth, to whom the Inhabi-

B 3 tants

socrates ; and profited so well by his Instructions, that he af-
 terwards succeeded him in the *Socratic* School.

(d) *Laius*, King of *Thebes*, petitioned *Apollo* for a Son.
 The Oracle answered him, That, if *Laius* became a Father,
 he should perish by the Hand of his Son. The Prediction
 was fulfilled by *Oedipus*. UPTON.

tants of the World should resort? Why is KNOW THYSELF inscribed on the Front of his Temple, when no one minds it?

§. 4. Did *Socrates* prevail on all who came to him, to take care of themselves? Not on the thousandth Part: but, however, being as he himself declares, divinely appointed to such a Post, he never deserted it. What doth he say, even to his Judges? “If you would acquit me, on Condition, that I should no longer act as I do now, I will not accept it, nor desist: but I will accost all I meet whether young or old, and interrogate them just in the same Manner: but particularly you, my Fellow-citizens; as you are more nearly related to me.” — “Are you so curious and officious, *Socrates*? What is it to you how we act?” — “What do you say? While you are of the same Community, and the same Kindred, with me, shall you be careless of yourself, and show yourself a bad Citizen to the City, a bad Kinsman to your Kindred, and a bad Neighbour to your Neighbourhood?” — “Why, who are you?” — Here it is a great Thing to say, “I am He who ought to take care of Mankind;” for it is not every little pauntry Heifer that dares resist the Lion: but if the Bull should come up, and resist him, say to him, if you think proper, *Who are you? What Business is it of yours?* In every Species, Man, there
is

is some one Part which by Nature excels; in Oxen, in Dogs, in Bees, in Horses. Do not say to what excels, *Who are you?* If you do, it will, some-how or other, find a Voice to tell you; “I am like the purple Thread in a Garment (e).” “Do not expect me to be like the rest; or find fault with my Nature, which hath distinguished me from others.”

§. 5. What then, am I such a one? How should I? Indeed, are you such a one as to be able to hear the Truth? I wish you were. But however, since I am condemned to wear a grey Beard and a Cloke, and you come to me as to a Philosopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I despaired of you; but will ask you — Who is it, young Man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly. You are a Man; that is, a mortal Animal, capable of a rational Use of the Appearances of Things. And what is this rational Use? A perfect Conformity to Nature. What have you then, particularly excellent? Is it the animal Part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the (f) Use of the Appearances of Things? No. The Excellence lies in the

B 4. rational

(e) See P. II. §. 3.

(f) The bare Use of Objects belongs to all Animals; a rational Use of them is peculiar to Man. See Introduction, §. 7.

rational Part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your Hair to Him who formed it, as he thought good. Well; what other Denominations have you? Are you a Man, or a Woman? A Man. Then adorn yourself as a Man, not a Woman. A Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and, if hairy, is a Monster, and shown among the Monsters at *Rome*. It is the same in a Man, not to be hairy; and, if he is by Nature not so, he is a Monster. But, if he clips and picks off his Hairs, what shall we do with him? Where shall we show him; and how shall we advertise him? *A Man to be seen, who would rather be a Woman*. What a scandalous Show! Who would not wonder at such an Advertisement? I believe indeed, that these very Pickers themselves would; not apprehending, that it is the very Thing of which they are guilty.

§. 6. Of what have you to accuse your Nature, Sir? That it hath made you a Man? Why; were all to be born Women then? In that Case, what would have been the Use of your Finery? For whom would you have made yourself fine, if all were Women? But the whole Affair displeases you. Go to work upon the Whole then. Remove what is the Cause of these Hairs; and make yourself a Woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half Man, half Woman. To whom would you be agreeable? To the Women? Be agreeable to them as a Man. Ay:

Ay : but they are pleased with smooth pretty Fellows.

Go hang yourself. Suppose they were pleased with Pathics, would you become one ? Is this your Business in Life ? Were you born to please dissolute Women ? Shall we make such a one as you, in the *Corinthian* Republic, for Instance, Governor of the City, Master of the Youth, Commander of the Army, or Director of the public Games ? Will you pick your Hairs, when you are married ? For whom, and for what ? Will you be the Father of Children, and introduce them into the State, picked, like yourself ? O what a fine Citizen, and Senator, and Orator ! For Heaven's sake, Sir, ought we to pray for a Succession of young Men, disposed and bred like you !

§. 7. Now, when you have once heard this Discourse, go home, and say to yourself ; It is not *Epicletus* who hath told me all these Things (for how should he ?) but some propitious God, by him (g) ; for it would never have entered the Head of *Epicletus*, who is not used to dispute with any one. Well ; let us obey God then, that we may not incur the divine Displeasure. If a Crow had signified any thing to you, by his Croaking ; it is not the Crow that signifies it, but God, by him. And, if you have any thing signified to you by the

B 5. human

(g) For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you. Matt. x. 20.

human Voice, doth he not cause the Man to tell it you ; that you may know the divine Efficacy, which declares its Significations to different Persons in different Manners ; and signifies the greatest and principal Things, by the noblest Messengers (*h*). What else doth the Poet mean, when he says,

Hermes I sent, his Purpose to restrain.

Hermes, descending from Heaven, was to warn *Him*; and the Gods now, likewise, send a *Hermes* to warn *You*, not to invert the well-appointed Order of Things ; nor be curiously trifling : but suffer a Man to be a Man ; and a Woman, a Woman : a beautiful Man, to be beautiful, as a Man ; a deformed Man, to be deformed, as a Man : for you do not consist of Flesh and Hair, but of the Faculty of Choice. If you take care to have *this* beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you, that you are deformed ; for Fancy you would rather hear any thing than this. But consider what *Socrates* says to the most beautiful and blooming of all Men, *Alcibiades*. “ Endeavour to make yourself beautiful. What doth he mean to say to him ; Curl your Locks, and pick the Hairs from your Legs ?” Heaven forbid !

(*h*) This Passage hath a remarkable Likeness to *Heb. i. 1, 2. God, who, at sundry Times and in diverse Manners, spake in Times past unto the Fathers by the Prophets, hath, in these last Days spoken unto us by his Son —*

Chap. 2. of EPICTETUS. IF

bid! But, Ornament your Choice: Throw away your wrong Principles.

What is to be done with the poor Body then?

Leave it to Nature. Another hath taken care of such Things. Give them up to Him.

What! then, must one be a Sloven?

By no means: but be neat, conformably to your Nature. A Man should be neat, as a Man; a Woman, as a Woman; a Child, as a Child. If not, let us pick out the Mane of a Lion, that he may not be slovenly; and the Comb of a Cock; for he ought to be neat too. Yes; but let it be as a Cock; and a Lion, as a Lion; and a Hound, as a Hound.

CHAP. II.

In what a Proficient ought to be exercised; and that we neglect the principal Things.

§. I. THERE are Three Topics in Philosophy, in which he, who would be wise and good, must be exercised (a). That of the *Desires*, and *Aversions*; that he may not be disappointed of the one, nor incur the other. That of the *Pursuits*, and *Avoidances*; and, in general, the Duties of Life; that he may act with Order and Consideration, and not carelessly. The Third Topic

B 6

belongs

(a) See Introduction, §. 3, 4, 5, 6.

belongs to Circumspection, and a Freedom from Deception; and, in general, whatever belongs to the Assent.

§. 2. Of these Topics, the principal and most urgent, is that of the Passions: for Passion is produced no otherwise, than by a Disappointment of the Desires, and an incurring of the Aversions. It is this which introduces Perturbations, Tumults, Misfortunes, and Calamities: this is the Spring of Sorrow, Lamentation, and Envy: this renders us envious, and emulous; and incapable of hearing Reason.

§. 3. The next Topic regards the Duties of Life. For I am not to be undisturbed by Passions, in the same Sense as a Statue is; but as one who preserves the natural and acquired Relations; as a pious Person, as a Son, as a Brother, as a Father, as a Citizen.

§. 4. The Third Topic belongs to those who are now making a Proficiency; and is a Security to the other Two, that no unexamined Appearance may surprize us, either in Sleep, or Wine, or in the Spleen. This, say you, is above us. But our present Philosophers, leaving the First and Second Topics [the Affections, and moral Duties], employ themselves wholly about the Third; Convertible, definitive, hypothetical Propositions [and other logical Subtilties]. For, they say, that we
must,

must, by engaging even in these Subjects; take care to guard against Deception. Who must? A wise and good Man. Is this Security from Deception, then, the Thing you want? Have you mastered the other Subjects? Are you not liable to be deceived by Money? When you see a fine Girl, do you oppose the Appearance which is raised in your Mind? If your Neighbour inherits an Estate, do you feel no Vexation? Do you, at present, want nothing more than Perseverance? You learn even these very Things, Wretch, with Trembling, and a solicitous Dread of Contempt; and are inquisitive to know, what is said of you; and, if any one comes and tells you, that, in a Dispute which was the best of the Philosophers, one of the Company said, that such a one was the only Philosopher, that little Soul of yours grows to the Size of two Cubits, instead of an Inch: but if another should come, and say, "You are mistaken, he is not worth hearing; for what doth he know? He hath the first Rudiments, but nothing more;" you are Thunderstruck; you presently turn pale, and cry out, "I will show him; what a Man, and how great a Philosopher I am." It is evident [what you are], by these very Things; why do you aim to show it by others? Do not you know, that *Diogenes* showed some Sophist in this Manner, by extending his
middle

middle Finger (*b*); and, when he was mad with Rage, This, says *Diogenes*, is *He*: I have showed him to you. For a Man is not showed in the same Sense as a Stone, or a Piece of Wood, by the Finger; but whoever shows his Principles, shows him as a Man.

§. 5. Let us see *your* Principles too. For is it not evident, that you consider your own Choice as nothing; but look out for something external, and independent on it? As, what such a one will say of you, and what you shall be thought; whether a Man of Letters; whether to have read *Chrysispus*, or *Antipater*; for, if *Archedemus* too, you have every thing you wish. Why are you still solicitous, lest you should not show us what you are? Will you let me tell you, what you have showed us, that you are? A mean, discontented, passionate, cowardly Fellow; complaining of every thing; accusing every body; perpetually restless; good for nothing. This you have showed us. Go now and read *Archedemus*: and then, if you hear but the Noise of a Mouse, you are a dead Man; for you will die some such Kind of Death as — Who was it? *Crinis* (*c*); who valued himself extremely too, that he understood *Archedemus*.

§. 6.

(*b*) Extending the middle Finger, with the Antients, was a Mark of the greatest Contempt.

(*c*) *Crinis* was a Stoic Philosopher. The Circumstances of his Death are not now known.

§. 6. Wretch, why do not you let alone Things, that do not belong to you ? These Things become such as are able to learn them, without Perturbation ; who can say, “ I am not subject to Anger, “ or Grief, or Envy. I am not restrained ; I am “ not compelled. What remains for me to do ? “ I am at Leisure ; I am at Ease. Let us see “ how convertible Propositions are to be treated : “ Let us consider, when an Hypothesis is laid “ down, how we may avoid a Contradiction.” To such Persons do these Things belong. They who are safe may light a Fire ; go to Dinner, if they please ; and sing, and dance : but you come and hoist a Flag, when your Vessel is just sinking.

C H A P. III.

What is the Subject-matter of a good Man ; and in what we chiefly ought to be Practitioners.

§. 1. **T**HE Subject-matter of a wise and good Man is, his own governing Faculty. The Body is the Subject-matter of a Physician, and of a Master of Exercise ; and a Field, of the Husbandman. The Business of a wise and good Man is, an Use of the Appearances of Things, conformable to Nature. Now, every Soul, as it is naturally formed for an Assent to Truth, a Dissent from Falshood, and a Suspence with regard to Uncertainty ;

tainty; so it is moved by a Desire of Good, an Aversion from Evil, and an Indifference to what is neither good nor evil. For, as a Money-changer, or a Gardener, is not at Liberty to reject *Cæsar's* Coin; but when once it is shown, is obliged, whether he will or not, to deliver what is sold for it; so is it in the Soul. Apparent Good at first Sight attracts, and Evil repels. Nor will the Soul any more reject an evident Appearance of Good, than [they will] *Cæsar's* Coin.

§. 2. Hence depends every Movement, both of God and Man; and hence *Good* is preferred to every Obligation, however near. My Connexion is not with my Father; but with Good. — Are you so hard-hearted? — Such is my Nature, and such is the Coin which God hath given me. If, therefore, *Good* is made to be any thing but Fair and Just, away go Father, and Brother, and Country, and every thing. What! Shall I overlook my own Good, and give it up to *you*? For what? “I am your Father.” But not my *Good*. “I am your Brother.” But not my *Good*. But, if we place it in a right Choice, *Good* will consist in an Observance of the several Relations of Life; and then, he who gives up some Externals, acquires *Good*. Your Father deprives you of your Money; but he doth not hurt you. Your Brother will possess as much larger a Portion of Land than you, as he pleases; but will he possess more

Honour? More Fidelity? More fraternal Affection? Who can throw you out of this Possession? Not even *Jupiter*: for, indeed, it is not his Will; but he hath put this Good into my own Power, and given it me, like his own, uncompelled, unrestrained, and unhindered. But, when any one hath a Coin different from this, [for his Coin,] whoever shows it to him, may have whatever is sold for it, in return. A thievish Proconsul comes into the Province: What Coin doth he use? Silver. Show it him, and carry off what you please. An Adulterer comes: What Coin doth he use? Women. Take the Coin, says one, and give me this Trifle. "Give it me, and it is yours." Another is addicted to Boys: give him the Coin, and take what you please. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine Nag, or a Puppy; and, though with Sighs and Groans, he will sell you for it, what you will; for he is inwardly compelled by another, who hath constituted this Coin.

§. 3. In this manner, ought every one chiefly to exercise himself. When you go out in a Morning, examine whomsoever you see, or hear: answer, as to a Question. What have you seen? A handsome Person? Apply the Rule. Is this dependent, or independent, on Choice? Independent. Throw it away. What have you seen? One grieving for the Disease of a Child? Apply the Rule. Death is independent on Choice.

Throw

Throw it by. Hath a Consul met you? Apply the Rule. What Kind of thing is the Consular Office? dependent, or independent, on Choice? Independent. Throw aside this too. It is not Proof. Cast it away. It is nothing to you.

§. 4. If we acted thus, and practised in this manner, from Morning till Night, by Heaven, something would be done. Whereas now, on the contrary, we are caught by every Appearance, half-asleep; and, if we ever do awake, it is only a little in the School: but, as soon as we go out, if we meet any one grieving, we say, "He is undone." If a Consul, "How Happy is He!" If an Exile, "How miserable." If a poor Man, "How wretched; he hath nothing to eat!"

§. 5. These vicious Principles then are to be lopped off: and here is our whole Strength to be applied, For what is Weeping and Groaning? Principle. What is Misfortune? Principle. What is Sedition, Discord, Complaint, Accusation, Impiety, Trifling? All these are Principles, and nothing more: and Principles concerning Things independent on Choice, as if they were either good or evil. Let any one transfer these Principles to Things dependent on Choice, and I will engage, that he will preserve his Constancy, whatever be the State of Things about him.

§. 6. The Soul resembles a Vessel filled with Water: the Appearances of Things resemble a
Ray,

Ray falling upon its Surface. If the Water is moved, the Ray will seem to be moved likewise, though it is in reality without Motion. Whenever therefore, any one is seized with a Swimming in his Head, it is not the Arts and Virtues that are confounded, but the Mind, in which they are : and, if this recover its Composure, so will they likewise.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning one who exerted himself, with indecent Eagerneſs in the Theatre.

§. 1. **W**HEN the Governor of Epirus had exerted himself indecently, in favour of a Comedian, and was, upon that Account, publicly railed at ; and, when he came to hear it, was highly displeased with those who railed at him : Why : what Harm, says *Epictetus*, have these People done ? They have favoured a Player ; which is just what you did.

Is this a proper Manner then, of expressing their Favour ?

Seeing you, their Governor, and the Friend and Vicegerent of *Cæſar*, express it thus, was it not to be expected, that they would express it thus too ? For, if it is not right to express Favour, in this Manner to a Player, be not guilty of it yourself ;
and,

and, if it is, why are you angry at them, for imitating you? For whom have the Many to imitate, but *you*, their Superiors? From whom are they to take Example, when they come into the Theatre, but from *you*? “Do but look how *Cæsar*’s Vice-gerent sees the Play? Hath he cried out? I will cry out too. Hath he leaped up from his Seat? I too will leap up from mine. Do his Slaves sit in different Parts of the House, making an Uproar? I indeed have no Slaves; but I will make as much Uproar as I can myself, instead of ever so many.”

§. 2. You ought to consider then, that when you appear in the Theatre, you appear as a Rule and Example to others, how they ought to see the Play. Why is it, that they have railed at you? Because every Man hates what hinders him. *They* would have one Actor crowned; *you* another. They hindered you; and you, them. You proved the stronger. They have done what they could: they have railed at the Person who hindered them. What would you have then? Would you *do* as you please, and not have them even *talk* as they please? Where is the Wonder of all this? Doth not the Husbandman rail at *Jupiter*, when he is hindered by him? Doth not the Sailor? Do Men ever cease railing at *Cæsar*? What then, is *Jupiter* ignorant of this? Are not the Things that are said, reported to *Cæsar*? How then doth
he

he act? He knows, that, if he was to punish all Railers, he would have nobody left to command.

§. 3. When you enter the Theatre then, ought you to say, "Come, let *Sopbron* (a) be crowned?" No. But, "Come, let me preserve my Choice, in a Manner conformable to Nature, upon this Occasion. No one is dearer to me than myself. It is ridiculous then, that, because another Man gains the Victory as a Player, I should be hurt. Whom do I wish to gain the Victory? Him who doth gain it; and thus he will always be victorious, whom I wish to be so." — But I would have *Sopbron* crowned. — Why, celebrate as many Games as you will, at your own House; *Nemean*, *Pythian*, *Isthmian*, *Olympic*; and proclaim him Victor in all: but, in public, do not arrogate more than your Due, nor seize to yourself what lies in common; otherwise, bear to be railed at: for, if you act like the Mob, you reduce yourself to an Equality with them.

CHAP.

(a) The Name of a Player. UPTON.

C H A P. V.

(b) *Concerning those who pretend Sickness, as an Excuse to return home.*

§. 1. **I** Am sick here, said one of the Scholars. I will return home.

Were you never sick at home then? Consider, whether you are doing any thing here, conducive to the Regulation of your Choice: for, if you make no Improvement, it was to no Purpose that you came. Go home. Take care of your domestic Affairs. For, if your ruling Faculty cannot be brought to a Conformity to Nature, your Land may. You may increase your Money, support the old Age of your Father, mix in the public Assemblies, and make a bad Governor, as you are a bad Man, and do other Things of that sort. But, if you are conscious to yourself, that you are casting off some of your wrong Principles, and taking up different ones in their room, and that you have transferred your Scheme of Life from Things not dependent on Choice, to those which are; and that, if you do sometimes cry *alas*, it is not

(b) The *Greek* Title to this Chapter is defective. Νοσος seems to be the Word wanting. Or, if Διαπλῆττι signifies, to pretend, as πλῆττι doth, the true Reading of the Text may be, πρὸς τοὺς νοσοῦν διαπλῆτταμένους.

not upon the Account of your Father, or your Brother, but yourself; why do you any longer plead Sickness (c)? Do not you know, that both Sickness and Death must overtake us? At what Employment? The Husbandman, at his Plow; the Sailor, on his Voyage. At what Employment would you be taken? For, indeed, at what Employment ought you to be taken? If there is any better Employment, at which you can be taken, follow that. For my own Part, I would be taken engaged in nothing, but in the Care of my own Faculty of Choice; how to render it undisturbed, unrestrained, uncompelled, free. I would be found studying this, that I may be able to say to God, "Have I transgressed thy Commands?" "Have I perverted the Powers, the Senses, the Pre-conceptions, which thou hast given me?" "Have I ever accused Thee, or censured Thy Dispensations? I have been sick, because it was Thy Pleasure; and so have others; but I willingly. I have been poor, it being thy Will; but with Joy. I have not been in Power; because it was not thy Will; and Power I have never desired. Hast thou ever seen me out of Humour, upon this Account? Have I not always approached Thee, with a cheerful Countenance; prepared to execute Thy Commands, and the Significations of thy Will? Is it thy

"Plea-

(c) Epict. *Res*, probably, should be, *Epict.* *Ti* 171.

“ Pleasure, that I should depart from this Affem-
“ bly ? I depart. I give Thee all Thanks, that
“ Thou hast thought me worthy to have a Share
“ in it, with Thee ; to behold Thy Works, and
“ to join with Thee, in comprehending Thy Ad-
“ ministration.” Let Death overtake me while
I am thinking, while I am writing, while I am
reading, such Things as these.

§. 2. But I shall not have my Mother, to hold
my Head, when I am sick.

Get home then to your Mother ; for you are fit
to have your Head held, when you are sick.

But I used at home, to lie on a fine Couch.

Get to this Couch of yours ; for you are fit to
lie upon such a one, even in Health : so do not
lose the doing what you are qualified for. But
what says *Socrates* ? “ As one Man rejoices in the
“ Improvement of his Estate, another of his
“ Horse, so do I daily rejoice in apprehending
“ myself to grow better.”

In what ? In pretty Speeches ?

Good Words, I intreat you.

In trifling Theorems ? What do they signify ?
Yet indeed I do not see, that the Philosophers
are employed, in any thing else.

Do you think it nothing, never to accuse or
censure any one, either God or Man ? Always
to carry abroad, and bring home, the same Coun-
tenance ?

tenance? These were the Things which *Socrates* knew ; and yet he never professed to know, or to teach any thing ; but if any one wanted pretty Speeches, or little Theorems, he brought him to *Protagoras*, to *Hippias* : just as if any one had come for Pot-herbs, he would have taken him to a Gardener. Who of you then hath such an [earnest] Intention as this? If you had, you would bear Sickness, and Hunger, and Death, with Chearfulness. If any of you hath been in Love, he knows that I speak Truth.

CHAP. VI.

Miscellaneous.

§. I. **W**HEN he was asked, How (a) it came to pass, that, though the Art of Reasoning is more studied now, yet the Improvements were greater, formerly? In what Instance, answered he, is it more studied *now* ; and in what were the Improvements greater, *then*? For in what is studied, at present, in that will be found likewise the Improvements, at present. The present Study is the Solution of Syllogisms ; and in *this*, Improvements are made. But formerly, the Study was to

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preserve

(a) By changing *των* into *ωωε*, and, as Mr. *Upton* proposes, *ωωερον* into *ωωωρον*, the whole Difficulty of this corrupted Passage is removed.

preserve the governing Faculty conformable to Nature; and Improvement was made in *that*. Therefore do not confound Things; nor when you study one, expect Improvement in another; but see whether any of us, who applies himself to think and act conformably to Nature, ever fails of Improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one.

§. 2. A good Man is invincible; for he doth not contend, where he is not superior. If you would have his Land, take it: take his Servants; take his public Post; take his Body. But you will never frustrate his Desire, nor make him incur his Aversion. He engages in no Combat, but what concerns the Objects of his own Choice. How can he fail then to be invincible?

§. 3. Being asked, what common Sense was? he answered: As that may be called a common Ear, which distinguishes only Sounds; but that, which distinguishes Notes, an artificial one: so there are some Things, which Men, not totally perverted, discern by their common natural Powers; and such a Disposition is called common Sense.

§. 4. It is not easy to gain the Attention of effeminate young Men; for you cannot take Custard by a Hook: but the Ingenuous, even if you discourage them, are the more eager for Learning. Hence *Rufus*, for the most part, did discourage them;

them ; and made use of that, as a Criterion of the Ingenuous and Disingenuous. For he used to say, as a Stone, even if you throw it up, will, by its own Propensity, be carried downward ; so an ingenuous Mind, the more it is forced from its natural Bent, the more strongly will it incline towards it.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning a Governor of the Free States, who was an Epicurean.

§. 1. **W**HEN the Governor, who was an Epicurean, came to him ; It is fit, says he, that we ignorant People should enquire of you Philosophers, what is the most valuable Thing, in the World ; as those who come into a strange City do of the Citizens, and such as are acquainted with it ; that, after this Enquiry, we may go and take a View of it, as they do in Cities. Now, scarcely any one denies, but that there are three Things belonging to Man ; Soul, Body, and Externals. It remains for you to answer which is the best. What shall we tell Mankind ? Is it Flesh ?

And was it for this, that *Maximus* took a Voyage in Winter as far as *Cassiope*, to accompany his Son ? Was it to gratify the Flesh ?

No, surely.

Is it not fit then, to employ our chief Study on what is best?

Yes, beyond all other Things.

What have we, then, better than Flesh?

The Soul.

Are we to prefer the Good of the Better, or of the Worse?

Of the Better.

Doth the Good of the Soul consist in what is dependent, or independent, on Choice?

In what is dependent on it.

Doth the Pleasure of the Soul then depend on Choice?

It doth.

And whence doth this Pleasure arise? From itself? This is unintelligible. For there must subsist some principal Essence of Good, in the Attainment of which, we shall enjoy this Pleasure of the Soul.

This too is granted.

In what then consists this Pleasure of the Soul?

For if it be in mental Objects, the Essence of Good is found (a). For it is impossible, that we should be reasonably elated with Pleasure, unless by Good; or that, if the leading Cause is not Good,

the
(a) The Translation follows Lord Shaftesbury's Correction of *luxurious*, for *ayathois*; which seems absolutely necessary to the Sense of the Passage.

the Effect should be good. For, to make the Effect reasonable, the Cause must be good. But this, if you are in your Senses, you will not allow; for it would be to contradict both *Epicurus*, and the rest of your Principles. It remains then, that the Pleasures of the Soul must consist in bodily Objects; and that there must be the leading Cause, and the Essence of Good. *Maximus* therefore did foolishly, if he took a Voyage for the Sake of any thing but Body; that is, for the Sake of what is best. He doth foolishly too, if he refrains from what is another's, when he is a Judge, and able to take it. But let us consider only this, if you please, how it may be done secretly, and safely, and so that no one may know it. For *Epicurus* himself doth not pronounce Stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it: and says, "Do not steal;" for no other Reason, but because it is impossible to insure ourselves against a Discovery. But I say to you, That, if it be done dextrously and cautiously, we shall not be discovered. Besides: we have powerful Friends, of both Sexes, at *Rome*; and the *Greeks* are weak; and nobody will dare to go up to *Rome*, on such an Affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper Good? It is Madness; it is Folly. But if you were to tell me, that you do refrain I would not believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to an apparent Falshood, or to deny an apparent

Truth, so it is impossible to abstain from an apparent Good. Now, Riches are a Good; and, indeed, the chief Instrument of Pleasures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the Wife of our Neighbour, if it can be done secretly? And, if the Husband should happen to be impertinent, why not cut his Throat too? if you have a mind to be such a Philosopher as you ought to be, a complete one, to be consistent with your own Principles. Otherwise you will not differ from us, who are called Stoics. For we too say one Thing, and do another: we talk well, and act ill: but you will be perverse in a contrary Way; teach bad Principles, and act well.

§. 2. For Heaven's sake represent to yourself a City of *Epicureans* (b). "I do not marry." "Nor
 " I. For we are not to marry, nor have Children;
 " nor to engage in public Affairs." What will be the Consequence of this? Whence are the Citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the Governor of the Youth? Who, the Master of their Exercises? What then, will he teach them? Will it be what used to be taught at *Athens*, or *Lacedæmon*? Take a young Man; bring him up, according to your Principles. These Principles are wicked; subversive of a State; pernicious

(b) The Translation follows the Reading of *Wolffius*.
 EDITOR.

nicious to Families ; nor becoming, even to Women. Give them up, Sir. You live in a capital City. You are to govern, and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one's Wife, or Child, or silver or gold Plate, is to have any Charms for you ; but your own. Provide yourself with Principles, consonant to these Truths ; and setting out from thence, you will with Pleasure refrain from Things so persuasive to mislead, and get the better. But if to their own persuasive Force, we add such a Philosophy, as hurries us upon them, and confirms us in them, what will be the Consequence ?

§. 3. In a sculptured Vase, which is the best ; the Silver, or the Workmanship ? In the Hand, the Substance is Flesh : but its Operations are the principal Thing. Accordingly, the Duties, relative to it, are likewise threefold ; some have respect to mere Existence ; others, to the manner of Existence ; and a third Sort are the leading Operations themselves. Thus likewise, do not set a Value on the Materials of Man, mere paucity Flesh ; but on the principal Operations belonging to him. What are these ?

Engaging in public Business ; Marrying ; the Production of Children ; the Worship of God ; the Care of our Parents ; and, in general, the having our Desires and Aversions, our Pursuits and

C 4 Avoidances,

Avoidances, such as each of them ought to be, conformable to our Nature.

What is our Nature?

To be free, noble spirited, modest. (For what other Animal blunders?) What other hath the Idea of Shame? But Pleasure must be subjected to these, as an Attendant and Handmaid, to call forth our Activity, and to keep us constant in natural Operations.

But I am rich, and want nothing.

Then why do you pretend to philosophize? Your gold and silver Plate is enough for you. What need have you of Principles?

Besides, I am Judge of the Greeks.

Do you know how to judge? Who hath imparted this Knowledge to you?

Cæsar, hath given me a Commission.

Let him give you a Commission to judge of Magic; and what Good will it do you? But how were you made a Judge? Whose Hand have you killed? That of *Symphorus*, or *Numenius* (c)? Before whose Bed-chamber have you slept? To whom have you sent Presents? After all, do you perceive, that the Office of Judge is of the same Value as *Numenius*?

But I can throw whom I please into Prison.

As

(c) Of *Symphorus* and *Numenius* there is no Account; and their Names serve only to show, that Persons once of such Power are now totally forgot.

As you may a Stone. *As each as such, as should be avoided.*

But I can beat whom I will. *As each as such, as should be avoided.*

As you may an As. *This is not a Govern-
ment, yet Men, on Govern, as like reasonable
Creatures. Shown us what is for our Interest, and
we will pursue it; it shows us what is against our
Interest, and we will avoid it. Like Socrates,
make us Imitators of yourself. He was properly
a Governor of Men, who subjected their Desires
and Aversions, their Pursuits, their Avoidances,
to himself. Do this; do not do that, or I will
"throw you into Prison." Going thus far only,
is not governing Men, like reasonable Creatures.
But — "Do as Jupiter hath commanded, or you
will be punished. You will be a Loser."*

What shall I lose?

Nothing more, than the not doing what you
ought. You will lose your Fidelity, Honour, De-
cency: Look for no greater Losses than these.

As each as such, as should be avoided.

C H A P. VIII.

As each as such, as should be avoided.

*How we are to exercise ourselves, against the Ap-
pearances of Things.*

§ 1. **I**N the same manner, as we exercise our-
selves, against sophistical Questions, we
should exercise ourselves likewise, in relation to
such Appearances, as every Day occur: for these

too offer Questions to us. — Such a one's Son is dead. What do you think of it? Answer: it is independent on Choice: it is not an Evil. — Such a one is disinherited by his Father. What do you think of it? It is independent on Choice: it is not an Evil. — *Cæsar* hath condemned him. — This is independent on Choice: it is not an Evil. — He hath been afflicted by it. — This is dependent on Choice: it is an Evil. — He hath supported it bravely. — This is dependent on Choice: it is a Good.

§. 2. If we accustom ourselves in this manner, we shall make an Improvement; for we shall never assent to any thing, but what the Appearance itself comprehends. A Son is dead. — What hath happened? — A Son is dead. — Nothing more? — Nothing. — A Ship is lost. — What hath happened? — A Ship is lost. He is carried to Prison. — What hath happened? — He is carried to Prison. That he is *unhappy*, is an Addition, that every one makes of his own. — “But *Jupiter* doth not order these Things right.” — Why so? Because he hath made you patient? Because he hath made you brave? Because he hath made them to be no Evils? Because it is permitted you, while you suffer them, to be happy? Because he hath opened you the Door, whenever they do
not

not suit you? Go out, Man, and do not complain (a).

§. 3. If you would know how the *Romans* treat Philosophers, hear. *Italicus*, esteemed one of the greatest Philosophers among them, being in a Passion with his own People, as if he had suffered some intolerable Evil, said once when I was by, "I cannot bear it? you are the Ruin of me; "you will make me just like *him*;" pointing to me.

C H A P. IX.

Concerning a certain Orator, who was going to Rome on a Law Suit.

§. 1. **W**HEN a Person came to him, who was going to *Rome*, on a Law Suit, in which his Dignity was concerned; and, after telling him the Occasion of his Journey, asked him, what he thought of the Affair? If you ask me, C 6

says,

(a) It is plain, the Stoics could not deny many of those Things to be very severely painful, which they maintain to be no Evils; since they so continually point at Self-murder as the Remedy. The lenient reviving Medicine, Future Hope, they knew nothing of; and their only Alternative, was an unfeeling Contempt, or a blind Despair. To feel tenderly the Loss of a Son, and yet with meek Piety support it, and give Thanks always, for all Things, unto God, and the Father, in humble Faith of their working together for our Good, was an Effort, beyond Stoicism to teach.

says *Epictetus*, what will happen to you at *Rome*, and whether you shall gain, or lose your Cause? I have no Theorem for this. But if you ask me, how you shall fare; I can answer, If you have right Principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For Principle is to every one, the Cause of Action. For what is the Reason, that you so earnestly desired to be voted Governor of the *Gnossians*? Principle. What is the Reason, that you are now going to *Rome*? Principle. And in Winter too, and with Danger, and Expence? Why? because it is necessary. What tells you so? Principle. If then, Principles are the Causes of all our Actions, where ever any one hath bad Principles, their Effect will be answerable to the Cause. Well then: are all our Principles sound? Are both yours, and your Antagonists? How then do you differ? Or are yours better than his? Why? You think so; and so doth he, that his are better; and so do Madmen. This is a bad Consideration. But show me, that you have made some Examination, and taken some Care of your Principles. As you now take a Voyage to *Rome*, for the Government of the *Gnossians*, and are not contented to stay at home, with the Honours you before enjoyed, but desire something greater, and more illustrious; did you ever take such a Voyage, in order to examine your own Principles; and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened

to hate any? Did you ever apply to any one, upon this Account? What Time did you ever set yourself? What Age? Remove your Years. If you are ashamed of me, do it to yourself. Did you examine your Principles, when you were a Child? Did you not do every thing, just as you do every thing, *now*? When you were a Youth, and frequented the Schools of the Orators, and made Declamations yourself, did you ever imagine, that you were deficient in any thing? And when you became a Man, and entered upon public Business, pleaded Causes, and acquired Credit, who, any longer, appeared to be equal to you? How would you have borne, that any one should examine, whether your Principles were bad? What, then, would you have me say to you?

Assist me in this Affair.

I have no Theorem for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that Account you came, as to a Philosopher; but as you would come to an Herb-seller, or a Shoe-maker.

To what Purposes then, have the Philosophers Theorems?

- For preserving and conducting the ruling Faculty conformably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a small Thing?

No; but the greatest.

Well: and doth it require but a short time? and may it be taken, as you pass by? If you can, take it then: and so you will say, "I have visited

"Epictetus."

“*Epicletus*.” — Ay: just as you would a Stone, or a Statue. For you have *seen* me, and nothing more. But he visits a Man, as a Man, who learns his Principles; and, in return, shows his own. Learn my Principles. Show me yours. *Then* say, you have visited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad Principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is visiting a Philosopher. No. But “It lies in our Way;” and, while we are about hiring a Ship, we may “call on *Epicletus*. Let us see what it is he says.” And then, when you are gone, you say, “*Epicletus* is nothing. His Language was “inaccurate, was barbarous.” For what else did you come to judge of? “Well; but if I employ (a) myself in these Things, I shall be “without an Estate, like you; without Plate, “without Equipage, like you.” — Nothing perhaps is necessary to be said to this, but that I do not want them. But, if you possess many Things, you still want others: so that, whether you will or not, you are poorer than I.

§. 2. What then do I want?

What you have not: Constancy; a Mind conformable to Nature; and a Freedom from Perturbation. Patron, or no Patron, what care I? But you do. I am richer than you. I am not anxious what *Cæsar* will think of me. I flatter no one, on that

(a) The first *or* I apprehend should be *and*, and is so translated.

that Account. This I have, instead of silver and gold Plate. You have your Vessels, of Gold; but your Discourse, your Principles, your Assents, your Pursuits, your Desires, of mere Earthen Ware. When I have all these conformable to Nature, why should not I bestow some Study upon my Reasoning too? I am at Leisure. My Mind is under no Distraction. In this Freedom from Distraction, what shall I do? Have I any thing more becoming a Man, than this? You, when you have nothing [to do], are restless; you go to the Theatre, or perhaps to bathe (*b*). Why should not the Philosopher polish his Reasoning? You have fine (*c*) crystal and myrrhine Vases; I have acute Forms of Reasoning. To you, all you have appears, little; to me, all I have, great. Your Appetite is unsatiable; mine is satisfied. When Children thrust their Hand into a narrow Jar of Nuts and Figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again; then they fall a crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the rest. And do you too drop your Desire: do not covet many Things, and you will get [some].

C H A P.

(*b*) I can find no Sense of *αναλυστις*, which suits this Place. Perhaps the Reading should be *ανα λουστis*; and it is so translated. Bathing was a common Amusement of idle People. See B. III. c. 24. p. 495. of Mr. Upton's Edition.

(*c*) ————— and how they quaff in Gold,
Crystal and myrrhine Cups, inbosc'd with Gems.

Paradise Regained, B. IV. v. 181.

CHAP. X.

In what Manner we ought to bear Sickness.

§. 1. **W**E should have all our Principles ready, to make use of, on every Occasion. At Dinner, such as relate to Dinner; in the Bath, such as relate to the Bath; in the Bed, such as relate to the Bed.

*Let not the stealing God of Sleep surprise,
Nor creep in Slumbers, on thy weary Eyes,
Ere ev'ry Action of the former Day
Strictly thou dost, and righteously survey,
What have I done? In what have I transgress'd?
What Good, or Ill, has this Day's Life express'd?
Where have I fail'd, in what I ought to do?
If Evil were thy Deeds, repent and mourn,
If Good, rejoice* ———

Rowe's Pythagoras.

We should retain these Verses, so as to apply them to our Use: not merely to repeat them aloud, as we do the Verses in Honour of *Apolla*, [without minding what we are about] (a).

§. 2. Again: In a Fever, we should have such Principles ready, as relate to a Fever; and not, as soon as we are taken ill, to lose and forget all. Provided I do but act like a Philosopher, let what will.

(a) This Place is either corrupt, as Mr. *Upton* thinks; or alludes to some ancient Custom not sufficiently understood now.

will happen. Some Way or other I must, from this frail Body, whether a Fever comes, or not (b). What is it to be a Philosopher? Is it not to be prepared against Events? Do not you comprehend, that you say, in Effect, if I am but prepared to to bear all Events with Calmness, let what will happen; otherwise, you are like a Pancratiast, who, after receiving a Blow, should quit the Combat. In that Case indeed you may allowably leave off, and not [run the Hazard] of being whipt (c). But what shall we get by leaving off Philosophy? What then ought each of us to say upon every difficult Occasion? "It was for this, that I exercised: it was for this, that I prepared myself." God says to you, give me a Proof if you have gone through the preparatory Combats, according to Rule (d): if you have

(b) This is a corrupt Passage, and the Translation conjectural. Perhaps the true Reading might be *ου ποτ' απελθοντα το σωματιν δι' απελθειν με*; and it is so translated. There is a similar Turn of Expression, in the fifth Chapter of the second Book, which seems to favour this Notion. See Page 189. L. 1. of Mr. Upton's Edition.

(c) Which was the Punishment of those, who presented themselves, as Candidates at the Olympic Games, and did not comply with the Rules, which were to be observed, upon that Occasion. *Epictetus* is here speaking of the preparatory Exercises, which lasted for ten Months before the Combat.

(d) St. Paul hath made use of this very Expression, *πορευομαις αθλειν*, 2 Tim. ii. 5.

have followed a proper Diet ; and proper Exercise ; if you have obeyed your Master : and, after this, do you faint, at the very Time of Action ? Now is the proper Time for a Fever. Bear it well : for Thirst : bear it well : for Hunger : bear it well. Is it not in your Power ? Who shall restrain you ? A Physician may restrain you from drinking ; but he cannot restrain you from bearing your Thirst, well. He may restrain you from eating ; but he cannot restrain you from bearing Hunger, well.—But I cannot follow my Studies.—And for what End do you follow them, Wretch ? Is it not that you may be prosperous ? That you may be constant ? that you may think and act conformably to Nature ? What restrains you, but that in a Fever, you may preserve your ruling Faculty conformable to Nature ? Here is the Horn of the Matter. Here is the Trial of the Philosopher ; for a Fever, is a Part of Life, just as a Walk, a Voyage, or a Journey. Do you read, when you are walking ? No : nor in a Fever. But when you walk well, you have every thing belonging to a Walker : so, if you bear a Fever well, you have every thing belonging to one in a Fever. What is it to bear a Fever well ? Not to blame either God, or Man : not to be afflicted at what happens : to expect Death in a right and becoming Manner ; and to do what is to be done.

When

When the Physician enters, not to dread what he may say; nor, if he should tell you, that you are in a fair Way, to be too much rejoiced: for what Good hath he told you? When you were in Health, what Good did it do you? Not to be dejected, when he tells you, that you are very ill: for what is it to be very ill? To be near the Separation of Soul and Body. What Harm is there in this, then? If you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter? What, will the World be quite overset when you die? Why then, do you flatter your Physician? Why do you say, "If you please, Sir, I shall do well (e)?" Why do you furnish an Occasion to his Pride? Why do not you treat a Physician, with regard to an insignificant Body, which is not yours, but by Nature mortal, as you do a Shoemaker, about your Foot; or a Carpenter, about a House? These are the Things necessary, to one in a Fever. If he fulfils these, he hath what belongs to him. For it is not the Business of a Philosopher to take care of these mere Externals; of his Wine, his Oil, or his Body; but his ruling Faculty: And how, with regard to Externals? So as not to behave inconsiderately, about them. What Occasion then, is there for Fear? What Occasion for Anger,

(e) See *Matth. viii. 2.* Κυριε, τον θυλον, δυνασαι με καθαρισαι
 UTTON.

ger (*f*), about what belongs to others, and what is of no Value? For, two Rules we should always have ready: That nothing is good or evil, but Choice: and, That we are not to lead Events, but to follow them. "My Brother ought not to have treated me so." Very true; but *he* must see to that. However he treats me, I am to act right, with regard to him: for the one is my own Concern; the other is not: the one cannot be restrained; the other may.

CHAP. XI.

Miscellaneous.

§. 1. **T**HERE are some Punishments appointed, as by a Law, for such as disobey the divine Administration. Whoever shall esteem any thing good, except what depends on Choice, let him envy, let him covet, let him flatter, let him be full of Perturbation. Whoever esteems any thing else to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be wretched. — And yet, though thus severely punished, we cannot desist.

Remember what the Poet says, of a Stranger.

A worse than thou might enter here secure.

No rude Affront shall drive him from my Door.

For

(*f*) ποσειδ, in the Greek, seems to have crept in from the preceding ποσειδας. Therefore it is omitted in the Translation.

For Strangers come from Jove.

HOMER.

§. 2. This too you should be prepared to say, with regard to a Father: It is not lawful for me to affront you, Father; even if a worse than you should have come: for all are from paternal *Jove*. And so of a Brother; for all are from kindred *Jove*. And thus we shall find *Jove* to be the Inspector of all the other Relations.

CHAP. XII.

Of Ascetic Exercise.

§. 1. **W**E are not to carry our Exercises beyond Nature; nor merely to attract Admiration: for thus we, who call ourselves Philosophers, shall not differ from Jugglers. For it is difficult too, to walk upon a Rope; and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought we too, for that Reason, to make it our Study to walk upon a Rope, or set up a Palm-Tree (*a*); or grasp a Statue?

(*a*) A Tree remarkable for its being straight and high. I should imagine therefore, that to set up the Palm-Tree meant some Act of Dexterity, not unlike, perhaps, to that of our modern Balance-masters: and that the Artist not only set up, but ascended to its Top, and there exhibited himself in various Attitudes. What confirms me in this Notion is, that these Palm-Tree Artists are joined with the Rope-dancers; their Professions being alike formed on the Difficulty and

Statue (b)? By no means. It is not every thing difficult, or dangerous, that is a proper Exercise; but such Things as are conducive, to what lies before us to do.

And what is it, that lies before us to do?

To have our Desires and Aversions free from Restraint.

How is that?

Not to be disappointed of our Desire, nor incur our Aversion. To this ought our Exercise to be turned. For, without strong and constant Exercise, it is not possible to preserve our Desire undisappointed, and our Aversion unincurred; and therefore, if we suffer it to be externally employed on Things independent on Choice, be assured, that your Desire will neither gain its Object, nor your Aversion avoid it.

§. 2. And, because Habit hath a powerful Influence, and we are habituated to apply our Desire and Aversion to Externals only, we must oppose one Habit to another; and, where the Appearances

and Danger. In LUCIAN's *Treatise de Syria Dea*; we meet with these Men, under the Name of the *Θαυροκατόντες*; who, it seems, were frequent in *Arabia* and *Syria*; Countries where the Palm is known to flourish. See the new Edition of LUCIAN. Tom. III. p. 475. I am obliged for this Note to Mr. HARRIS.

(b) *Diogenes* used, in Winter, to grasp Statues, when they were covered with Snow, as an Exercise, to expure himself to Hardship. *DIOGENES LAËRTIUS*.

ces are most slippery, there oppose Exercise. I am inclinable to Pleasure. I will (c) bend myself beyond a due Proportion to the other Side, for the sake of Exercise. I am averse to Pain. I will break and exercise the Appearances [which strike my Mind], that I may withdraw my Aversion, from every such Object. For who is the Practitioner in Exercise? He who endeavours totally to restrain Desire, and to apply Aversion only to Things dependent on Choice; and endeavours it most in the most difficult Cases. Hence different Persons are to be exercised, in different Ways. What signifies it, to this Purpose, to set up a Palm-Tree, or carry about a Tent (d) of Skins, or a Pestle and Mortar (d)? If you are hasty, Man, let it be your Exercise, to bear ill Language patiently; and, when you are affronted, not to be angry.

(c) *AN ATYXNON* is variously read. Perhaps the right Word may be *AVATOIXNON* derived from *TOIXOS*; which signifies, among other Things the Side of a Ship, or Boat. It appears from *Julius Pollux*, and *Phrynicius*, in *Stephens's* Lexicon, and *Scot's* Appendix, that *AVATOIXEN* is a Word used by the Vulgar, to signify being sometimes on one Side of the Vessel, and sometimes on the other; which agrees very well here: *I will lean to the opposite Side, &c. i. e. to keep the Vessel even.* I am obliged for this Note to a Friend.

(d) These Particulars are not now understood; but show, in general, that the antient Philosophers had their absurd and ostentatious Austerities, and Mortifications, as well as the Monks, and *Indian* Philosophers since.

angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at such a Proficiency, as, when any one writes you, to say to yourself, "Let me suppose this, to be grasping "a Statue." Next, exercise yourself to make a decent Use of Wine: not to drink a great deal; for even in this, there are some so foolish as to ex-
~~ercise~~ ^{ercise} themselves: but at first to abstain from it; and to abstain from a Girl, and from Delicacies in Eating. Afterwards you will venture into the Lists, at some proper Season; by Way of Trial, if at all, to see whether Apparancers get the better of you, as much as they used to do. But at first, fly from what is stronger than you. The Contest of a fine Girl, with a young Man, just initiated into Philosophy, is unequal. The Brass Pot and the Earthen Pitcher, as the Fable says, are an unsuitable Match.

§. 3. Next to the Desires and Aversions, is the Second Class, of the Pursuits and Avoidances; that they may be obedient to Reason; that nothing may be done improperly in Point of Time or Place, or in any other Respect.

§. 4. The Third Class relates to Assent; and what is plausible and persuasive. As *Socrates* said, that we are not to lead an unexamined Life; ~~so~~ ^{neither} are we to admit an unexamined Appearance; but to say, "Stop: let me see what you are, "and whence you come." (As the Watch say, Show me the Ticket.) "Have you that Signal
 " from

the Nature, which is necessary to the Admittance of every Appearance? But, if we consider the Nature of the Things, which are applied to the Body, for those who exercise it; if they any way affect the Mind or Reason, they may be used in a different Manner. But, if this be done for mere Ostentation, it belongs to one who looks out and hunts for something external, and seeks for Spectators to attract, "What a great Man!" Horace Apollonius said well, "If you have a mind to exercise yourself, for your own Benefit, when you are not attending with intent, take a little cold Water in your Mouth, and spit it out again, and tell nobody." But, if this be done for mere

CHAP. XIII.

What Solitude is; and what a solitary Person.

§. 1. SOLITUDE is the State of a helpless Person. For not he who is alone, is therefore *solitary*, any more than one in a Crowd, the contrary. When therefore we lose a Son, or a Brother, or a Friend, on whom we have been used to repose, we often say, we are left *solitary*, even in the midst of Rome, where such a Crowd is continually meeting us; where we live among so many, and when we have, perhaps, a numerous Train of Servants: For he is understood to be

What II. D. *solitary*.

solitary, who is helpless and exposed to such as would injure him. Hence, in a Journey especially, we call ourselves solitary, when we fall among Thieves: for it is not the Sight of a *Man* that removes our Solitude, but of an *honest* Man; a Man of Honour, and a helpful Companion. If merely being alone is sufficient for Solitude, *Jupiter* may be said to be solitary at the Conflagration, and bewail himself, that he hath neither *Juno* nor *Pallas*, nor *Apollo*, nor Brother, nor Son, nor Descendant, nor Relation. This, some indeed say, he doth, when he is alone at the Conflagration (a). Such as these, moved by some natural Principle, some natural Desire of Society, and mutual Love, and by the Pleasure of Conversation, do not rightly consider the State of a Person who is alone. We ought, however, to be prepared in some manner for this also, to be self-sufficient, and able to bear our own Company. For as *Jupiter* converses with himself, acquiesces in himself, and contemplates his own Administration, and is employed in Thoughts worthy of himself; so should we too be able to talk with ourselves, and not to need the Conversation of others; nor be at a Loss [for Employment]: to attend to the divine Administration; to consider our Relation to other Beings: how we

(a) The Stoics held successive Conflagrations, at destined Periods; in which all Beings were reformed into the Deity.

we have formerly been affected by Events ; how we are affected now : what are the Things that still press upon us : how these too may be cured ; how removed : if any thing wants completing, to complete it, according to Reason. You see, that *Cæsar* hath procured us a profound Peace : there are neither Wars nor Battles, nor great Robberies nor Piracies ; but we may travel at all Hours, and sail from East to West. But can *Cæsar* procure us Peace from a Fever too ? From a Shipwreck ? From a Fire ? From an Earthquake ? From a Thunder Storm ? Nay, even from Love ? He cannot. From Grief ? From Envy ? Nor : not from any one of these. But the Doctrine of Philosophers promises to procure us Peace, from these too. And what doth it say ? “ If you will
 “ attend to me, O Mortals, where-ever you are,
 “ and whatever you are doing, you shall neither
 “ grieve, nor be angry, nor be compelled, nor
 “ restrained : but you shall live impassive, and
 “ free from all.” Shall not he who enjoys this Peace, proclaimed, not by *Cæsar* (for how should he have it to proclaim ?) but by God, through Reason, be contented, when he is alone reflecting, and considering ; “ To me there can now no Ill
 “ happen : there is no Thief, no Earthquake.
 “ All is full of Peace, all full of Tranquillity ;
 “ every Road ; every City, every Assembly. My
 “ Neighbour, my Companion, unable to hurt

“ me.” Another, whose ^{you said} Care it is, provides you with Food, with Clothes, with Senses, with Pre-conceptions. Whenever he doth not provide what is necessary, he sounds a Retreat: He opens the Door, and says to you; “ Come.” Whither? To nothing dreadful; but to that, whence you were made; to what is friendly and congenial, to the Elements (b). What in you was Fire, goes away to Fire; what was Earth, to Earth; what Air, to Air; what Water, to Water. There is no *Hades*, nor *Acheron*, nor *Cocytus*, nor *Pyriphlegethon*; but all is full of Gods and Demons. He who can have such Thoughts; and can look upon the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and enjoy the Earth and Sea, is no more solitary, than he is helpless. — Well: but suppose any one should come and murder me, when I am alone.—Fool; not you; but that insignificant *Body* of yours.

§. 2.

(b) What a melancholy Description of Death, and how gloomy the Ideas in this *consolatory* Chapter! All Beings reduced to mere Elements, in successive Conflagrations! A noble Contrast to the Stoic Notions upon this Subject, may be produced from several Passages in the Scripture. — *Then shall the Dust return to the Earth, as it was; and the Spirit shall return to God, who gave it.* Eccles. xii. 7. *For, if we believe that Jesus died, and rose again, even so them also, which sleep in Jesus, will God bring with him.* 1 Thess. iv. 14. See *John* vi. 39, 40. xi. 25, 26. 1 *Cor.* vi. 14. xv. 53. 2 *Cor.* v. 14, &c.

§ 2. What Solitude is there then left? What Destitution? Why do we make ourselves worse than Children? What do they do, when they are left alone? They take up Shells and Dust: they build Houses; then pull them down: then build something else: and thus never want Amusement. Suppose you were all to sail away; am I to sit, and cry, because I am left alone, and solitary? Am I so unprovided with Shells and Dust? But Children do this from Folly; and we are wretched from Wisdom.

§ 3. Every great Faculty is dangerous to a Beginner. (c). Study first how to live like a Person in Sickness; that in time you may know how to live like one in Health. Abstain from Food. Drink Water. Totally repress your Desire, for some time, that you may at length use it according to Reason; and, if according to Reason, [as you may,] when you [come to] have some Good in you, you will use it well. No: but we would live immediately as Men already wise, and be of Service to Mankind. — Of what Service? What are you doing? Why: have you been of Service to yourself? but you would exhort them. You exhort! Would you be of Service to them, show them

D 3

(c) The Greek, from *επισκευή* or *επισκευή*, is so corrupted and unintelligible, that it is totally rejected. Indeed, the Connexion of this Paragraph with what precedes, is by no means clear.

them, by your own Example, what kind of Men Philosophy makes; and be not impertinent. When you eat, be of Service to those who eat with you; when you drink, to those who drink with you. Be of Service to them, by giving way to all, yielding to them, bearing with them; and not by throwing out your own ill Humour upon them.

C H A P. XIV.

Miscellaneous.

§. 1. **A** S bad Performers cannot sing alone, but in a Chorus; so some Persons cannot walk alone. If you are any thing, walk alone: talk by yourself; and do not skulk in the Chorus. Think a little at last: look about you: sift yourself, that you may know what you are.

§. 2. If a Person drinks Water, or doth any thing else, for the sake of Exercise, upon every Occasion he tells all he meets; "I drink Water." Why: do you drink Water merely for the sake of drinking it? If it doth you any Good to drink it, drink it; if not, you act ridiculously. But, if it is for your Advantage, and you drink it, say nothing about it before those who are apt to take Offence. What then? These are the very People you wish to please.

§. 3.

§. 3. Of Actions, some are performed on their own Account; others occasioned by Circumstances: some proceed from Motives of Prudence: some from Complaisance to others; and some are done in pursuance of a Manner of Life, which we have taken up.

§. 4. Two Things must be rooted out of Men; Conceit and Diffidence. Conceit lies in thinking you want nothing: and Diffidence, in supposing it impossible, that, under such adverse Circumstances, you should ever succeed. Now, Conceit is removed by Confutation: and of this *Socrates* was the Author. And [in order to see] that the Undertaking is not impracticable, consider and enquire. The Enquiry itself will do you no Harm: and it is almost being a Philosopher, to enquire, How it is possible to make use of our Desire and Aversion; without Hindrance.

§. 5. I am better than you; for my Father hath been Consul. I have been a Tribune, says another, and not you. If we were Horses, would you say, My Father was swifter than yours? I have Abundance of Oats and Hay, and fine Trap-pings? What now, if, while you were saying this I should answer; "Be it so. Let us run a Race " then." Is there nothing in Man analogous to a Race in Horses, by which it may be known, which is better or worse? Is there not Honour, Fidelity, Justice? Show yourself the better in

these; that you may be the better, as a Man.
 But if you tell me, you can kick violently; I will
 tell you again, that you value yourself on the Pro-
 perty of an Ass.

CH A P. XV.

*That every Thing is to be undertaken with Circum-
 spection.*

§. 1. (a) **I**N every Affair consider what precedes
 and follows; and then undertake it.
 Otherwise you will begin with Spirit; but, not
 having thought of the Consequences, when some
 of them appear, you will shamefully desist. “I
 would conquer at the Olympic Games.” But
 consider what precedes and follows, and then, if
 it be for your Advantage, engage in the Affair.
 You must conform to Rules; submit to a Diet;
 restrain from Dainties; exercise your Body, whe-
 ther you chuse it or not, at a stated Hour, in
 Heat

(a) This XVth Chapter makes the XXIXth of the *Enchi-
 ridion*; but with some Varieties of Reading. Particularly,
 for *εἰ τοι ἀγῶνι παρρησιασθήναι* here, is *εἰς τοι ἀγῶνα παροχρησθῆναι*
 there.

This Chapter has a great Conformity to *Luke xiv. 28.*
 &c. But it is to be observed, that *Epictetus*, both here, and
 elsewhere, supposes some Persons incapable of being Philo-
 sophers; that is, virtuous and pious Men: but Christianity
 requires and enables all, to be such.

Heat and Cold; you must drink no cold Water; nor, sometimes even Wine (b). In a Word, you must give yourself up to your Master, as to a Physician. Then, in the Combat, you may be thrown into a Ditch, dislocate your Arm, turn your Ankle, swallow Abundance of Dust, be whipt (c); and, after all, lose the Victory. When you have reckoned up all this, if your Inclination still holds, set about the Combat. Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like Children, who sometimes play Wrestlers, sometimes Gladiators; sometimes blow a Trumpet, and sometimes act a Tragedy; when they happen to have seen and admired these Shows. Thus you too will be, at one Time, a Wrestler; at another, a Gladiator; now, a Philosopher; then, an Orator: but, with your whole Soul, nothing at all. Like an Ape, you mimic All you see; and one thing after another is sure to please you; but is out of Favour, as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon any thing considerately, nor after having viewed the whole Matter on all Sides, or made any Scrutiny into it; but rashly, and with a cold Inclination. Thus some, when they have seen a Philosopher, and heard a Man

D 5

speaking

(b) St Paul hath a similar Allusion to the public Games, 1 Cor. ix. 25. Both Writers have them frequently in view.

(c) Which was the Case, in any Violation of the Laws of the Games.

speaking like *Euphrates* (d), (though indeed, who can speak like him,) have a Mind to be Philosophers too. Consider first, Man, what the Matter is, and what your own Nature is able to bear. If you would be a Wrestler, consider your Shoulders, your Back, your Thighs : for different Persons are made for different Things. Do you think, that you can act as you do, and be a Philosopher ? That you can eat (e), and drink, and be angry, and discontented, as you are now ? You must watch ; you must labour ; you must get the better of certain Appetites : must quit your Acquaintance ; be despised by your Servant ; be laughed at by those you meet : come off worse than others, in every thing ; in Magistracies ; in Honours ; in Courts of Judicature. When you have considered all these Things round, approach, if you please : if, by parting with them, you have a Mind to purchase Apathy, Freedom, and Tranquillity. If not, do not come hither : do not, like Children, be one while a Philosopher, then a Publican, then an Orator, and then one of *Cæsar's* Officers. These Things are not consistent. You must be one Man, either good or bad. You must

(d) The Translation doth not follow the Pointing of Mr. Upton's Edition in this Place.

Euphrates was a Philosopher of *Syria*, whose Character is described, with the highest Encomiums, by *Pliny*. See L. B. Ep. x.

(e) *Ταῦτα* in this Place should be *τ'αὐτὰ*.

must cultivate either your own ruling Faculty, or
Externals; and apply yourself either to Things
within or without you; that is, be either a Phi-
losophy, or one of the Vulgar (f).

CHAP. XVI.

*That Caution is necessary in Condescension and Com-
plaisance.*

§. I. **H**E who frequently converses with others,
either in Discourse, or Entertainments,
or in any familiar Way of Living, must necessarily
either become like his Companions, or bring them
over to his own Way. For, if a dead Coal be ap-
plied to a live one, either the first will quench the
last, or the last kindle the first: Since then, the
Danger is so great, Caution must be used in enter-
ing into these Familiarities with the Vulgar; re-
membering, that it is impossible to touch a Chim-
ney-Sweeper, without being Partaker of his Soot.
For what will you do, if you are to talk of Gladia-
tors, of Horses, of Wrestlers, and what is worse,
of Men? "Such a one is good; another, bad:
"this was well, that ill done." Besides: what if
any one should sneer, or ridicule, or be ill-natured?

D 6

Is

(f) What is omitted at the End of this Chapter, is placed
at the End of the XVIIth; to which Lord Shaftesbury thinks
it belongs, or to one of the Miscellaneous Chapters; which
is the more probable Opinion,

Is any of you prepared, like a Harpist; who, when he takes his Harp, and tries the Strings, finds out which Notes are discordant, and knows how to put the Instrument in Tune? Hath any of you such a Faculty as *Socrates* had; who, in every Conversation, could bring his Companions to his own Purpose? Whence should you have it? You must therefore be carried along by the Vulgar. And why are they more powerful than you? Because they utter their corrupt Discourses, from Principle, and you your good ones, only from your Lips. Hence they are without Strength, or Life; and it would turn one's Stomach to hear your Exhortations, and poor miserable Virtue, celebrated up-hill and down. Thus it is, that the Vulgar get the better of you: for Principle is always strong, always invincible. Therefore, before these good Opinions are fixed in you, and you have acquired some Faculty for your Security, I advise you to be cautious, in your Familiarity with the Vulgar: otherwise, if you have any Impressions made on you in the Schools, they will melt away daily, like Wax before the Sun. Get away then, far from the Sun, while you have these waxen Opinions.

§. 2. It is for this Reason, that the Philosophers advise us to leave our Country; because inveterate Manners draw the Mind aside, and prevent the Beginning of a new Habit. We cannot bear those,

who meet us, to say, "Hey-day! such a one is
"a turned Philosopher; who was so and so."
Thus Physicians send Patients, with lingering
Distempers, to another Place, and another Air:
and they do right. Do you too import other
Manners, instead of those you carry out. Fix
your Opinions, and exercise yourself in them. No:
but from hence to the Theatre, to the Gladiators,
to the Walks, to the Circus; then hither again,
then back again; just the same Persons all the
while. No good Habit, no Attention, no Anti-
madversion, upon ourselves. No Observation
what Use we make of the Appearances presented
to our Minds; whether it be conformable, or con-
trary, to Nature; whether we answer them right,
or wrong; (a) whether we say to Things inde-
pendent on Choice, "You are nothing to
"me." If this be not (b) yet your Case, fly from
your former Habit: fly from the Vulgar; if you
would ever begin to be any thing.

CHAPTER

(a) The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture,
Dr. E. A. Upton, U.C.

(b) ~~Manus.~~ Mr. Upton's Manuscript.

C H A P. XVII.

Of Providence.

§. I. **W**HENEVER you lay any thing to the Charge of Providence, do but reflect; and you will find, that it hath happened agreeably to Reason.

Well: but a dishonest Man hath the Advantage.

In what?

In Money.

Why: he is better [qualified] for it (c) than you: because he flatters, he throws away Shame; he keeps awake: and where is the Wonder? But look whether he hath the Advantage of you in Fidelity, or in Honour. You will find he hath not: but, that where-ever it is best for you to have the Advantage of him, there you have it. I once said to one who was full of Indignation, at the good Fortune of *Philostorgus*, “ Why: would you be
“ willing

(c) “ *But sometimes Virtue starves, while Vice is fed.*”

What then? Is the Reward of Virtue, Bread?

That, Vice may merit; 'tis the Price of Toil:

The Knave deserves it, when he tills the Soil;

The Knave deserves it, when he tempts the Maid.

Essay on Man, L. IV.

“willing to sleep with *Sura* (d) ? Heaven forbid, said he, that Day should ever come ! — Why then are you angry, that he is paid for what he sells : or how can you call him happy, in Possessions acquired by Means, which you detest ? Or what Harm doth Providence do, in giving the best Things to the best Men ? Is it not better to have a Sense of Honour, than to be rich ? — Granted. — Why then are you angry, Man, if you have what is best ? Always remember then, and have it ready, That a better Man hath the Advantage of a worse, in that Instance, in which he is better ; and you will never have any Indignation.

But my Wife treats me ill.

Well ; if you are asked, what is the Matter : answer ; “ My Wife treats me ill.”

Nothing more ?

Nothing.

My Father gives me nothing. — What is the Matter ? — My Father gives me nothing. To denominate this an Evil, some external and false Addition must be made. We are not therefore to get rid of Poverty ; but of our Principle concerning it ; and we shall do well.

When

(d) This Person is not known. One of his Name is mentioned in the *Acts of Ignatius*, as being Consul at the Time, when he suffered Martyrdom.

When *Galba* was killed, *Commodus* said to *Rufus*, "Now, indeed, the World is governed by Providence." I never thought, answered *Rufus*, of bringing the slightest Proof, that the World was governed by Providence, from *Galba*.

C H A P. XVIII.

That we ought not to be alarmed, by any News that is brought us.

§. 1. **W**HEN any alarming News is brought you, always have it at Hand, that no News can be brought you, concerning what is in your own Choice. Can any one bring you News, that your Opinions or Desires are ill conducted? By no means; but that somebody is dead: What is that to you then? That somebody speaks ill of you. And what is that to you then? That your Father is forming some Contrivance, on either. Against what? Against your Choice? How can he? Well: but against your Body; against your Estate? You are very safe: this is not against you. — But the Judge [perhaps] hath pronounced you guilty of Impiety. And did not the Judges pronounce the same of *Socrates*? Is his pronouncing a Sentence, any Business of yours? No. Then why do you, any longer, trouble yourself about it? There is a Duty incumbent on your Father; which unless

unless he performs, he loses the Character of a Father, of natural Affection, of Tenderness. Do not want him to lose any thing else, by this: for no Person is ever guilty in one Instance, and a Sufferer in another. Your Duty, on the other Hand, is to make your Defence, with Constancy, Modesty, and Mildness: otherwise you lose the Character of filial Piety; of Modesty, and Generosity of Mind. Well: and is your Judge free from Danger? No. He runs an equal Hazard. Why then, are you still afraid of his Decision? What have you to do with the Evil of another? Making a bad Defence would be your own Evil. Let it be your only Care to avoid that: but whether Sentence is passed on you, or not, as it is the Business, so it is the Evil, of another. "Such a one threatens you." — *Me?* No. — "He censures you." — Let him look to it, how he doth his own Business. — "He will give an unjust Sentence against you. — Poor Wretch!"

C H A P. XIX.

What is the Condition of the Vulgar; and what of a Philosopher.

§. I. **T**HE first Difference between one of the Vulgar, and a Philosopher, is this: the one says, I am undone, on the Account of my Child,

Child, my Brother, my Father: but the other, if ever he be obliged to say, I am undone! reflects, and adds, on Account of myself. For Choice cannot be restrained, or hurt, by any thing to which Choice doth not extend; but only by itself. If therefore we always would incline this Way, and, whenever we are unsuccessful, would lay the Fault on ourselves, and remember, that there is no Cause of Perturbation and Inconstancy, but Principle, I engage we should make some Proficiency. But we set out in a very different Way, from the very Beginning. In Infancy, for Example, if we happen to stumble, our Nurse doth not chide us, but beats the Stone. Why: what Harm hath the Stone done? Was it to move out of its Place, for the Folly of your Child? Again: if we do not find something to eat, when we come out of the Bath, our Governor doth not try to moderate our Appetite, but beats the Cook. Why: did we appoint you Governor of the Cook, Man? No: but of our Child. It is he whom you are to correct and improve. By these Means, even when we are grown up, we appear Children. For an unmusical Person is a Child in Music; an illiterate Person, a Child in Learning; and an untaught one, a Child in Life.

C H A P.

CHAP. XX.

That same Advantage may be gained, from every external Circumstance.

§. I. **I**N Appearances that are merely Objects of Contemplation, almost all Persons have allowed Good and Evil to be in ourselves, and not in Externals. No one says, it is good, to be Day ; evil, to be Night ; and the greatest Evil, that Three should be Four : but what ? That Knowledge is good, and Error evil. So that, concerning Falshood itself, there exists one (a) good Thing ; the Knowledge, that it is Falshood. Thus then, should it be, in Life also. Health is a Good ; Sicknes, an Evil. No, Sir. But what ? A right Use of Health is a Good ; a wrong one, an Evil. So that, in truth, it is possible to be a Gainer, even by Sicknes. And is it not possible, by Death too ? By Mutilation ? Do you think (b) *Menæceus* an inconsiderable Gainer by Death ? — “ May whoever talk thus, be such a Gainer “ as he was ! ” — Why : pray, Sir, did not he
pre-

(a) The Passage, as it now stands in the *Greek*, is scarcely intelligible. The Difficulty is removed, by reading *αγαθόν* for *αγατν*, and the Translation follows this Conjecture.

(b) The Son of *Creon*, who killed himself, after he had been informed, by an Oracle, that his Death would procure a Victory to the *Thebans*. APOLLODORUS. UPTON.

preserve his Patriotism, his Magnanimity, his Fidelity, his gallant Spirit? And, if he had lived on, would he not have lost all these? Would not Cowardice, Mean-spiritedness, and Hatred of his Country, and a wretched Love of Life, have been his Portion? Well, now; do not you think him a considerable Gainer, by dying? No: but I warrant you, (c) the Father of *Admetus* was a great Gainer, by living on, in so mean-spirited and wretched a Way, as he did! Why: did not he die at last? For Heaven's sake, cease to be thus struck, by the mere Materials, [of Action.] Cease to make yourselves Slaves; first of Things, and then, upon their Account; of the Men who have the Power, either to bestow, or take them away. Is there any Advantage then to be gained from these Men? From all; even from a Reviler. What Advantage doth a Wrestler gain from him, with whom he exercises himself, before the Combat: the greatest. Why: just in the same manner I exercise myself with this Man. (d) He exercises me in Patience, in Gentleness, in Meekness. No: but, I suppose, I gain an Advantage from him who manages my Neck, and sets my Back and Shoulders in order; and the best Thing a Master of Exercise can say, is, "Lift him up with both Hands," and the heavier he is, the greater is my

(c) See P. 242. Vol. I. Note a.

(d) *ὄντος* for *ὄντος*. WOLFIIUS.

my Advantage : and yet, it is no Advantage to me, when I am exercised in Gentleness, of Temper ! This is not knowing, how to gain an Advantage from Men. Is my Neighbour a bad one ? He is so, to himself ; but a good one, to me. He exercises my good Temper, my Moderation. Is my Father bad ? To himself ; but not to me. “ This is the Rod of *Hermes*. Touch with it “ whatever you please, and it will become Gold.” No : but bring whatever you please, and I will turn it into Good. Bring Sickness, Death, Want, Reproach, capital Trial. All these by the Rod of *Hermes*, shall turn to Advantage. — “ What will “ you make of Death ? ” — Why : what but an Ornament to you ? what but a Means of your showing, by (e) Action, what the Man is, who knows, and follows the Will of Nature. “ What will you “ make of Sickness ? ” — I will show its Nature. I will make a good Figure in it ; I will be composed and happy. I will not flatter my Physician. I will not wish to die. What need you ask further ? Whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, respectable, and eligible. No. — “ But, take care not to be sick.” Just as, if one should say, “ Take care, that the Appearance “ of Three being Four, doth not present itself to “ you.” “ It is an Evil.” How an Evil, Man ?

If.

(e) For *διὰ τῆς αἰτίας*, *διὰ τῆς αἰτίας* seems the true Reading.

If I think as I ought about it, what Hurt will it any longer do me? Will it not rather be even an Advantage to me? If then I think as I ought, of Poverty, of Sickness, of being out of Power, is not that enough for me? Why then must I seek any longer Good or Evil, in Externals? But what is the State of the Case? These Things are allowed here; but nobody carries them home; but immediately every one is in a State of War with his Servant, his Neighbour, with those who sneer and ridicule him. Well fare (f) *Leibius*, for proving every Day, that I know nothing.

C H A P. XXI.

Concerning those who readily set up for Sophists.

§. 1. (a) **T**HEY who have received bare Propositions, are presently inclined to throw them up, as a sick Stomach doth its Food. First concoct it, and then you will not throw it up; otherwise it will be crude and impure, and unfit.

(f) Mr. *Upton* conjectures this *Leibius* to have been some Buffoon.

(a) The Translation follows the Conjecture of *Wolfius*, *αυθαγορεύ.*

There are other Difficulties in the Text, as it now stands, *ἐξέμενος*, perhaps, should be *ἐξέμεσις*; or, probably, there should be no *μὴ* before *ἐξέμενος*: and then the Meaning of
Epiſtetus

unfit for Nourishment. But show us, from what you have digested, some Change in your ruling Faculty; as Wrestlers do in their Shoulders, from their Exercise, and their Diet: as Artificers, in their Skill, from what they have learnt. A Carpenter doth not come and say, "Hear me discourse on the Art of Building:" but he hires a House, and fits it up; and shows himself Master of his Trade: Let it be your Business likewise to do something like this: eat like a Man; drink, dress, marry, have Children, perform the Duty of a Citizen; bear Reproach; bear with an unreasonable Brother; bear with a Father; bear with a Son, a Neighbour, a Companion; as becomes a Man. Show us these Things, that we may see that you have really learnt somewhat, from the Philosophers. No: "But come and hear me repeat Commentaries." Get you gone; and seek somebody else, to throw them out upon. "Nay, but I will explain the Doctrines of *Chrysippus* to you, so as no other Person can: I will elucidate his Diction, in the clearest Manner." And is it for this then, that young Men leave their Country, and their own Parents, that they may

Epictetus will be, That the Persons of whom he is speaking, ought first to concoct Propositions for their own Use, and then throw them up (*i. e.* utter them in Discourse), for the Use of others. But the Figure he makes use of is so dirty, that it is not to be enlarged upon, though taken from the Practice of the Greek and Roman Physicians.

may come and hear you explain Words? Ought they not to interpret; strive, free from Passion, free from Perturbation, furnished with such a Provision for Shift, that, seeing but with it, they will be able to deal all Evils well; and deliver Ornaments from them? But how should you impart what you have learnt? For have you yourself done any thing else, from the Beginning, but spent your Time in solving Syllogisms, and convertible Propositions, and interrogatory Arguments. — “But such a one hath a School, and why should not I have one?” — Wretch, these Things are not effected, in a careless and fortuitous Manner. But there must be Age, and a Method of Life, and a guiding God. Is it not so? No one quits the Port, or sets Sail, till he hath sacrificed to the Gods, and implored their Assistance: nor do Men sow, without first invoking Ceres. And shall any one who hath undertaken so great a Work, undertake it safely, without the Gods? And shall they, who apply to such a one, apply to him with Success? What are you doing else, Man, but divulging the Mysteries? And you say, “There is a Temple at Eleusis; and here is one too. There is a (b) Priest; and I will make a Priest.”

(b) The Priest who presided over the *Eleusian* Mysteries was called *Hierophantes*; i. e. a Revealer of sacred Things. He was obliged to devote himself to divine Service, and lead a chaste

"*Priest here; there is a Herald; and I will ap-
 "point a Herald, too; there is a Torch-bearer;
 "and I will have a Torch-bearer, too; there are
 "Torches; and so shall there be more. The
 "Words said, the Things done, as the Gate.
 "Where is the Difference betwixt one and the
 "other?" Most impious Man! is there no Dif-
 ference? Are these Things of Use out of Place,
 and out of Time? A Man should come with Sa-
 crifices and Prayers, previously purified, and his
 Mind affected with a Sense, that he is approach-
 ing to sacred and ancient Rites. Thus the Myf-
 teries become useful: thus we come to have an
 Idea, that all these Things were appointed by the
 Antients, for the Instruction and Correction of
 Life. But you divulge and publish them, with-
 out Regard to Time and Place; without Sacri-
 fices, without Purity: you have not the Garment
 that is necessary for a Priest, nor the Hair, or the
 Girdle (c), that is necessary; nor the Voice, nor
 the Age: nor have you purified yourself, like him.
 But, when you have got the Words by Heart,
 you say, "The Words are sacred of themselves."*

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chaste and single Life. He was attended by three Officers;
 a Torch-bearer, a Herald, and One who assisted at the Al-
 tar. For a fuller Account of the *Eleusinian* Mysteries, see
 POTTER's *Grecian Antiquities*, Vol. I. c. 20.

(c) The Girdle is mentioned among the holy Garments
 of the Levitical Priests. *Exod. xxviii. 4, 39, 40, &c.*

These Things are to be approached, in another Manner. It is a great, it is a mystical Affair; not given by Chance, or to every one indifferently. Nay, more Wisdom, perhaps, is not a sufficient Qualification for the Care of Youth. There ought to be likewise a certain Readiness and Aptitude for this, and indeed a particular Constitution of Body; and, above all, a Counsel from God to undertake this Office, as he counselled *Socrates* to undertake the Office of Confutation; *Diogenes*, that of authoritative Reproof; *Zeno*, that of dogmatical Instruction. But you set up for a Physician, provided with nothing but Medicines, and without knowing, or having studied, where, or how, they are to be applied. "Why: such a *Joseph* had Medicines for the Eyes; and I have the same." Have you then, a Faculty too of making use of them? Do you, at all, know when, and how, and to whom, they will be of Service? Why then do you act at Hazard? Why are you careless, in Things of the greatest Importance? Why do you attempt a Matter unsuitable to you? Leave it to those who can perform it, and do it Honour. Do not you too bring a Scandal upon Philosophy, by your Means; nor be one of those, who cause the Thing itself to be calumniated. But, if Theophrastus delight you, sit quiet, and turn them every Way by yourself; but never call yourself a Philosopher; nor suffer another to call you so; but say

say, ^{that} He is mistaken: for my Desires are not
 "different from what they were; nor my Pur-
 "suits directed to other Objects; nor my Assent
 "otherwise given; nor have I at all made any
 "Change in the Use of the Appearances, from my
 "former Condition." Think and speak thus of
 yourself, if you would think as you ought: if not,
 act at all Hazards; and do as you do; for it be-
 comes you.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Cynic Philosophy (a).

§. 1. **W**HEN one of his Scholars, who seem-
 ed inclined to the Cynic Philosophy,
 asked him, what a Cynic must be, and what was
 the general Plan of that Sect? Let us examine
 it, says he, at our Leisure. But thus much I can
 tell

(a) The Cynics owed their Original to *Antisthenes*, a
 Disciple of *Socrates*. They held Virtue to be the highest
 Good, and the End of Life; and treated Riches, Honours,
 and Power, with great Contempt. They were Enemies to
 Science, and polite Literature; and applied themselves whol-
 ly to the Study of Morality. There was, in many Respects,
 great Conformity between them and the Stoics: but the
 Stoics selected what seemed laudable, in their Principles,
 without imitating the Roughness of their Address, and the
 detestable Indecency of their external Behaviour. The
 Stoics were indeed a reformed Branch of the Cynics, and

tell you how, that he who (b) attempts to great an Affair without God, is an Object of divine Wrath, and would only bring public Dishonour upon himself. For, in a well regulated House, no one comes, and says to himself, "I ought to be the Manager here." If he doth, and the Master (c) returns, and sees him insolently giving Orders, he drags him out, and hath him whipt. Such is the Case likewise in this great City [of the World.] For here too is a Master of the Family, who orders every thing. "You are the Sun: you can, by making a Circuit, form the Year, and the Seasons, and increase and nourish the Fruits; raise and calm the Winds, and give a moderate Warmth to the Bodies of Men. Go! make your Circuit; and thus in-

timately silence, perhaps, spoke of them somewhat more favourably, than they might otherwise have done. The Cynics are said to have derived their Name from *Cynosarges*, a *Gymnasium*, without the Walls of *Athens*, where *Antisthenes* taught; and which was so called from the Accident of a white Dog, stealing Part of a Victim, which *Dionus* was sacrificing to *Hercules*: and their barking at every body, and their Want of Shame, helped to confirm the Appellation. In this *Cynosarges* was a celebrated Temple of *Hercules*; which, very possibly, gave the Cynics the original Hint of comparing themselves to that Hero; which they so much affected.

(b) And no Man taketh this Honour unto himself, but he that is called of God. — *Heb. v. 4.*

(c) This hath a remarkable Likeness to *Matth. xxiv. 50, 51.* especially in the Originals.

It instantly moves every thing, from the greatest
 to the least. (C) You are a Calf, when the Lion
 approaches, do you? (d) Faint, or you will suffer for
 Strength. You are a Bull: come and fight, for that
 is incumbent on you, and becomes you, and you
 can do it. You can lead an Army to Troy, if
 you will. You can engage in single
 Combat with Hector, be you Achilles." But,
 if Thersites had come and claimed the Command,
 either he would not have obtained it, or, if he
 had, he would have disgraced himself, before the
 more Witnesses.

Do you too, carefully deliberate upon this
 Matter: it is not what you think it. "I wear
 an old Cloak now, and I shall have one then.
 I sleep upon the hard Ground now; and I shall
 sleep so then. I will moreover, take a Wallet
 and a Staff, and go about, and will beg of those
 I meet, and begin by (c) abusing them; and,
 if I see any one using Means to take off the
 Hair from his Face, or Body; or setting his
 Curls, or walking in Purple, I will rebuke
 him." If you imagine this to be the Thing,
 avaunt; come not near it: it doth not belong to
 you. But, if you imagine it to be what it really
 is, and do not think yourself unworthy of it,
 consider how great a thing you undertake. First,

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with

(d) It is a small away, and I will have it done.

(c) For λοιδορειν read λοιδοροειν. Upton.

with regard to yourself: you must no longer, in any Instance, appear like what you do now. You must accuse neither God nor Man. You must totally suppress Desire; and must transfer Aversion to such Things only as are dependent on Choice. You must have neither Anger, nor Resentment, nor Envy, nor Pity. Neither Boy, nor Girl, nor Fame, nor Delicacies in Eating, must have Charms for you. For you must know, that other Men indeed fence themselves with Walls, and Houses, and Darkness, when they do any thing of this kind, and have many Concealments: a Man shuts the Door, places somebody before the Apartment; "Say, He is gone out; "say, He is not at Leisure." But the Cynic, instead of all this, must fence himself with virtuous Shame; otherwise *He* will act indecently, naked, and in the open Air. This is *his* House; this, *his* Door; this, *his* Porter; this, *his* Darkness. He must not wish to conceal any thing relating to himself: for, if he doth, he is gone; he hath lost the Cynic; the open, the free Character: he hath begun to fear something external: he hath begun to need a Concealment; nor can he get it when he will. For where shall he conceal himself, or how? For if this Tutor, this Pedagogue of the Public, should happen to slip, what must *he* suffer? Can he then, who dreads these Things, be thoroughly bold within, and prescribe

prescribe to other Men? Impracticable, impossible,

§. 3. In the first place then, you must purify your own ruling Faculty, conformably (*f*) to this Method of Life. Now the Subject-matter for me to work upon, is my own Mind; as Wood is for a Carpenter, or Leather for a Shoemaker: and my Business is, a right Use of the Appearances of Things. But Body is nothing to me; its Parts nothing to me. Let Death come when it will; either of the Whole, or of Part. "Go into Exile." And whither? Can any one turn me out of the World? He cannot. But where-ever I go, there is the Sun, the Moon, the Stars, Dreams, Auguries, Communication with God. And even this Preparation is, by no means, sufficient for a true Cynic. But it must farther be known, that he is a Messenger sent from Jupiter to Men, concerning Good and Evil; to show them, that they are mistaken, and seek the Essence of Good and Evil where it is not; but do not observe it where it is: that He is a Spy, like *Diogenes*, when he was brought to *Philip*, after the Battle of *Chæroneæ* (*g*). For, in effect, a Cynic is a Spy, to discover what Things are friendly, what hostile, to Man: and he must, after mak-

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(*f*) The Sense seems to require, that *κατὰ* should be *κατά*; and it is so translated.

(*g*) See Vol. I. P. 95. Note (*c*).

ing and succumb to the temptation, come and tell them the truth; might be struck with Terror; as to point out to these Enormities, where there are none; nor, in any other Instance, all concerted in a foundation by Appearances.

§ 4. He trusts, then, if it should so happen, be able to lift up his Voice, come upon the Stage, and say, like *Secutus*, "O Mortals, whether are you hurrying? What are you about? Why do you tumble up and down, Wretches, like blind Men? You are going a wrong Way, and have forsaken the right. You seek Prosperity, and (b) Happiness in a wrong Place, where it is not; nor do you give Credit to another; who shows you where it is. Why do you seek it without? It is not in Body: if you do not believe me, look upon (i) *Myra*; look upon *Ofellus*. It is not in Wealth: if you do not believe me, look upon *Crasus*; look upon the Rich of the present Age, how full of Lamentation, their life is. It is not in Power: for, otherwise, they who have been twice and thrice Consuls, might be happy: but they are not. To whom, then, we give Credit in this Affair? To you, who look only upon the External of their Constitution, and are dazzled by Appearances, or by themselves."

(b) The Translation follows Lord Shaftesbury's Conjecture.

(i) Unknown Persons, probably of great bodily Strength.

"themselves? What do they say? How them,
 "when they groan, when they sigh, when they
 "think themselves more wretched; and in more
 "Danger, from these very Confusions, this
 "Glory, and Splendor. It is not in Empire
 "otherwise *Nero* and *Sardanapalus* had been hap-
 "py. But not even *Agamemnon* was happy,
 "though a better Man than *Sardanapalus*, or
 "*Nero*. But, when others are snoring, what is
 "He doing?"

He rends his Hairs —

And what doth he say himself?

*Scarcely can my Knees these trembling Limbs sustain;
 And scarce my Heart support its Load of Pain.*

POPE.

Why: which of your Affairs goes ill, poor
 Wretch? Your Possessions? No. Your Body?
 No. But you have Gold and Brags in Abundance.
 What then goes ill? That Part of you, whatever
 it be called, is neglected and corrupted; by which
 we desire, and are averse; by which we pursue,
 and avoid. — How neglected? — It is ignorant
 of that for which it was naturally formed, of the
 Essence of Good, and of the Essence of Evil. It
 is ignorant what is its own, and what another's.
 And, when any thing belonging to others goes
 ill it says, "I am undone; the Great are in dan-
 "ger!" (Poor ruling Faculty! which alone is ne-
 glected,

neglected, and hath no Care taken of it.) "They will die by the Sword of the *Trojans*." — And, if the *Trojans* should not kill them, will they not die? — "Yes; but not all at once." — Why : where is the Difference? For, if it be an Evil to die, whether it be all at once, or singly, it is equally an Evil. Will any thing more happen, than the Separation of Soul and Body (k)? — "Nothing." — And, when the *Greeks* perish, is the Door shut against you? Is it not in your Power, to die? — "It is." — Why then do you lament, while you are a King, and hold the Sceptre of *Jove*? A King is no more to be made unfortunate than a God. What are you then? You are a Shepherd (l), truly so called: for you weep,

(k) Were Conquerors deeply to consider, how much more happens than the mere Separation of Soul and Body, they would not, for Increase of Dominion, or a Point of false Honour, push Thousands at once into an unknown Eternity.

(l) We find this Phrase often used by the inspired Writers, to describe the Office and Duty of a King, or Ruler. And the most tender and affectionate Compassion is implied in it, *Isaiah* xl. 11. where it is said of the KING of Kings, *He shall feed his Flock, like a Shepherd: He shall gather the Lambs with his Arm, and carry them in his Bosom; and shall gently lead those that are with young.* He accordingly applies this distinguishing Character to himself, in several Places of the New Testament; especially *John* x. 11, 14, 15, 16.

Hamor speaks of *Agathemmon* by this Name (which we see was not unusual in the East) to express his Authority and Care: but *Epictetus* applies it as a Term of Reproach, to im-

ply

weep, just as Shepherds do, when the Wolf seizes any of their Sheep: and they who are governed by you are mere Sheep. But why do you come hither? Was your Desire in any Danger? Your Aversion? Your Pursuits? Your Avoidances? "No," says he: "but my Brother's Wife hath been stolen." — Is it not great good Luck then, to be rid of a sorry adulterous Wife? — "But must we be held in Contempt by the Trojans?" — What are they? Wise Men, or Fools? If wise, why do you go to war with them? If Fools, why do you mind them?

§. 5. Where then doth our Good lie, since it doth not lie in these Things? Tell us, Sir; you who are our Messenger and Spy.—Where you do not think, nor are willing to seek it. For, if you were willing, you would find it in yourselves: nor would you wander abroad, nor seek what belongs to others, as your own. Turn your Thoughts into yourselves. Consider the Pre-conceptions which you have. What do you imagine Good to be?—What is prosperous, happy, unhindered.—Well: and do you not naturally imagine it great? Do

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not
ply Ignorance, and Meanness of Spirit. One cannot help observing, on what is here said of *Agamemnon*, the Selfishness of the Stoic Doctrine; which, as it all along forbids Pity and Compassion, will have even a King to look upon the Welfare of his People; and a General on the Preservation of his Soldiers, as Matters quite foreign and indifferent to him.

not you imagine it valuable? Do not you imagine it incapable of being hurt? In what Materials then must you seek Prosperity, and Exemption from Hindrance? In that which is inflav'd, or free?—In the Free?—Is your Body then inflav'd, or free?—We do not know.—Do not you know, that it is the Slave of Fever, Gout, Deffluxion, Dysentery: of a Tyland; of Fire, Steel; of every thing stronger than itself?—Yes, it is a Slave.—How then can any thing belonging to the Body be unhindered? And how can that be great, or valuable, which is, by Nature, lifeless, Earth, Clay? What then, have you nothing free?—Possibly nothing:—Why: who can compel you to assent to what appears false?—No one.—Or who, not to assent to what appears true?—No one.—Here then you see, that there is something in you, by Nature, free. But who of you can desire or be averse, or use his active Powers of Pursuit or Avoidance, or concert, or purpose, unless he hath been impress'd by an Appearance of its being for his Advantage, or his Duty?—No one.—You have then, in these too, something unrestrained and free. Cultivate this, Wretches; take care of this; seek for Good here.—But how is it possible, that a Man, worth nothing, naked, without House or Home, squalid, unattended, who belongs to no Country, can lead a prosperous Life?—See: God hath sent us One,

One, to show, in fact, that it is possible to be
 as *Take Notice of me, that I am without a Coun-*
try, without a House, without an Estate, with-
out a Servant: I lie on the Ground with
no Children, no Coat (h); but only Earth,
and Heaven, and one sorry Cloke. And what
 do I want? Am not I without a Servant; without
 a Fear? Am not I free? Did any of you ever see
 me disappointed of my Desire, or incurring my
 Aversion? Did I ever blame God or Man?
 Did I ever excuse any one? Hath any of you
 seen me look discontented? How do I treat
 those whom you fear, and of whom you are
 struck with Awe? Is it not like a sorry Slave?
 Who that sees me, doth not think, that he sees

(m) It is observable, that *Epictetus* seems to think it a necessary Qualification in a Teacher, sent from God, for the Instruction of Mankind, to be destitute of all external Advantages, and a suffering Character. Thus doth this excellent Man, who, had carried human Reason to so great a Height, bear Testimony to the Propriety of that Method which the Divine Wisdom hath thought fit to follow, in the Scheme of the Gospel; whose Great Author had not where to lay his Head: and which some, in later Ages, have inconsiderately urged as an Argument against the Christian Religion. The infinite Disparity between the Proposal of the Example of *Dicægenes*, in *Epictetus*, and of our Redeemer, in the New Testament, is too obvious to need any Enlargement.

(h) The Translation follows *M. Ulpian's* Conjecture, of *apokalyptus*, instead of *mequtroptidus*.

"his own King and Master?" This is the Language, this the Character, this the Undertaking, of a Cynic. No: I warrant you; but the Wallet, and the Staff, and the great Jaws: swallowing, or treasuring up, whatever is given you: abusing unreasonably those you meet; or showing a brawny Arm. Do you consider, how you shall attempt so important an Affair? First take a Mirror: View your Shoulders, examine your Back; your Thighs. You are going to be enrolled a Combatant at the Olympic Games, Man; not in a poor slight Contest. In the Olympic Games, a Champion is not allowed merely to be conquered, and depart: but must first be disgraced, in the View of the whole World; not only of the *Athenians*, or *Spartans*, or *Nicopolitans*: and then he, who hath rashly departed, must be whipt too; and, before that, must suffer Thirst, and Heat; and swallow an Abundance of Dust.

§. 6. Consider carefully; know yourself; consult the Divinity: attempt nothing without God: for, if he counsels you, be assured, that it is his Will, that you should be a great Man; or, [which comes to the same thing,] suffer many a Blow. For there is this very fine Circumstance connected with the Character of a Cynic, that he must be beat like an Ass: and, when he is beat, must love those who beat him; as the Father, as the Brother

Brother of All (α). Now to be sure; but, if any body beats you, stand publicly and roar out, “O, *Cæsar*, am I to suffer such Things, in breach of your Peace? Let us go before the Proconsul.”—But what is *Cæsar* to a Cynic, or what is the Proconsul, or any one else, but *Jupiter*? Who hath deputed him, and Whom he serves. Doth he invoke any other, but Him? And is he not persuaded, that whatever he suffers of this Sort, it is *Jupiter*; who doth it to exercise him? Now *Hercules*, when he was exercised by *Eury- stheus*, did not think himself miserable; but executed, with Alacrity, all that was to be done. And shall he who is appointed to the Combat, and exercised by *Jupiter*, cry out, and take Offence at Things? A worthy Person, truly, to bear the Scepter of *Diogenes*! Hear what *He*, in a Fever, said to those who were passing by (p). “Sorry
“ Wretches,

(o) Compare this with the Christian Precepts, of Forbearance, and Love to Enemies, *Matth. v. 39—44*. The Reader will observe, that Christ specifies higher Injuries and Provocations than *Epietetus* doth; and requires of all his Followers, what *Epietetus* describes only as the Duty of one or two extraordinary Persons, as such.

(p) St. *Jerom*, cited by Mr. *Upton*, gives the following, somewhat different, Account of this Matter. *Diogenes*, as he was going to the Olympic Games, was taken with a Fever, and laid himself down in the Road; his Friends would have put him into some Vehicle; but he refused it, and bid them

“ Wretches, why do not you stay? Do you take
 “ such a Journey to *Olympia*, to see the Destruction
 “ tion, or Combat, of the Champions; and have
 “ you no Inclination to see the Combat between
 “ a Man and a Fever?” Such a one, who took
 a Pride in difficult Circumstances, and thought
 himself worthy to be a Spectacle to those who
 passed by, was a likely Person, indeed, to accuse
 God, who hath deputed him, as treating him un-
 worthily! For what Subject of Accusation shall
 he find? That he preserves a Decency of Beha-
 viour? With what doth he find fault? That he
 sets his own Virtue in a clearer Light? — Well
 and what doth he say of Poverty? Of Death? Of
 Pain? How did he compare his Happiness with
 that of the *Persian* King; or rather thought it be-
 yond Comparison. For, amidst Perturbations, and
 Grievs, and Fears, and disappointed Desires, and
 incutred Aversions, how can there be any En-
 trance for Happiness? And, where there are cor-
 rupt Principles, there must all these Things ne-
 cessarily be.

§. 7. The same young Man enquiring, Whe-
 ther, if a Friend should be willing to come to
 him, and take care of him when he was sick, he
 should

go on to the Show. “ This Night,” said he, “ I will ei-
 “ ther conquer, or be conquered. If I conquer the Fever,
 “ I will come to the Games; if it conquers me, I will de-
 “ scend to Hades.”

should comply? And where, says *Epictetus*, will you find me the Friend of a Cynic? For to be worthy of being numbered among his Friends, a Person ought to be such another as himself: he ought to be a Partner of the Scepter and the Kingdom, and a worthy Minister, if he would be honoured with his Friendship; as *Diogenes* was the Friend of *Antisthenes*; as *Crates*, of *Diogenes*. Do you think, that he who only comes to him, and salutes him, is his Friend, and that he will think him worthy of being entertained as such? If such a Thought comes into your Head, rather look round you, for some clever Dunghill, to shelter you in your Fever, from the North Wind, that you may not perish by taking Cold. But you seem to me, to want [only] to get into somebody's House, and to be well fed there a while. What Business have you then, even to attempt so important an Affair as this?

§. 8. But (said the young Man) will a Cynic engage himself in Marriage, and the Production of Children, as a principal Point (q)?

If you will allow me a Republic of Sages, no one there, perhaps, will readily apply himself to the Cynic Philosophy. For on whose Account should he embrace that Method of Life? However, suppose he doth, there will be nothing to restrain

(q) The Stoics directed this; and the Epicureans forbade it.

restrain him from marrying, and having Children. For his Wife will be such another as himself; his Father-in-Law such another as himself; and his Children will be brought up in the same manner. But as the State of Things now is, like that of an Army prepared for Battle, is it not necessary that a Cynic should be without (r) Distraction; intirely attentive to the Service of God: at Liberty to walk among Mankind: not tied down to vulgar Duties, nor entangled in Relations; which, if he transgresses, he will no longer keep the Character of a wise and good Man; and which, if he observes, there is an End of him, as the Messenger, and Spy, and Herald of the Gods? For, consider, there are some Offices due to his Father-

(r) It is remarkable, that *Epictetus* here uses the same Word (*ἀντιστοίχως*) with *St. Paul*, 1 *Cor.* vii. 35. and urges the same Consideration, of applying wholly to the Service of God, to dissuade from Marriage. His Observation too, that the State of Things was then (*ὡς ἢ ἀνταρταῖς*) like that of an Army prepared for Battle, nearly resembles the Apostle's (*ἐν καιρῷ ἀνάγκῃ*) present Necessity. *St. Paul* says, 2 *Tim.* ii. 4. (*οὐδεὶς στρατευόμενος ἐμπλέκεται*), &c. *no Man that warreth entangleth himself with the Affairs of this life*. So *Epictetus* says here, that a Cynic must not be (*ἐμπλεκόμενος*) entangled in Relations, &c. From these and many other Passages of *Epictetus*, one would be inclined to think, that he was not unacquainted with *St. Paul's* Epistles; or, that he had heard something of the Christian Doctrine. Yet see Introduction, §. 40.

Father-in-Law; some to the other Relations of his Wife; some to his Wife herself: besides, after this, he is (s) confined to the Care of his Family when sick, and making Provision for their Support. Not to speak of other Things, he must have a Vessel, to warm Water in, to bathe his Child. There must be Wool, Oil, a Bed, a Cup, for his Wife, after her Delivery; and thus the Furniture increases: more Business, more Distraction. Where, for the future, is this King, whose Time is devoted to the public Good?

To whom its Safety, a whole People owes.

Who ought to oversee others; married Men, Fathers of Children: [to observe] who treats his Wife well; who, ill: who quarrels: which Family is well regulated; which, not: like a Physician, who goes about, and feels the Pulse of his Patients: “You have a Fever; you the Head-ach; you, the Gout. Do you (t) abstain from Food: do you eat: do you omit Bathing: you must have an Incision made: you be cauterised.” Where shall He have Leisure for this, who is tied down to vulgar Duties? Must not he provide Clothes for his Children; and send them with Pens, and Ink, and Paper, to a School-master? Must not he provide a Bed for them?

(For

(s) ΕΚΚΛΙΣΤΑΙ. should be, ἐν κλίστῃ; and is so translated.

(t) ΑΣΙΤΗΣΘΩ. UPTON. WOLFIIUS.

(For they cannot be Cynics from their Birth) Otherwise, it would have been better to expose them, as soon as they were born, than to kill them thus. Do you see to what we bring down our Cynic? How we deprive him of this Kingdom? — “ Well: but *Crates* (u) was “ married.” The Case of which you speak was a particular one, arising from Love; and the Woman, another *Crates*. But we are enquiring about

(u) *Crates* was a Theban of Birth and Fortune, who was so charmed by the Appearance of *Telephus*, in the Character of a dirty, ragged Beggar, upon the Stage, that he gave away all his Estate, assumed the Wallet and Staff, and turned Cynic. *Hipparchia*, a Thracian Lady, was so affected by the Discourses and Manners of this polite Philosopher, that she fell desperately in love with him, and neither the Riches, Beauty, or Distinction, of others, who paid their Addresses to her, were able to rival him, in her Heart. Her Relations vainly endeavoured to oppose her Inclination: she was deaf to all their Remonstrances; and even threatened to kill herself, unless she was suffered to marry *Crates*. At the Desire of her Family, he tried, himself, to dissuade her from this Scheme. He pointed out to her the Deformity of his Person; and, throwing down his Wallet and Staff before her, told her, these were all the Riches she was to expect; and that his Wife must pursue the same Course of Life, as he did: and desired her to consider of it. But no Consideration was able to shake her Resolution. She married him, and became as absolute a Cynic as himself; utterly disregarding all external Propriety and Decency. See *DIOG. LAERTIUS*, in their Lives.

about ordinary and (u) common Marriages : and in this Enquiry we do not find the Affair mightily suited to the Condition of a Cynic.

§. 9. How then shall he keep up Society ?

For Heaven's sake do they confer a greater Benefit upon the World, who leave two or three surviving Children in their stead, than those, who, as far as possible, overset all Mankind ; what they do ; how they live ; what they attend to ; what they neglect, contrary to their Duty. Did all they, who left Children to the *Thebans*, do them more Good than *Epaminondas*, who died childless ? And did *Priam*, who was the Father of fifty Prodigates, or *Danaus* (w), or *Æolus*, conduce more to

(v) Mr. Upton's Reading.

(w) *Danaus* and *Egyptus* were the Sons of *Belus*. *Danaus* had fifty Daughters, who, from their Grandfather, were called *Belides* ; and *Egyptus*, fifty Sons. After a Quarrel between the two Brothers, a Reconciliation was agreed, upon Condition of a Marriage between their Children. But *Danaus*, having learnt from an Oracle, that he was to be killed by one of his Sons-in-Law, commanded his Daughters to murder their Husbands, and furnished them with Daggers for that Purpose. They all, except one, executed this cruel Order. The Poets represent them, as punished, in the infernal Regions, by an everlasting unavailing Attempt, to fill a Sieve with Water.

Æolus was the Father of *Sisyphus* ; who, for his infamous Robberies, was killed by *Theseus* ; and, after his Death, condemned, in *Tartarus*, to roll continually a vast Stone up a Hill.

to the Advantage of Society, than *Homer*? Shall a military Command, or any other Post, then, exempt a Man from marrying, and becoming a Father, so that he shall be thought to have made sufficient Amends for the Want of Children, and shall not the Kingdom of a Cynic be a proper Compensation for it? Perhaps we do not understand his Grandeur, nor duly represent to ourselves the Character of *Diogenes*; but consider Cynics as they are now; who stand like Dogs watching at Tables, and who imitate the others in nothing, unless, perhaps, in breaking Wind; but absolutely in nothing besides: else this [which you have objected] would not move us; nor should we be astonished, that a Cynic will not marry, nor have Children. Consider, Sir, that he is the Father of Human-kind: that all Men are his Sons, and all Women his Daughters. Thus he attends; thus takes Care of all. What do you think it is from Impertinence that he rebukes those he meets? He doth it as a Father, as a Brother, as a Minister of the common Parent, *Jove*.

§. 10. Ask me, if you please, too, Whether a Cynic will engage in the Administration of the Commonwealth. What Commonwealth do you enquire after, Blockhead, greater than what he administers? Whether he will harangue among the
Athenians,

Athenians, about Revenues and Taxes, whose Business it is to debate with all Mankind; with the *Athenians*, *Corinthians*, and *Romans*, equally: not about Taxes and Revenues, or Peace and War, but about Happiness and Misery, Prosperity and Adversity, Slavery and Freedom. Do you ask me, whether a Man engages in the Administration of the Commonwealth, who administers such a Commonwealth as this? Ask me too, whether he will accept any Command? I will answer you again, What Command, Fool, greater than that which he now exercises?

§. II. A Cynic, however, hath need of a Constitution duly qualified: for, if he should appear consumptive, thin, and pale, his Testimony hath no longer the same Authority. For he must not only give a Proof to the Vulgar, by the Constancy of his Mind, that it is possible to be a Man of Figure and Merit, without those Things that strike them with Admiration: but he must show too, by his Body, that a simple and slender Diet, under the open Air, doth no Injury to the Constitution. "See, I and my Body are a Witness to this." As *Diogenes* did: for he went about fresh, and plump; and gained the Attention of the Many, by the very Appearance of a healthy Body. But a pitiable Cynic seems a mere Beggar; all avoid him; all are offended at him: for he ought not to appear slovenly, so as to drive
People

People from him; but even his rough Negligence should be neat and engaging.

§. 12. Much natural Agreeableness and Acuteness are likewise necessary in a Cynic, (otherwise he becomes a mere Driveller, and nothing else); that he may be able to give an Answer readily, and pertinently, upon every Occasion. Like *Diogenes*, to one who asked him, “Are you that *Diogenes*, who do not believe, there are any Gods?” “How so, replied he, when I think you odious to them?” Again: when *Alexander* surprized him sleeping, and repeated,

*To waste long Nights in indolent Repose
Ill fits a Chief, who mighty Nations guides,*

before he was quite awake, he answered,

Directs in Council, and in War presides.

POPE’S *Homer*, B. II. V. 27.

§. 13. But, above all, the ruling Faculty of a Cynic must be purer than the Sun: otherwise he must necessarily be a common Cheat, and a Rascal; if, while he is guilty of some Vice himself, he reproves others. For, consider how the Case stands. Arms and Guards give a Power to common Kings and Tyrants of reproving, and of punishing Delinquents, though they are wicked themselves: but to a Cynic, instead of Arms and Guards, Conscience gives this Power; when he knows,

knows, that he hath watched and laboured for Mankind: that he hath slept pure, and waked still purer: and that he hath regulated all his Thoughts as the Friend, as the Minister of the Gods, as a Partner of the Empire of Jupiter: that he is ready to say, upon all Occasions,

Conduct me, Jove, and thou, O Destiny.

And, "if it thus pleases the Gods, thus let it be." Why should he not dare to speak boldly to his own Brethren; to his Children? in a word, to his Kindred? Hence he, who is thus qualified, is neither impertinent, nor a busy Body: for he is not busied about the Affairs of others, but his own, when he oversees the Transactions of Men. Otherwise say, that a General is a busy Body, when he oversees, examines, and watches his Soldiers; and punishes the Disorderly. But, if you reprove others, at the very Time that you have a Cake [concealed] under your own Arm, I will ask you, Had you not better, Sir, go into a Corner, and eat up what you have stolen? But what have you to do with the Concerns of others? For what are you? Are you the Bull in the Herd, or the Queen of the Bees? Show me such Ensigns of Empire, as the hath from Nature. But, if you are a Drone, and arrogate to yourself the Kingdom of the Bees, do not you think, that your fellow Citizens will drive you out, just as the Bees do the Drones?

§. 14. A Cynic must, besides, have so much Patience, as to seem insensible, and a Stone, to the Vulgar. No one reviles, no one beats, no one affronts *him*; but he hath surrendered his Body to be treated at pleasure, by any one who will. For he remembers, that the Inferior, in whatever Instance it is the inferior, must be conquered by the Superior: and the Body is inferior to the Multitude, the Weaker to the Stronger. He never therefore, enters into a Combat where he can be conquered; but immediately gives up what belongs to others: he doth not claim what is slavish and dependent: but, where Choice, and the Use of the Appearances, are concerned, you will see, that he hath so many Eyes, you would say *Argos* was blind to him. Is his Assent ever precipitate? His Pursuits, ever rash? His Desire, ever disappointed? His Aversion, ever incurred? His Intention, ever fruitless? Is he ever querulous, ever dejected, ever envious? Here lies all his Attention and Application. With regard to other Things, he snores supine. All is Peace. There is no Robber, no Tyrant of the Choice. — But of the Body? — Yes. — The Estate? — Yes. — Magistracies and Honours? — Yes. And what doth he care for these? When any one therefore would frighten him with them, he says, “Go, look for Children: Vizards are frightful to
“ *Them*;

“ *Them* ; but *I* know they are only Shell, and
“ have nothing withinside.”

§. 15. Such is the Affair about which you are deliberating : therefore, if you please, for Heaven’s sake, defer it ; and first consider how you are prepared for it. Mind what *Hector* says to *Andromache*.

*No more — but hasten to thy Tasks at home,
There guide the Spindle, and direct the Loom.
Me, Glory summons, to the Martial Scene,
The Field of Combat is the Sphere for Men.*

POPE’s Homer.

Thus conscious he was of his own Qualifications, and of her Weakness.

C H A P. XXIII.

Concerning such as read and dispute, ostentatiously.

§. 1. **F**IRST say to yourself, what you would be ; and then do, what you have to do. For, in almost every thing else, we see this to be the Practice. Olympic Champions first determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a Racer, in a longer Course, there must be one kind of Diet, Walking, Anointing, and Exercise : to one in a shorter, all these must be different ; and to a Pentathlete (*a*), still more different. You will find the Case the same in the

F 2

manual

(*a*) See Vol. II. Note (*a*) p. 2.

manual Arts. If a Carpenter, you must have such and such Things: if a Smith, such other. For, if we do not refer each of our Actions to some End, we shall act at random: if to an improper one, we shall miss our Aim. Further: there is a general and a particular End. First, to act as a Man. What is comprehended in this? Not to be, though gentle, like a Sheep; nor mischievous, like a wild Beast. But the particular End relates to the Study, and Choice of each Individual. A Harper is to act as a Harper; a Carpenter, as a Carpenter; a Philosopher, as a Philosopher; an Orator, as an Orator. When therefore you say, "Come, and hear me read:" observe first, not to do this at random; and, in the next Place, after you have found to what End you refer it, consider whether it be a proper one. Would you be useful, or be praised? You presently hear him say, "What do I value the Praise of the Multitude?" And he says well: for this is nothing to a Musician, or a Geometrician, as such. You would be useful then. In what? Tell us, that we too may run, to make Part of your Audience. Now, is it possible for any one to benefit others, who hath received no Benefit himself? No: for neither can he, who is not a Carpenter, or a Shoemaker, benefit any, in respect to those Arts. Would you know then, whether you have received Benefit? Produce your Principles,

Principles, Philosopher : What is the Aim and Promise of Desire ? Not to be disappointed. What of Aversion ? Not to be incurred. Come : do we fulfil this Promise ? Tell me the Truth : but, if you falsify, I will tell it *you*. The other Day, when your Audience came but coldly together, and did not receive what you said, with Acclamations of Applause, you went away dejected. Again : the other Day, when you were praised, you went about, asking every body, “ What did you think of me ? ” — “ Upon my Life, Sir, it was prodigious. ” — “ But, how did I express myself upon that Subject ? ” — “ Which ? ” — “ Where I gave a Description of *Pan*, and the *Nymphs* (b). ” — “ Most excellently. ” — And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your Desires and Aversions conformably to Nature ? Get you gone. Persuade somebody else. Did not you, the other Day, praise a Man, contrary to your own Opinion ? Did not you flatter a certain Senator ? Would you wish your own Children to be like him ? — “ Heaven forbid ! ” — “ Why then did you praise and exalt him ? ” — “ He is an ingenuous young Man, and attentive to Discourses. ” — “ How so ? ” — “ He admires *me*. ” Now indeed you have produced your Proof. After all, what do you think ? Do not

F 3

these

(b) Mr *Upton* observes, that these florid Descriptions were the principal Study of the Sophists.

these very People secretly despise you? When therefore a Man, conscious of no good Action, or Intention, finds some Philosopher saying, "You are a great Genius, and of a frank and candid Disposition;" what do you think he says, but, "This Man hath some Need of me." Pray tell me, what Action of a great Genius he hath shown. You see, he hath long conversed with you, hath heard your Discourses, hath heard your Lectures. Hath he turned his Attention to himself? Hath he perceived his own Faults? Hath he thrown off his Conceit? Doth he seek an Instructor? — Yes, he doth. — An Instructor how to *live*? No, Fool; but how to *talk*: for it is upon this Account that he admires *you*. Hear what he says. "This Man writes with very great Art, and much more finely than *Dion* (c)." That is quite another thing. Doth he say, This is a modest, faithful, calm Person? But, if he said this too, I would ask him, since he is *faithful*, What is it to be *faithful* (d)? And, if he could not tell, I would add, First learn the Meaning of what you say, and then speak. While you are in this bad Disposition then, and gaping after Applauders,

(c) *Dion* was a Greek Writer of those Times; called, for his Eloquence, *Chrysofom*, or Golden-mouthed: as one of the Fathers of the Church was afterwards.

(d) The Sense seems absolutely to require, that the latter *εὐτος* should be either expunged or changed into *τὸν*.

plauders, and counting your Hearers, would you be of Benefit to others? "To-day I had many
 "more Hearers." "Yes, many: we think there
 "were five hundred." You say nothing: make
 them a Thousand. — "*Dion* never had so great
 "an Audience." "How should he?"—"And
 "they have a fine Taste for Discourses." —
 "What is excellent, Sir, will move even a Stone."
 Here is the Language of a Philosopher! Here is
 the Disposition of one, who is to be beneficial to
 Mankind! Here is the Man, attentive to Dis-
 courses! Who hath read the Works of the So-
 cratic Philosophers, as such; not as if they were
 the Writings of Orators, like *Lysias* and *Isocrates*.
 "I have often wondered by what Arguments, (c),
 " &c. No: By what Argument: that is the
 "more perfectly accurate Expression." Is this
 to have read them any otherwise, than as you
 read little Pieces of Poetry? If you read them as
 you ought, you would not dwell on such Trifles;
 but would rather consider such a Passage as this:
Anytus and Melitus may kill; but they cannot hurt
me. And, I am always so disposed, as to regard none
of my Friends, but that Reason, which, after Exami-
nation, appears to me to be the best. Hence, who

F 4

ever

(c) These Words are the Beginning of *Xenophon's* Me-
 moirs of *Socrates*; and it was a Debate among the minute
 Critics, whether *Argument* or *Arguments* was the proper
 Reading. UPTON.

ever heard *Socrates* say, "I know, or teach, any thing?" But he sent different People to different Instructors: so they came to him, desiring to be recommended to the Philosophers; and he took and recommended them. No: but I warrant you, as he accompanied them, he used to give them such Advice as this: "Hear me discourse. — To-day at the House of *Quadratus* (f)." — Why should I hear you? Have you a Mind to show me how finely you put Words together, Sir? And what Good doth that do you? "But, praise me." — What do you mean by praising you? — Say, incomparable! prodigious! — Well: I do say it. But, if Praise be that which the Philosophers call by the Appellation of *Good*, what have I to praise you for? If it be a Good to speak well, teach me, and I will praise you. — "What then, ought these Things to be heard without Pleasure?" — By no means. I do not hear even a Harper, without Pleasure; but am I therefore to stand playing upon the Harp? Hear what *Socrates* says to his Judges. "It would not be decent for me to appear before you, at this Age, composing Speeches, like a Boy." Like a Boy, says he. For it is, without doubt, a pretty Knack, to chuse out Words, and place them together: and then to read or speak them gracefully in public;

(f) It might be usual for Persons of Fashion to lend their Houses, for Sophists and Orators to declaim in. *URTON.*

lic ; and, in the midst of the Discourse, to observe, that “ he vows by all that is good, there “ are but Few capable of those Things.” But doth a Philosopher apply to People to hear him ? Doth not he attract those who are fitted to receive Benefit from him, in the same manner as the Sun, or their necessary Food doth ? What Physician applies to any body to be cured by him ? (Though now indeed I hear, that the Physicians at Rome apply for Patients ; but in my Time they were applied to) “ I apply to you, to come and hear “ that you are in a bad Way ; and that you take “ care of every thing, but what you ought : that “ you know not what is good or evil ; and are un- “ fortunate, and unhappy.” A fine Application ! And yet, unless the Discourse of a Philosopher hath this Effect, both that, and the Speaker, are void of Life (g). *Rufus* used to say, If you are at leisure to praise me, I speak to no Purpose. And indeed he used to speak in such a manner, that each of us, who heard him, supposed, that some Person had accused us to him ; he so hit upon what was done by us, and placed the Faults of every one, before his Eyes.

§. 2. The School of a Philosopher is a Surgery. You are not to go out of it with Pleasure, but with Pain ; for you come there, not in Health : but one

F 5

of

(g) *St. James* uses the same Word, when he saith, *Faith without Works is dead.*

of you hath a dislocated Shoulder; another, an Abscess; a third, a Fistula; a fourth, the Head-ach. And I am then, to sit uttering pretty trifling Thoughts, and little Exclamations, that, when you have praised me, you may each of you go away with the same dislocated Shoulder, the same aching Head, the same Fistula, and the same Abscess, that you brought? And is it for this that young Men are to travel? And do they leave their Parents, their Friends, their Relations, and their Estates, that they may praise you, while you are uttering little Exclamations?" Was this the Practice of *Socrates*? Of *Zeno*? Of *Cleanthes*? "What then! is there not in speaking, a Style "and Manner of Exhortation?" — Who denies it? Just as there is a Manner of Confutation, and of Instruction. But whoever therefore, added that of *Ostentation*, for a fourth? For in what doth the exhortatory Manner consist? In being able to show to one and all, the Contradictions in which they are involved; and that they care for every thing rather than what they mean to care for: for they mean the Things conducive to Happiness; but they seek them where they are not to be found. To effect this, must a thousand Seats be placed, and an Audience invited; and you, in a fine Robe, or Cloke, ascend the Rostrum, and describe the Death of *Achilles*? Forbear, for Heaven's sake, to bring, as far as you are able, good
Words

Words and Practices into Disgrace. Nothing, to be sure, gives more Force to Exhortation, than when the Speaker shows, that he hath need of the Hearers! but tell me, who, when he hears you reading or speaking, is solicitous about *himself*? Or turns his Attention upon *himself*? Or says, when he is gone away, “The Philosopher hit “me well.” Instead of this, even though you are in high Vogue, is not all that one Man says; “He spoke finely about *Xerxes*.” — “No, says “another; but on the Battle of *Thermopylæ*.” Is this the Audience of a Philosopher?

C H A P. XXIV.

That we ought not to be affected, by Things not in our own Power.

§. 1. **L**ET not what is contrary to Nature in another, be an Evil to you: for you were not born to be depressed, and unhappy, along with others; but to be happy, along with them. And if any is unhappy, remember, that he is so for himself: for God made all Men to enjoy Felicity, and a settled good Condition. He hath furnished all with Means for this Purpose; having given them some Things for their own; others, not for their own. Whatever is subject to Restraint, Compulsion, or Deprivation, not their own: whatever is not subject to Restraint,

their own. And the Essence of Good and Evil, he hath placed in Things which are our own; as it became Him, who provides for, and protects us, with paternal Care.

But I have parted with such a one, and he is in Grief.

And why did he esteem what belonged to another, his own? Why did he not consider, while he was pleased with seeing you, that you are mortal, that you are subject to change your Abode? Therefore he bears the Punishment of his own Folly. But to what Purpose, or for what Cause, do you too break (a) your Spirits? Have not you neither studied these Things? But, like trifling, silly Women, considered the Things you delighted in; the Places, the Persons, the Conversations, as if they were to last for ever; and now sit crying, because you do not see the same People, nor live in the same Place? Indeed you deserve to be so affected, and thus to become more wretched than Ravens or Crows; which, without groaning, or longing for their former State, can fly where they will,

(a) There is no need of *Salmasius's* Change of *αντι τινος*, &c. to *αντιτεινεις*, &c. if, for *επι τι κλας*, one reads *επι κλας*. The *τι* might arise from a Mistake in writing *πι* twice over. *επεκλασεν* is used in the same Sense, in L. 3. c. 26. p. 527. of Mr. *Upton's* Edition. If *κλαω* hath it, the present Reading may stand.

will, build their Nests in another Place, and cross the Seas.

Ay : but this happens from their Want of Reason.

Was Reason then given to us by the Gods, for the Purpose of Unhappiness and Misery, to make us live wretched and lamenting ? O, by all means, let every one be immortal ! Let nobody go from home ! Let us never go from home ourselves, but remain rooted to a Spot, like Plants ! And, if any of our Acquaintance should quit his Abode, let us sit and cry ; and when he comes back, let us dance, and clap our Hands, like Children. Shall we never wean ourselves, and remember what we have heard from the Philosophers, (unless we have heard them only as juggling Enchanters ;) That the World is one great City, and the Substance one, out of which it is formed : that there must necessarily be a certain Rotation of Things : that some must give way to others ; some be dissolved, and others rise in their stead : some remain in the same Situation, and others be moved : but that all is full of Friendship : first of the Gods, and then of Men, by Nature endeared to each other : that some must be separated ; others live together, rejoicing in the Present, and not grieving for the Absent : and that Man, besides a natural Greatness of Mind, and Contempt of Things independent on Choice, is likewise formed not to be rooted to the Earth : but
to

to go at different Times to different Places ; sometimes on urgent Occasions, and sometimes merely for the sake of Observation. Such was the Case of *Ulysses* ; who,

*Wand'ring from Clime to Clime observant stray'd,
Their Manners noted, and their States survey'd.*

POPE's *Odyss.* I.

And yet, before him, of *Hercules*, to travel over the World.

*Just and unjust recording in his Mind,
And, with sure Eyes, inspecting all Mankind.*

POPE's *Odyss.* XVII. v. 580.

To expel and clear away the one, and, in its stead, to introduce the other. Yet how many Friends do you think he must have at *Thebes* ? How many at *Argos* ? How many at *Athens* ? And how many did he acquire in his Travels ? He married too, when he thought it a proper Time, and became a Father, and then quitted his Children ; not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them Orphans : for he knew, that no human Creature is an Orphan ; but that there is a Father, who always and without Intermission, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it, as Matter of Talk, that *Jupiter* was the Father of Mankind ; but he esteemed and called him his own Father, and performed all that he did, with
a View

a View to Him. Hence, he was, in every Place, able to live happy. But it is never possible to make Happiness consistent with a Desire of what is not present. For (b) what is happy must have all it wishes for : must resemble a Person satisfied with Food : there must be no Thirst, no Hunger.

But *Ulysses* longed for his Wife, and sat crying on a Rock.

Why : do you mind *Homer*, and his Fables, in every thing ? Or, if *Ulysses* really did cry, what was he, but a wretched Man ? But what wise and good Man is wretched ? The Universe is surely but ill governed, unless *Jupiter* takes care, that his Subjects may be happy like himself. But these are unlawful and profane Thoughts ; and *Ulysses*, if he did indeed cry and bewail himself, was not a good Man. For who can be a good Man, who doth not know what he is ? And who knows this, and forgets, that all things made are perishable ; and that it is not possible for Man and Man always to live together ? What then ? To desire Impossibilities is base and foolish : it is the Behaviour of a (c) Stranger [to the World] ; of one who fights against God, the only Way he can, by his Principles.

But

(b) Το γὰρ ευδαιμονοῦν ἀπεχεῖν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θελεῖ, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ εἶκέναι. This bears a strong Resemblance to ἀπεχω δεῖ πάντα καὶ περισσεύω, πεπληρωμαί, &c. *Phil.* iv. 18.

(c) The *Greek* should be pointed, ξένου, θεομαχούντος,

But my Mother grieves, when she doth not see me.

And why hath not she learnt these Doctrines ? I do not say, that Care ought not to be taken that she may not lament ; but that we are not to wish absolutely, what is not in our own Power. Now, the Grief of another is not in our Power : but my own Grief is. I will therefore absolutely suppress my own, for that is in my Power ; and I will endeavour to suppress another's Grief, as far as I am able : but I will not endeavour it absolutely, otherwise I shall fight against God ; I shall resist *Jupiter*, and oppose him, in the Administration of the Universe. And not only my (d) Children's Children will bear the Punishment of this Disobedience, and Fighting against God, but I myself too ; starting, and full of Perturbation, both in the Day-time, and in my Dreams by Night ; trembling at every Message, and having my (e) Enjoyment dependent on the Intelligence of others. “ Somebody is come from *Rome*.” “ No Harm, I hope.” Why, what Harm can happen to you, where you are not ? — “ From *Greece*.” “ No Harm, I hope.” Why, at this Rate, every
Place

(d) An Allusion to *Homer*.

(e) The Translation here follows a Conjecture of *Wolfius* ; who reads, for *εὐπειθεῖαι*, *εὐπαθεῖαι*. The same Word occurs in B. IV. c. 3. p. 582. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition ; and is there translated in the same manner.

Place may be the Cause of Misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it must be beyond Sea too, and by Letters ? Such is the Security of your Condition !

But what if my Friends there should be dead ?

What indeed, but that those are dead, who were born to die. Do you at once wish to live to be old, and yet not to see the Death of any one you love ? Do not you know, that, in a long Course of Time, many and various Events must necessarily happen ? That a Fever must get the better of one ; a Highwayman, of another ; a Tyrant, of a third ? For such is the World we live in ; such they who live in it with us. Heats and Colds, improper Diet, Journies, Voyages, Winds, and various Accidents destroy some, banish others ; destine one to an Embassy, another to a Camp. And now, pray, sit in a Flutter about all these Things ; lamenting, disappointed, wretched, dependent on another ; and that not one or two, but ten thousand times ten thousand.

§. 2. Is this what you have heard from the Philosophers ? This what you have learnt ? Do not you know (f) what sort of a Thing a Warfare is ? One must keep Guard ; another go out for a Spy ; another, to Battle too. It is neither possible,

(f) The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture, in his *Addenda*.

possible, that all should be in the same Place, nor indeed better : but you, neglecting to perform the Orders of your General, complain, whenever any thing a little hard is commanded ; and do not consider what you make the Army become, as far as lies in your Power. For, if all should imitate you, nobody will dig a Trench, or throw up a Rampart, or watch, or expose himself to Danger ; but every one will appear useless to the Expedition. Again : if you were a Sailor in a Voyage, fix upon one Place, and there remain. If it should be necessary to climb the Mast, refuse to do it ; if to run to the Head of the Ship, refuse to do it. And what Captain will bear you ? Would not he throw you over board, as a useless Piece of Goods, and mere Luggage, and a bad Example to the other Sailors ? Thus also, in the present Case : every one's Life is a (g) Warfare, and that long and various. You must observe the Duty of a Soldier, and perform every thing, at the Nod of your General : and even, if possible, divine what he would have done. For there is no Comparison between the above-mentioned General and This, either in Power, or Excellence of Character. You are placed in an extensive Command,

(g) This Figure is frequently used both by sacred and profane Authors. See *Job* vii. 1. *Eph.* vi. 12. 1 *Pet.* ii. 11, &c. *Vivere militare est. Life is a State of War.* SEN. *Epist.* 96, &c.

Command, and not in a mean Post; but you are a Senator (b): Do not you know, that such a one must spend but little Time on his Affairs at home; but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying; attending on the Duties either of a Magistrate, a Soldier, or a Judge? And now pray, would you be fixed and rooted on the same Spot, like a Plant?

Why: it is pleasant.

Who denies it? And so is a Ragout pleasant; and a fine Woman is pleasant. Is not this just what They say who make Pleasure their End? Do not you perceive whose Language you have spoken? That of *Epicureans* and *Catamites*. And while you follow their Practices, and hold their Principles, do you talk to us of the Doctrines of *Zeno* and *Socrates*? Why do not you throw away, to as great a Distance as possible, those Ornaments which belong to others, and which you have nothing to do with? What else do the *Epicureans* desire, than to sleep without Hindrance, and rise, (i) without Compulsion; and, when they are got up, to yawn at their leisure, and wash their Face; then write and read what they please; then prate about some Trifle or other, and be applauded.

(b) Instead of ΑΛΛ, ας Βουλευτης, the true Reading, perhaps, is, ΑΛΛα ες Βουλευτης; and it is translated accordingly.

(i) The Conjecture of *Wolfius* (αναγκη) is a good one; and the Translation hath followed it.

plauded by their Friends, whatever they say : then go out for a Walk ; and, after they have taken a Turn, bathe, and then eat ; and then to Bed : in what manner they spent their Time there, why should one say ? For it is easily guessed. Come : now do *you* also tell me, what Course of Life *you* desire to lead, who are a Zealot for Truth, and *Diogenes*, and *Socrates* ? What would you do at *Athens* ? These very same Things ? Why then do you call yourself a Stoic ? They who falsely pretend to the *Roman* Citizenship, are punished severely : and must those be dismissed with Impunity, who falsely claim so great a Thing, and so venerable a Title, as you do ? Or is this impossible ; and is there not a divine, and powerful, and inevitable Law, which exacts the greatest Punishments from those, who are guilty of the greatest Offences ? For what says this Law ? *Let him who claims what doth not belong to him, be arrogant, be vain-glorious, be base, be a Slave : let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity ; and, in a Word, let him be unhappy, let him lament.*

§. 3. (k) What then ! would you have me pay my Court to such a one ? Would you have me frequent his Door ?

If

(k) What follows hath no Connexion with what immediately preceded ; but belongs to the general Subject of the Chapter.

If Reason requires it, for your Country, for your Relations, for Mankind, why should you not go? You are not ashamed to go to the Door of a Shoemaker, when you want Shoes; nor of a Gardener, when you want Lettuce. Why then of the Rich, when you have some similar Want?

Ay: but I am not struck with Awe of a Shoemaker.

Nor of a rich Man neither.

I need not flatter a Gardener.

Nor a rich Man neither.

How then shall I get what I want?

Why, do I bid you go, in Expectation of getting it? No: only that you may do what becomes yourself.

Why then, after all, should I go?

That you may have gone: that you may have discharged the Duties of a Citizen, of a Brother, of a Friend. And, after all, remember, that you are going to a Shoemaker, to a Gardener, who hath not the Power of any thing great or respectable, though he should sell it ever so dear. You are going to buy Lettuces. They are sold for a Penny, not for a Talent. So here too, the Matter is worth going to his Door about. Well: I will go. It is worth talking with him about. (1). Well: I will talk with him. Ay:

(1) The Change of the Persons in these Discourses is often so sudden, that it is difficult to discover the Speaker; and one can

Ay ; but one must kiss his Hand too, and cajole him with Praise.

Away with you. That is worth a Talent. It is not expedient for myself, nor my Country, nor my fellow Citizens, nor my Friends, to destroy the good Citizen, and the Friend [in my own Character.]

But one shall appear not to have set heartily about the Business, if one fails.

What, have you forgot again, why you went ? Do not you know, that a wise and good Man doth nothing for Appearance ; but for the sake of having acted well ?

What Advantage then it is to him, to have acted well.

What Advantage is it to one, who writes the Name of *Dion* as he ought ? The having writ it.

Is there no Reward then ?

Why : do you seek any greater Reward, for a good Man, than the doing what is fair and just ? And yet, at *Olympia*, you desire nothing else ; but think it enough, to be crowned Victor. Doth it appear to you so small and worthless a Thing, to be fair, good and happy ? Besides : being introduced

can judge only from the general Sense. The Translator hath endeavoured to give this Passage the Turn which seems most agreeable to the Context, without adhering very literally to the several Words in the *Greek*. *Epietetus*, in this Paragraph, personates the Scholar, whom he is exhorting to visit a great Man.

duced by God into this great City, [the World,] and bound to discharge, at this time, the Duties of a Man, do you still want Nurses and a Mamma; and are you (*m*) moved and effeminated by the Tears of poor foolish Women? Are you thus determined never to cease being an Infant? Do not you know, that he who acts like a Child, the older he is, so much the more he is ridiculous?

§. 4. (*n*) Did you never visit any one at *Athens*, at his own House;

Yes: whomsoever I pleased.

Why: now you are here, be willing to visit this Person, and you will still see whom you please; only let it be without Meanness, without Desire, or Aversion, and your Affairs will go well: but their going well, or not, doth not consist in going to the House, and standing at the Door, or not; but lies within, in your own Principles; when you have acquired a Contempt of Things independent on Choice, and esteem none of them your own; but that what belongs to you is only to judge, to think, to exert your Pursuits, your Desires, and Aversions, right. What further Room is there, after this, for Flattery, for Meanness? Why do you still long for the Quiet you enjoyed there (*o*); for Places familiar to you? Stay a little, and these will become

(*m*) This refers to a former Part of the Chapter.

(*n*) Here, what was said before, about going to a great Man is again resumed.

(*o*) At *Athens*.

become familiar to you, in their Turn ; and then, if you are so mean spirited, weep and lament again at leaving these.

How then am I to preserve an affectionate Temper ?

As becomes a noble-spirited and happy Person. For Reason will never tell you to be dejected; and broken-hearted; or to depend on another; or to reproach either God; or Man. Be affectionate in such a manner as to observe all this. But if, from *Affection*, as you call it, you are to be a Slave; and a Wretch, it is not worth your while to be affectionate. And what restrains you from loving any one as a Mortal, as a Person who may be obliged to quit you ? Pray did not *Socrates* love his own Children ? But it was as became one, who was free, and mindful that his first Duty was, to gain the Love of the Gods. Hence he violated no Part of the Character of a good Man, either in his Defence, or in fixing a Penalty on himself (p).

Nor

(p) It was the Custom at *Athens*, in Cases where no fixed Punishment was appointed by the Law; before the Judges gave Sentence, to ask the Criminal himself, what Penalty he thought he deserved. *Socrates* refused either to comply with this Form himself, or suffer any of his Friends to do it for him; alledging, that the naming a Penalty was a Confession of Guilt. When the Judges therefore asked him, what Penalty he thought he deserved, he answered, " The highest Honours, " and Rewards; and to be maintained in the *Prytaneum*, at

" the

Nor yet before, when he was a Senator, or a Soldier. But *we* make use of every Pretence to be mean-spirited; some, on the Account of a Child; some, of a Mother; and some, of a Brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy, on the Account of any one; but happy, on the Account of All; and chiefly of God, who hath constituted us for this Purpose. What! did *Diogenes* love nobody; who was so gentle, and benevolent, as chearfully to undergo so many Pains and Miseries of Body, for the common Good of Mankind? Yes: he did love them: but how? As became a Minister of *Jove*; at once taking care of Men, and obedient to God. Hence the whole Earth, not any particular Place, was his Country. And when he was taken Captive, he did not long for *Athens*, and his Friends and Acquaintance there; but made himself acquainted with the Pirates, and endeavoured to reform them: and, when he was at last sold, he lived at *Corinth*, just as before at *Athens*: and, if he had gone to the *Perrhæbeans* (q), he would have been exactly the same. Thus is Freedom acquired. Hence he used to say, “ Ever since “ *Antisthenes* made me free (r), I have ceased to

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G

“ be

“ the public Expence.” An Answer which so extremely irritated his Judges, that they immediately condemned him to Death. PLATO. CICERO.

(q) A People towards the Extremity of *Greece*.

(r) *Diogenes* was the Disciple of *Antisthenes*. Compare what *Diogenes* says of *Antisthenes* making him free, with *John* viii. 32—36.

“ be a Slave.” How did *he* make him free? Hear what he says. “ He taught me what was
“ my own, and what not. An Estate is not my
“ own. Kindred, Domestics, Friends, Reputati-
“ on, familiar Places, Manner of Life, all belong
“ to another.” “ What is your own then?”
“ The Use of the Appearances of Things. He
“ showed me, that I have *this*, not subject to Re-
“ straint, or Compulsion: no one can hinder or
“ force me to use them, any otherwise than I please.
“ Who then, after this, hath any Power over me?
“ *Philip*, or *Alexander*, or *Perdiccas*, or the *Persian*
“ King? Whence should they have it? For he
“ that is to be subdued by Man, must, long before,
“ be subdued by Things. He therefore, of whom
“ neither Pleasure, nor Pain, nor Fame, nor
“ Riches, can get the better; and who is able,
“ whenever he thinks fit, to throw away his whole
“ Body, with Contempt, and depart, whose Slave
“ can he ever be? To whom is he subject?” But
if *Diogenes* had taken Pleasure in living at *Athens*,
and had been subdued by that Manner of Life, his
Affairs would have been at every one’s Disposal;
and whoever was stronger, would have had the
Power of grieving him. How would he have flatter-
ed the Pirates, think you, to make them sell him
to some *Athenian*, that he might see again the fine
Piræum, the long Walls, and the Citadel? How
would you see them, you Wretch? As a dispirit-
ed

ed Slave? And what Good would that do you?—

“ No: but free.” — Show in what manner, free.

See, somebody lays hold on you; whoever takes you away from your usual Manner of Life, and says, “ You are my Slave: for it is in my Pow-

“ er to restrain you from living as you like. It

“ is in my Power to (s) afflict and humble you.

“ Whenever I please, you may be chearful again;

“ and set out, elated, for *Athens*.” What do you

say to him who thus enslaves you? What Method

will you find of getting free? Or dare you not so

much as look up at him; but, without making

many Words, supplicate to be dismissed? You

ought to go to Prison, Man, with Alacrity, with

Speed, and to precede your Conductors. Instead

of this, do you regret living at *Rome*, and long for

Greece? And, when you must die, will you then

too come crying to us, that you shall no more see

Athens, nor walk in the *Lyceum*? Have you tra-

velled for *this*? Is it for *this*, that you have been

seeking for somebody to do you Good? What

Good? That you may the more easily solve Syl-

logisms, and manage hypothetical Arguments?

And is it for this Reason, you left your Brother,

your Country, your Friends, your Family, that

you might carry back such Improvements as these?

So that you did not travel for Constancy, nor for

G 2

Tran-

(s) Instead of *αἰνῶμαι*, the sense seems to require *αἰνῶν*; and it is so translated.

Tranquillity ; nor that, secured from Harm, you might complain of no one, accuse no one : that no one might injure you ; and that thus you might preserve your relative Duties, without Impediment. You have made a fine Traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical Arguments, and convertible Propositions ! If you please too, sit in the Market, and cry them for Sale, as Mountebanks do their Medicines. Why will you not rather deny, that you know even what you have learned ; for fear of bringing a Scandal upon Theorems as useless ? What Harm hath Philosophy done you ? In what hath *Chrysippus* injured you, that you should give a Proof, by your Actions, that Philosophy is of no Value ? Had you not Evils enough at home ? How many Causes for Grief and Lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled ? But you have added more ; and, if you ever get any new Acquaintance and Friends, you will find fresh Causes for groaning ; and, in like manner, if you attach yourself to any other Country. To what Purpose therefore do you live ? To heap Sorrow upon Sorrow, to make you wretched ? And then you tell me this is *Affection*. What Affection, Man ? If it be good, it is not the Cause of any Ill : if ill, I will have nothing to do with it. I was born for my own Good ; not Ill.

§. 5. What then is the proper Exercise in this Case ?

First,

First, the highest, and principal, and obvious, as it were at your Door, is, that when you attach yourself to any thing, it may not be as to what cannot be taken away.

But as to what?

As to something of the same kind with an earthen Pot, or a glass Cup; that, when it happens to be broken, you may remember not to be troubled (1). So here too: when you kiss your Child, or your Brother, or your Friend, never intirely give way to the Appearance, nor suffer the Pleasure to diffuse itself as far as it will; but curb it, restrain it, like those who stand behind triumphant Victors, and remind them, that they are Men. Do you likewise remind yourself, that you love what is mortal; that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the present, not irrevocably, nor for ever; but as a Fig, or a Bunch of Grapes, in the appointed Season. If you long for these in Winter, you are a Fool. So, if you long for your Son, or your Friend, when he is not allowed you, know, you wish for Figs in Winter. For as Winter is to a Fig, so is every Accident in the Universe, to those Things which are taken away by it. In the next place, represent to yourself Appearances contrary to (u) whatever Objects

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give

(1) See *Enchiridion*, c. iii.

(u) The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture.

give you Pleasure. What Harm is there, while you are kissing your Child, to say softly, "To-morrow you will die:" and so to your Friend, "To-morrow either you or I shall go away, and we shall see each other no more."

But these Sayings are ominous.

And so are some Incantations: but, because they are useful, I do not mind it; only let them be useful. But do you call any thing *ominous*, except what is the Signification of some Ill? Cowardice is *ominous*; Mean-spiritedness is *ominous*; Lamentation, Grief, Want of Shame. These are Words of bad Omen; and yet we ought not to be scrupulous of using them, as a Guard against the Things they mean. But do you tell me, that a Word is *ominous* which is significant of any thing natural? Say too, that it is *ominous*, for Ears of Corn to be reaped; for this signifies the Destruction of the Corn; but not of the World. Say too, that the Fall of the Leaf is *ominous*; and that a candied Mass should be produced from Figs; and Raisins, from Grapes. For all these are Changes from a former, into another State; not a Destruction, but a certain appointed Oeconomy and Administration. Such is Absence, a small Change: such is Death, a greater Change: not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not.

What

(w) What then, shall I be no more ?

You will be : but [you will be] some thing else, of which, at present, the World hath no Need: for even *you* were not produced when you pleased, but when the World hath Need [of you.] Hence a wise and good Man, mindful who he is, and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his Post regularly, and dutifully to God. “ Is it thy Pleasure I should
 “ any longer continue in being ? I will continue,
 “ free, spirited, agreeably to thy Pleasure : for
 “ Thou hast made me incapable of Restraint, in
 “ what is my own. But hast Thou no farther
 “ Use for me ? Fare thou well ! I have staid thus
 “ long for thy Sake alone, and no other ; and
 “ now I depart in Obedience to Thee.” —
 “ How do you depart ?” — “ Again : agreeably
 “ to thy Pleasure ; as free, as thy Servant, as one
 “ sensible of thy Commands, and thy Prohibiti-
 “ ons. But, while I am employed in thy Service,
 “ *what* wouldst Thou have me be ? A Prince, or
 “ a private Man ; a Senator, or a Plebeian ; a
 “ Soldier, or a General ; a Preceptor, or a
 “ Master of a Family ? Whatever Post or Rank

G 4

“ Thou

(w) The Translation follows Mr. *Upton's* Transposition of *own*. The Meaning of the Passage is, that, though the personal Existence is dissolved, and destroyed by Death, the Substance, out of which it was produced, remains, under some other Form ; which was the Stoic Doctrine.

“ Thou shalt assign me, like *Socrates*, I will die a
 “ thousand times rather than desert it. *Where*
 “ wouldst thou have me be? At *Rome*, or at *A-*
 “ *thens*; at *Thebes*, or at *Gyaros*? Only remember
 “ me there. If Thou shalt send me, where Men
 “ cannot live conformably to Nature, I do not
 “ depart from thence (*x*), in Disobedience to thy
 “ Will; but as receiving my Signal of Retreat
 “ from Thee. I do not desert Thee: Heaven
 “ forbid! but I perceive Thou hast no Use for
 “ me. If a Life conformable to Nature be grant-
 “ ed, I will seek no other Place, but that in
 “ which I am; nor any other Company, but
 “ those with whom I am.”

§. 6. Let these Things be ready at hand, Night
 and Day. These Things write; these Things
 read; of these Things talk both to yourself and
 others. [Ask them,] “ Have you any Assistance
 “ to give me for this Purpose?” And again, go
 and ask another, and another. Then if any of
 those Things should happen that are said to be
 against our Will, immediately this will be a Re-
 lief to you; in the first Place, that it was not un-
 expected. For it is a great Matter upon all Oc-
 casions, to [be able to] say (*y*), “ I knew that I
 “ begot one born to die.” Thus do you say too;
 “ I

(*x*) Answer. WOLFIIUS.

(*y*) This was said by *Xenophon*, when News was brought
 him, that his Son *Gryllus* was killed in a Battle.

" I knew that I was liable to die, to remove, to
 " be exiled, to be imprisoned." If afterwards
 you turn to yourself, and seek from what Quarter
 the Event proceeds, you will presently recollect:
 " It is from Things independent on Choice;
 " not from what is my own. What then is it to
 " me?" Then, farther (which is the chief):
 Who sent it? The Commander, the General, the
 City, the Law of the City? Give it me then;
 for I must always obey the Law in all Things.
 Farther yet: when any Appearance molests you
 (for [to prevent] *that*, is not in your Power,) strive
 against it; and, by Reason, conquer it. Do
 not suffer it to gain Strength, nor to lead you on
 to Consequences; and represent what, and how,
 it pleases. If you are at *Gyaros*, do not represent
 to yourself the Manner of Living at *Rome*; how
 many Pleasures you used to find there, and how
 many would attend your Return; but be intent
 on this Point; How he, who lives at *Gyaros*, may
 live with Spirit and Comfort, at *Gyaros*. And,
 if you are at *Rome*, do not represent to yourself
 the Manner of Living at *Athens*: but consider
 only, how you ought to live where you are. Last-
 ly: to all other Pleasures oppose that of being
 conscious, that you are obeying God; and per-
 forming, not in Word, but in Deed, the Duty of
 a wise and good Man. How great a Thing is it
 to be able to say to yourself, " What others are

“ now solemnly arguing in the Schools, and seem
 “ to carry beyond Probability, this I am [actu-
 “ ally] performing. They are sitting and expa-
 “ tiating upon *my* Virtues, and disputing about
 “ *me*, and celebrating *me*. *Jupiter* hath been
 “ pleased to let me receive a Demonstration of
 “ this from myself; and indeed that *He* may know
 “ whether he hath a Soldier, a Citizen, such as
 “ he should be, and to produce me as a Witness
 “ to other Men, concerning Things independent
 “ on Choice. See that your Fears were vain,
 “ your Appetites vain. Seek not Good from
 “ without: seek it in yourselves, or you will ne-
 “ ver find it. For this Reason, he now brings
 “ me hither, now sends me thither; shows me
 “ to Mankind, poor, without Authority, sick;
 “ sends me to *Gyaros*; leads me to Prison: not
 “ that he hates me: Heaven forbid! For who
 “ hates the best of his Servants? Nor that he
 “ neglects me: for he doth not neglect any one
 “ of the smallest (z) Things: but to exercise me,
 “ and make use of me as a Witness to others.
 “ Appointed to such a Service, do I still care
 “ where I am, or with whom, or what is said of
 “ me, instead of being wholly attentive to God,
 “ and to his Orders and Commands?”

§. 7.

(z) Compare this with the Description of the universal
 Care of Providence, *Matth.* x. 29, 30. and the Occasion on
 which it was introduced.

§. 7. Having these Things always at hand, and practising them by yourself, and making them ready for Use, you will never want any one to comfort and strengthen you. For Shame doth not consist in not having any thing to eat, but in not having Reason enough to exempt you from Fear and Sorrow. But, if you once acquire that Exemption, will a Tyrant, or his Guards, or Courtiers, be any thing to you? Will any Destination of Offices, or they who offer Sacrifices in the Capitol, on being admitted into the Emperor's Train, give you Uneasiness, who have received so great a Command from *Jupiter*? Only, do not make a Parade of it, nor grow insolent upon it. But show it by your Actions: and, though no one should perceive it, be content, that you are well, and happy.

C H A P. XXV.

Concerning Those who desist from their Purpose.

§. 1. **C**ONSIDER which of the Things, which you at first proposed to yourself, you have retained, which not, and how; which give you Pleasure, which Pain, in the Reflection; and if possible, recover yourself, where you have failed. For the Champions, in this greatest of Combats, must not grow weary; but are even con-

tentedly to bear Whipping. For this is no Combat of Wrestling or Boxing; where both he who succeeds, and he who doth not succeed, may possibly be of very great Worth, or of little; indeed may be very fortunate, or very miserable: but the Combat is for good Fortune and Happiness itself. What is the Case then? *Here*, even if we have renounced the Contest, no one restrains us from renewing it; nor need we wait for another four Years, for the Return of another *Olympiad*: but recollecting, and recovering yourself, and returning with the same Zeal, you may renew it immediately: and even if you should again yield, you may again begin: and, if you once get the Victory, you become like one who hath never yielded. Only do not begin, from a Habit of this, to do it with Pleasure, and then, like Quails that have fled the Pit (*a*), go about as if you were a brave Champion, though you have been conquered; all the Games round (*b*). — “ The Appearance

(*a*) Is was a Sport among the *Greeks*, to put Quails in a circular Space, like our Cockpits, and use various Ways of trying their Courage. If the Quail ran away out of the Pit, its Master lost.

(*b*) An Allusion to the *Pythian*, *Isthmian*, *Nemean*, and *Olympic* Games. The Persons who were victorious in all these, were distinguished by a particular Name; signifying, that they had been Conquerors through the whole Circle of the Games. UPTON.

“ance of a pretty Girl conquers me.” What then? “Have not I been conquered before?” “I have a mind to rail at somebody. Well: “have not I railed before?” — You talk to us just as if you had come off unhurt. Like one that should say to his Physician, who had forbidden him to bathe, “Why, did not I bathe before?” Suppose the Physician should answer him, “Well: “and what was the Consequence of your Bathing? Were not you feverish? Had not you “the Head-ach?” So, when you before railed at some body, did not you act like an ill-natured Person; like an impertinent one? Have not you fed this Habit of yours, by Actions familiar to it? When you were conquered by a pretty Girl, did you come off with Impunity? Why then do you talk of what you have done *before*? You ought to remember it, I think, as Slaves do Whipping, so as to refrain from the same Faults. — “But the Case is unlike: for there it is Pain “that Causes the Remembrance: but what is “the Pain, what the Punishment, of my committing Faults? For when was I ever habituated [by any Suffering] to avoiding acting ill?” — Therefore the Pains of Experience, whether we will, or not, have their Use.

C H A P. XXVI.

Concerning those who are in Dread of Want.

§. 1. (a) **A**R E not you ashamed to be more fearful and mean-spirited than fugitive Slaves? To what Estates, to what Servants, do *they* trust, when they run away, and leave their Masters? Do not they, after carrying off a little with them for the first Days, travel over Land and Sea, contriving first one, then another Method of getting Food? And what Fugitive ever died with Hunger? But *you* tremble, and lie awake by Night, for fear you should want Necessaries. Wretch! are you so blind? Do not you see the Way where the Want of Necessaries leads?

Why, where doth it lead?

Where a Fever, where even a Stone falling on you, leads — to Death. Have not you yourself then, often said this to your Companions? Have not you read, have not you written, many Things of this kind? And how often have you arrogantly boasted, that you are easy with regard to Death?

Ay: but my Family too will starve with Hunger.

What

(a) Compare this Chapter with the beautiful and affecting Discourses of our Saviour on the same Subject, *Matth.* vi. 25—34. *Luke* xii. 22—30.

What then ? Doth their Hunger lead any other Way than yours ? Is there not the same Descent ? The same State below ? Will not you then, in every Want and Necessity, look with Confidence there, whereeven the most Rich and Powerful, and Kings and Tyrants themselves must descend ? You indeed, hungry perhaps ; and they, burst with Indigestion and Drunkenness ? What Beggar have you almost ever seen, who did not live to Old-age, nay, to extreme Old-age ? Chilled with Cold Day and Night, lying on the Ground, and eating only what is barely necessary, they come nearly to an Impossibility of Dying.—Cannot you write ? Cannot you keep a School ? Cannot you be a Watchman at somebody's Door ?

But it is shameful to come to this Necessity.

First therefore learn what Things are shameful ; and then tell us, you are a Philosopher : but at present, do not bear, that even any one else should call you so. Is that shameful to *you*, which is not your own Act ? Of which you are not the Cause ? Which hath happened to you by Accident, like a Fever, or the Head-ach ? If your Parents were poor, or left others their Heirs, or, though they are living, do not assist you, are these Things shameful for *you* ? Is this what you have learned from the Philosophers ? Have you never heard, that what is shameful is blameable ; and what is blameable deserves to be blamed ? Whom do you
blame

blame for an Action not his own, which he hath not done himself? Did *you* then make your Father such a one [as he is?] Or is it in *your* Power to mend him? Is that permitted you? What then, must you desire what is not permitted; and, when you fail of it, be *ashamed*? Are you thus habituated, even when you are studying Philosophy, to depend upon others, and to hope nothing from yourself? Sigh then, and groan, and eat in Fear that you shall have no Victuals To-morrow. Tremble, lest your Servants should rob you, or run away from you, or die. Thus live on, without ceasing, whoever you are, who have applied to Philosophy in Name only; and, as much as in you lies, have disgraced its Theorems, by showing, that they are unprofitable and useless to those who take up the Profession of them. You have never made Constancy, Tranquillity, and Apathy, the Object of your Desires; have attended on no one upon this Account; but on many, for the sake of Syllogisms: nor have ever, by yourself, examined any one of these Appearances. “Can I bear this, or can I not bear it? What remains for me to do?” But, as if all your Affairs went safe and well, you have dwelt upon the third Class (*b*), that of Security from Failure; that you may never fail—Of what?—Fear, Mean spiritedness, Admiration of Riches, an unaccomplished

(*b*) See Introduction, §. 6.

accomplished Desire, and unsuccessful Aversion. These are the Things which you have been labouring to secure. Ought you not first to have acquired something by the Use of Reason, and then to have provided Security for *that*? Whom did you ever see building a Round of Battlements, without placing them upon a Wall? And what Porter is ever set where there is no Door? But you *study*. Can you show me what you study?

Not to be shaken by Sophistry.

Shaken from what? Show me first, what you have in your Custody; what you measure, or what you weigh; and then accordingly show me the Balance, or the Bushel. What signifies it to go on, ever so long, measuring Dust? Ought you not to show, what makes Men happy, what makes their Affairs proceed as they wish? How we may blame no one, accuse no one; how acquiesce in the Administration of the Universe? Show me these Things. "See, I do show them," say you; "I will solve Syllogisms to you." — This is the Measure, Wretch, and not the Thing measured. Hence you now pay the Penalty due for neglecting Philosophy. You tremble, you lie awake, you advise with every body, and if what you are advised to doth not please every body, you think that you have been ill-advised. Then you dread Hunger, as you fancy: but it is not Hunger that you dread; but you are afraid, that you shall not have
a Cook;

a Cook; that you shall not have another Person for a Butler: another, to pull off your Shoes; a fourth, to dress you; others, to rub you: others, to follow you: that when you have undressed yourself in the Bathing-room, and stretched yourself out like those who are crucified, you may be rubbed here and there; and the Person who presides over these Operations may stand by, and say, "Come this Way; give your Side; take hold on his Head; turn your Shoulder:" and that, when you are returned home from the Bath, you may bawl out, "Doth nobody bring any thing to eat?" And then, "Take away; wipe the Table."—This is your Dread, that you shall not be able to lead the Life of a sick Man. But learn the Life of those in Health: how Slaves live; how, Labourers; how, those who are genuine Philosophers; how *Socrates* lived, even with a Wife and Children; how, *Diogenes*; how, *Cleanthes* (c), at once studying and drawing Water. If these are the Things you would have, you will have them every-where, and with a fearless Confidence.

In

(c) *Cleanthes* was a Stoic Philosopher, the Disciple and Successor of *Zeno*. He used to draw Water for his Livelihood all Night, and study all Day. He was so poor, that for Want of proper Materials, he used to write down what he had heard from his Master *Zeno*, on Tiles, and Pieces of Bone.

In what?

In the only Thing that can be confided in ; what is sure, incapable of being restrained, or taken away ; your own Choice.

§. 2. But why have you contrived to make yourself so useless, and good for nothing, that nobody will receive you into their House ; nobody take Care of you : but though, if any sound useful Vessel was thrown out of Doors, whoever finds it, will take it up, and esteem it as a Gain ; yet nobody will take up *you* ; but every body esteem you a Loss. What, cannot you so much as perform the Office of a Dog, or a Cock ? Why then do you wish to live any longer, if you are so worthless ? Doth any good Man fear, that Food should fail him ? It doth not fail the Blind ; it doth not fail the Lame. Shall it fail a good Man ? A Paymaster is not wanting to a Soldier, or to a Labourer, or to a Shoemaker ; and shall one be wanting to a good Man ? Is God so negligent of his own Institutions ; of his Servants ; of his Witnesses, whom alone he makes use of as Examples to the Uninstructed, both that He *is*, and that he administers the

Bone. The Physicians ordered him, for a Swelling in his Gums, to abstain two Days from Food ; with which he complied. When he was recovered, they gave him Leave to return to his usual Diet ; which he refused ; and, saying he was now far advanced on his Journey, starved himself to Death. **DIOG. LAERT.**

the Universe rightly ; and doth not neglect human Affairs ; and that no Evil happens to a good Man, either living or dead ? What then is the Case, when he doth not bestow Food ? What else, than that, like a good General, he hath made me a Signal of Retreat ? I obey, I follow ; speaking well of my Leader, praising his Works. For I came when it seemed good to him, and again, when it seems good to him, I depart : and in Life it was my Business to praise God, both by myself, to each particular Person, and to the World. Doth he not grant me many Things ? Doth he not grant me Affluence ? It is not his Pleasure, that I should live luxuriously : for he did not grant that even to *Hercules*, his own Son ; but another (*d*) reigned over *Argos* and *Mycene* ; while *he* lived subject to Command, laboured, and was exercised. And *Eurystheus* was just what he was ; neither King of *Argos*, nor *Mycene* ; not being indeed King of himself. But *Hercules* was Ruler and Governor of the whole Earth and Seas ; the Expeller of Lawlessness and Injustice ; the Introducer of Justice and Sanctity. And this he effected naked and alone. Again : when *Ulysses* was shipwrecked, and cast away, did his helpless Condition at all deject him ? Did it break his Spirit ? No : but how did he go to *Nausicaa*, and her Attendants,

(*d*) *Eurystheus*.

dants, to ask those Necessaries which it seems most shameful to beg from another ?

*As the fierce Lion, on the Mountain bred,
Confiding in his Strength——.*

Confiding in what ? Not in Glory, or in Riches, nor in Dominion ; but in his own Strength : that is, in his Principles, concerning what Things are in our own Power ; what, not. For these alone are what render us free, render us incapable of Restraint ; raise the Head of the Dejected, and make them look, with unaverted Eyes, full in the Face of the Rich, and of the Tyrants : and this was the Gift of the Philosopher (e). But *you* will not set out with Confidence ; but trembling, about such Trifles as Clothes and Plate. Wretch ! have you thus wasted your Time till now ?

But what, if I should be sick ?

You will be sick as you ought.

Who will take care of me ?

God : your Friends.

I shall lie in a hard Bed.

But like a Man.

I shall not have a convenient Room.

You will be sick in an inconvenient one then.

Who will provide Victuals for me ?

They

(e) The Sense would be better, if we read *the philosopher*, of Philosophy.

They who provide for others too : you will be sick like *Manes* (f).

But, besides, what will be the Conclusion of my Sickness ? Any other than Death ?

Why, do not you know then, that the Origin of all human Evils, and of Mean-spiritedness, and Cowardice, is not *Death* ; but rather the *Fear of Death* ? Fortify yourself therefore against this. Hither let all your Discourses, Readings, Exercises, tend. And then you will know, that thus alone are Men made free (g).

(f) The Name of a Slave, particularly of a Slave who once belonged to *Diogenes* : and perhaps this Expression alludes to some Story about him, which is now unknown.

(g) There is, I think, in this Discourse, a remarkable Likeness to great Part of the xith and xiith Chapters of the Epistle to the *Hebrews*. The Authors, in each, proceed on the Principle, that *God is*, and *that He is a Rewarder of them, that diligently seek Him* : They call the good Persons, who patiently suffer from a Conviction of this Truth, by the same Title of *Witnesses* : and they make Use of the same *Gymnastic Term Exercises*, to express the Nature of their Trials. The Resemblance will appear much more strongly, by comparing the Originals.

Both the Apostle and the Philosopher, are endeavouring to impress on their Disciples, the Duty of Dependence on God, and of Confidence in Him : but there is great Difference in the Encouragement, which animated and supported the *Cloud of Witnesses*, cited by the first, and those mentioned by the last. *Epictetus*, after supposing it absurd that a good Man should fail of a Pay-master, acknowledges, however, that he may happen to be starved ; and (as was observed

observed in a former Note) hath no other Comfort to give him, but the Consideration, that his Sufferings will be terminated in Death; which, in the Stoic Scheme, was the Loss of all personal Existence; a very different Expectation from that *Recompence of Reward*, which enabled the Worthies of Revelation to support their Afflictions; and to despise all present Pleasures, inconsistent with their Duty. (*Heb. xi. 24—26.*) Again: *Epictetus* proposes *Hercules* and *Ulysses* as illustrious Instances, that Hardships and Sufferings are no Proofs of the Divine Displeasure. He represents *Hercules* as the Son of God; and the Description, which he gives, of his Character and Offices, is very striking: especially if one was to render the Words, as they are translated in the Bible, that He *purged Iniquity and Unrighteousness, and brought in Righteousness and Holiness*. But it must be observed, that great Part of the Story of *Hercules* was merely imaginary; and even according to *that*, though he destroyed many wicked Men, he was far from being a Teacher, or Practiser of *Righteousness and Holiness*. His Life is represented, as sullied with Vice and Folly: it was partly spent, and at last ended, in mischievous, and deplorable Madness. There are at least, equal Objections to be made to the Conduct of the deceitful and cruel *Ulysses*. Besides; these Heroes, who are produced by *Epictetus* in Support of his Argument, were cold and unaffecting Instances to his Audience; to whom they stood in so very distant a Relation. But the Apostle urges an Example deeply interesting, when he directs his Disciples to look unto the Author and Finisher of their Faith, who for the Joy that was set before him, endured the Cross, despising the Shame, and is set down at the right Hand of the Throne of God.

END of the THIRD BOOK.






THE
DISCOURSES
OF
EPICTETUS.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Freedom.

§. 1.  E is free, who lives as he likes ;
who is not subject either to
Compulsion, to Restraint, or
to Violence : whose Pursuits
are unhindered, his Desires
successful, his Aversions unincurred. Who then
would wish to lead a wrong Course of Life? —

“ No one.” — Who would live deceived, prone to mistake, unjust, dissolute, discontented, dejected? — “ No one.” — No wicked Man then lives as he likes; therefore neither is he free. And who would live in Sorrow, Fear, Envy, Pity; with disappointed Desires, and incurred Aversions? — “ No one.” — Do we then find any of the Wicked exempt from Sorrow, Fear; disappointed Desires, incurred Aversions? — “ Not one.” — Consequently then, not free (a).

§. 2. If a Person who hath been twice Consul should hear this, provided you add, “ but you are a wise Man; this is nothing to you;” he will forgive you. But if you tell him the Truth; that, in point of Slavery, he doth not differ from those who have been thrice sold, what must you expect, but to be beaten? “ For how, says he, am I a Slave? My Father was free, my Mother free (b). Besides, I am a Senator too, and the Friend of *Cæsar*; and have been twice Consul; and have myself many Slaves.” — In the first Place, most worthy Sir, perhaps your Father too was a Slave of the same kind; and your Mother, and your Grandfather, and all your Ancestors

(a) *Whosoever committeth Sin, is the Servant of Sin.* John viii. 34.

(b) *They answered him, We be Abraham's Seed, and were never in Bondage to any Man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?* John viii. 33.

tors successively. But even if they were ever so free, what is that to *you*? For what, if they were of a generous, you of a mean Spirit: they, brave; and you, a Coward: they sober; and you, dissolute?

§. 3. And, "What, says he, is this towards "being a Slave?" (c)—Do you think it nothing towards being a Slave, to act against your Will? Compelled, and lamenting?—"Be it so. But "who can compel me, but the Master of All, "*Cæsar*?"—By your own Confession then, you have *one* Master: and let not his being, as you say, Master of All, give you any Comfort; but know that you are a Slave in a great Family. Thus the *Nicopolitans* too, frequently cry out, "By the "Life of *Cæsar*, we are free!"

§. 4. For the present, however, if you please, we will let *Cæsar* alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in Love with any one, either of a servile or liberal Condition?—"Why, what is "that to the being either a Slave, or free?"—Was you never commanded any thing by your Mistress, that you did not chuse? Have you never flattered your Slave? Have you never kissed her Feet? And yet, if you were commanded to kiss *Cæsar's* Feet, you would think it an Outrage, and

H 2

an

(c) Mr. Upton's Copy transposes many Pages of this Chapter to their right Place; which, in others, were joined to the last Chapter of the Third Book.

an Excess of Tyranny. Have you never gone out by Night, where you did not chuse? Have you never spent more than you chose? Have not you sometimes uttered your Words with Sighs and Groans? Born to be reviled, and shut out of Doors? But, if you are ashamed to confess your own Follies, see what *Thrasonides* (*d*) says, and doth; who, after having fought more Battles perhaps than you, went out by Night, when *Geta* (*e*) would not dare to go: Nay, had he been compelled to it by him, would have gone roaring, and lamenting his bitter Servitude. And what doth [this Master of his] say afterwards? “A
 “ sorry Girl hath enslaved *me*, whom no Enemy
 “ ever enslaved.”—(Wretch! to be the Slave of
 a Girl, and a sorry Girl too! Why then do you still call yourself *free*? Why do you boast your military Expeditions?)—Then he calls for a Sword, and is angry with the Person, who, out of Kindness, denies it; and sends Presents to her who hates him; and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little Success. But how is he elated even then? Is it so, as neither passionately to desire or fear.

§. 5. Consider, in Animals, what is our Idea of Freedom. Some keep tame Lions, and feed,
 and

(*d*) A Character in one of the Comedies of *Menander*, called *The Hated Lover*.

(*e*) The Name of a Slave.

and even carry them about with them : and who will say, that any such Lion is free ? Nay, doth he not live the more slavishly, the more he lives at Ease ? And who, that had Sense and Reason, would wish to be one of those Lions ? Again : How much do Birds, which are taken and kept in a Cage, suffer, by trying to fly away ? Nay, some of them starve with Hunger, rather than undergo such a Life : then, as many of them as are saved, it is scarcely, and with Difficulty, and in a pining Condition ; and the Moment they find any Hole, out they hop. Such a Desire have they of natural Freedom, and to be at their own Disposal, and unrestrained. — “ And what Harm (f) doth this Confinement do you ? ” — “ What say you ? ” — “ I was born to fly where I please, to live in the open Air, to sing when I please. You deprive me of all this, and say, What *Harm* doth it do you ? ”

§. 6. Hence we will allow those only to be free, who do not endure Captivity ; but, as soon as they are taken, die, and escape. Thus *Diogenes* somewhere says, That the only Way to Freedom is to die with Ease. And he writes to the *Persian King* ; “ You can no more enslave the *Athenians*, than you can Fish. ” — “ How ? What, shall not I take them ? ” — “ If you do take them, ” says he, they will leave you, and be gone, like Fish. For take a Fish, and it dies. And, if

H. 3

“ the

(f) *Wolfius*, very rightly, for *καλον* reads *κακον*.

“ the *Athenians* too die, as soon as you have taken them, of what Use are your warlike Preparations ?”—This is the Voice of a free Man, who had examined the Matter in earnest ; and, as it might be expected, found it out. But, if you seek it where it is not, what Wonder if you never find it ?

§. 7. A Slave wishes to be immediately set free. Think you it is because he is desirous to pay his Fine to the Officer (g) ? No ; but because he fancies, that for want of acquiring his Freedom, he hath hitherto lived under Restraint, and unprosperously. “ If I am once set free, says he, it is all Prosperity : I care for no one ; I speak to All, as their Equal, and on a Level with them. I go where I will, I come when (h), and how I will.” He is at last made free ; and presently, having no where to eat, he seeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may sup. He then either submits to the basest and most infamous Prostitution ; and if he can obtain Admission to some great Man’s Table, falls into a Slavery much worse than the former ; or, if the Creature, void of Sense and right Taste, happens to acquire an affluent Fortune, he doats upon some Girl, laments, and is unhappy, and wishes for Slavery again. “ For what Harm did it do me ? Another clothed me

(g) See Vol. I. p. 136. Note (d).

(h) It seems necessary, that ~~she~~ and ~~we~~ should be ~~eray~~ and ~~ones~~ ; and they are so translated.

“ me, another shod me, another fed me, another
 “ took care of me when I was sick. It was but
 “ in a few Things, by way of Return, I used to
 “ serve him. But now, miserable Wretch ! what
 “ do I suffer, in being a Slave to many, instead
 “ of one ! Yet, if I can obtain the Equestrian
 “ Rings (i), I shall live with the utmost Prospe-
 “ rity and Happiness.” In order to obtain them,
 he first suffers what he deserves ; and, as soon as
 he hath obtained them, it is all the same again.
 “ But then, says he, if I do but get a military
 “ Command, I shall be delivered from all my
 “ Troubles.” He gets a military Command.
 He suffers as much as the vilest Rogue of a Slave :
 and, nevertheless, he asks for a second Command,
 and a third : and when he hath put the finishing
 Hand, and is made a Senator, then he is a Slave
 indeed. When he comes into the Assembly, it is
 then that he undergoes his finest and most splendid
 Slavery.

§. 8. — (k). Not to be a Fool ; but to learn
 what *Socrates* taught ; the Nature of Things :
 and not to adapt Pre-conceptions rashly to parti-
 cular Subjects. For the Cause of all human Evils
 is, the not being able to adapt general Pre-con-
 ceptions to particular Cases. But different Peo-

H 4

ple

(i) A Gold Ring was the peculiar Ornament of the Ro-
 man Knights, by which they were distinguished from the
 Plebeians. UPTON.

(k) Something is here wanting in the Original:

ple have different Opinions. One thinks the Cause of his Evils to be, that he is sick. By no means : but that he doth not adapt his Pre-conceptions right. Another, that he is poor : another, that he hath a harsh Father and Mother : another, that he is not in the good Graces of *Cæsar*. This is nothing else, but not understanding how to adapt our Pre-conceptions. For, who hath not a Pre-conception of Evil, that it is hurtful ? That it is to be avoided ? That it is by all means to be prudently guarded against ? One Pre-conception doth not contradict another, except when it comes to be adapted. What then is this Evil, thus hurtful, and to be avoided ? “ Not to be the Friend of *Cæsar*,” saith one. He is gone ; he fails in the adapting ; he is embarrassed ; he seeks what is nothing to the Purpose. For, if he gets to be *Cæsar*’s Friend, he is never the less distant from what he sought. For what is it that every Man seeks ? To be secure, to be happy, to do what he pleases without Restraint, and without Compulsion. When he becomes the Friend of *Cæsar* then, doth he cease to be restrained ? To be compelled ? Is he secure ? Is he happy ? Whom shall we ask ? Whom can we better credit than this very Man, who hath been his Friend ? Come forth and tell us, whether you sleep more quietly now, or before you were the Friend of *Cæsar* ?

You

You presently hear him cry, "Leave off, for Heaven's sake, and do not insult me. You know not the Miseries I suffer: there is no Sleep for me; but one comes, and saith, that *Cæsar* is already awake; another, that he is just going out. Then follow Perturbations, then Cares."

Well: and when did you use to sup more pleasantly, formerly, or now? Hear what he says about this too. When he is not invited, he is distracted: and if he is, he sups like a Slave with his Master, solicitous all the while, not to say or do any thing foolish. And what think you? Is he afraid of being whipped, like a Slave? How can he hope to escape so well? No: but as becomes so great a man, *Cæsar's* Friend, of losing his Head.—And when did you bathe more quietly; when did you perform your Exercises more at your leisure; in short, which Life would you rather wish to live, your present, or the former? I could swear, there is no one so stupid and insensible (1), as not to deplore his Miseries, in proportion as he is more the Friend of *Cæsar*.

§. 9. Since then, neither they who are called Kings (m), nor the Friends of Kings, live as they like; who, after all, are free? Seek, and you will find: for you are furnished by Nature with Means

H 5

for

(1) ἀνάλγητος for ἀνάλγητος. UPTON.

(m) The Stoics held the wise Man to be the only real King. UPTON.

for discovering the Truth. But, if you are not able by these alone to find the Consequences, hear them who have sought it. What do they say? Do you think Freedom a Good?—"The greatest."—Can any one then, who attains the greatest Good be unhappy, or unsuccessful in his Affairs?—"No."—As many, therefore, as you see unhappy, lamenting, unprosperous, confidently pronounce them not free.—"I do."—Henceforth then we have done with buying and selling, and such like stated Conditions of becoming Slaves. For, if you have made these Concessions properly, whether a great or a little King, a Consular, or one twice a Consul, be unhappy, he is not free.—"Agreed."

§. 10. Further then, answer me this: do you think Freedom to be something great, and noble, and valuable?—"How should I not?"—Is it possible then, that he who acquires any thing so great and valuable, and noble, should be of an abject Spirit?—"It is not."—Whenever then you see any one subject to another, and flattering him, contrary to his own Opinion, confidently say, that He too is not free: and not only if he doth it for a Supper, but even if it be for a Government; nay, a Consulship: but call those indeed little Slaves, who act thus for the sake of little Things; and the others, as they deserve, great Slaves.—"Be this too agreed."—Well: do you think Freedom

to be something independent and self-determined ? — “ How can it be otherwise ? ” — Him then, whom it is in the Power of another to restrain or to compel, affirm confidently, to be not free. And do not mind his Grandfathers, or Great Grandfathers ; or inquire, whether he hath been bought or sold : but, if you hear him say, from his Heart, and with Emotion, *my Master*, though twelve Lictors should march before him, call him a Slave. And, if you should hear him say, *Wretch, that I am ! what do I suffer !* call him a Slave. In short, if you see him wailing, complaining, unprosperous, call him a Slave in Purple. — “ Suppose then he doth nothing of all this. ” — Do not yet say, he is free ; but learn whether his Principles are liable to Compulsion, to Restraint, or Disappointment ; and, if you find this to be the Case, call him a Slave, keeping Holiday during the *Saturnalia* (n). Say, that his Master is abroad : he will come presently ; and you will know what he suffers. — “ Who will come ? ” — Whoever hath the Power either of bestowing, or taking away, any of the Things he wishes for. — “ Have we so many Masters then ? ” — We have. For, prior to all such, we have the Things themselves for our Masters ; now they are many : and it is through these, that

H 6 it

(n) The Feast of *Saturn*, in which the Slaves had a Liberty of sitting at Table with their Masters ; in Memory of the Equality of Conditions under his Reign.

it becomes necessary that such as have the Disposal of them, should be our Masters too. For no one fears *Cæsar* himself; but Death, Banishment, Loss of Goods, Prison, Disgrace. Nor doth any one love *Cæsar*, unless he be a Person of great Worth: but we love Riches, the Tribunate, the Prætorship, the Consulship. When we love, and hate, and fear these Things, they who have the Disposal of them must necessarily be our Masters. Hence we even worship them as Gods. For we consider, that whoever hath the Disposal of the greatest Advantages, is a Deity: and then we subjoin falsely, *but such a one hath the Power of the greatest Advantages; therefore he is a Deity*. For, if we subjoin falsely, the Inference arising from thence must be false likewise.

§. 11. “What is it then that makes a Man free
 “and independent? For neither Riches, nor
 “Consulship, nor Command of Provinces, or
 “Kingdoms, make him so; but something else
 “must be found.”—What is it that preserves any
 one from being hindered and restrained in Writing?
 —“The Science of Writing.”—In Music?
 —“The Science of Music.”—Therefore, in
 Life too, the Science of Living. As you have
 heard it in general then, consider it likewise in
 Particulars. Is it possible for Him to be unre-
 strained, who desires any of those Things, that
 are

are in the Power of others?—"No."—Can he avoid being hindered?—"No."—Therefore neither can he be free. Consider then, whether we have nothing, or all, in our own Power alone, or whether some Things are in our own Power and some in that of others.—"What do you mean?"—When you would have your Body perfect, is it in your own Power, or is it not?—"It is not."—When you would be healthy?—"Nor this."—When you would be handsome?—"Nor this."—Live or die?—"Nor this."—Body then is not our own; but subject to every thing stronger than itself.—"Agreed."—Well: is it in your own Power to have an Estate when you please, and such a one as you please?—"No."—Slaves?—"No."—Clothes?—"No."—A House?—"No."—Horses?—"Indeed none of these."—Well: if you would ever so fain have your Children live, or your Wife, or your Brother, or your Friends, is it in your own Power?—"No, nor this."—Will you say then, that there is *nothing* independent, which is in your own Power alone, and unalienable? See then, if you have any thing of this sort.—"I do not know."—But, consider it thus: Can any one make you assent to a Falseness?—"No one."—In the Topic of Assent then, you are unrestrained and unhindered.—"Agreed."—Well: and can any one compel you to exert your Pursuits, towards what you do
not

not like? — “He can. For when he threatens me with Death, or Fetters, he compels me to exert them.” — If then you were to despise dying, or being fettered, would you any longer regard him? — “No.” — Is despising Death then an Action in our Power, or is it not? — “It is.” — Is it therefore in your Power also, to exert your Pursuits towards any thing, or is it not? — “Agreed, that it is. But in whose Power is my avoiding any thing?” — This too is in your own. — “What then, if, when I am exerting myself to walk, any one should restrain me?” — What Part of you can he restrain? Can he restrain your Assent? — “No: but my Body.” — Ay, as he may a Stone. — “Be it so. But still I walk no more.” — And who told you, that Walking was an Action of your own, that cannot be restrained? For I only said, that your exerting yourself towards it could not be restrained. But, where there is need of Body, and its Assistance, you have already heard, that nothing is in your Power. — “Be this too agreed.” — And can any one compel you to desire against your Will? — “No one.” — Or to propose, or intend, or, in short, not to make use of the Appearances which present themselves to you? — “Nor this. But when I desire any thing, he will restrain me from obtaining what I desire.” — If you desire any thing that is your own, and that cannot be restrained;

restrained, how can He restrain you?"—"By no means."—And pray who tells you, that he who desires what depends on another, cannot be restrained?—"May not I desire Health then?"—By no means: nor any thing else that depends on another: for what is not in your own Power, either to procure, or to preserve, when you will, *that* belongs to another. Keep off not only your Hands from it, but, far prior to these, your Desires. Otherwise you have given yourself up a Slave: you have put your Neck under the Yoke, if you admire any of the Things not your own, but subject and mortal, to which soever of them you are attached.—"Is not my Hand my own?"—It is a Part of you; but it is, by Nature, Clay; liable to Restraint, to Compulsion; a Slave to every thing stronger than itself. And why do I say your *Hand*? You ought to possess your whole *Body* as a paultry Ass, with a Pack-saddle on, as long as may be, as long as it is allowed you. But, if there should come a Press (*a*), and a Soldier should lay hold on it, let it go. Do not resist, or murmur: otherwise you will be first beat, and lose the Ass after all. And, since you are to consider, the Body [itself] in this manner, think what remains to do concerning those Things which are provided for the Sake of the Body. If *that* be an Ass,

(*a*) Beasts of Burden and Carriages are pressed, for the Use of Armies, when Need requires.

As, the rest are Bridles, Pack-saddles, Shoes, Oats, Hay, for the As. Let these go too. Quit them more easily and expeditiously, than the As. And when you are thus prepared, and thus exercised, to distinguish what belongs to others from your own ; what is liable to Restraint, from what is not ; to esteem the one your own Property, the other not ; to keep your Desire, to keep your Aversion, carefully turned to this Point ; whom have you any longer to fear ?—"No one."—For about what should you be afraid ? About what is your own, in which consists the Essence of Good and Evil ? And who hath any Power over *this* ? Who can take it away ? Who can hinder you ? No more than God [can be hindered]. But are you afraid for Body, for Possessions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you ? And what have you been studying all this while, but to distinguish between your own, and not your own ; what is in your Power, and what is not in your Power ; what is liable to Restraint, and what is not ? And for what Purpose have you applied to the Philosophers ? That you might be never the less disappointed and unfortunate ? No doubt you will be exempt from Fear and Perturbation ! And what is *Grief* to you ? For [nothing but] what we fear, when expected, affects us with Grief when present. And what will you any longer

longer passionately wish for? For you have a temperate and steady Desire of Things dependent on Choice, as they are good, and present: and you have no Desire of Things independent on Choice, so as to leave room for that irrational and impetuous, and immoderately hasty Passion.

§. 12. Since then you are thus affected with regard to *Things*, what *Man* can any longer be formidable to you? What hath *Man* formidable to *Man*, either in Appearance, or Speech, or mutual Intercourse? No more than Horse to Horse, or Dog to Dog, or Bee to Bee. But *Things* are formidable to every one, and whenever any Person can either confer or take away these from another, *He* becomes formidable too. — “How (p) then is the Citadel” [the Seat of Tyranny] “to be destroyed?” — Not by Sword or Fire, but by Principle. For if we should demolish that which is in the Town, shall we have demolished also that of a Fever, of pretty Girls, in short, the Citadel within ourselves; and turned out the Tyrants, to whom we are subject upon all Occasions, every Day; sometimes the same, sometimes others? From hence we must begin; from hence demolish the Citadel; turn out the Tyrants: give

up.
(p) *Epictetus* here personates one desirous of recovering the Liberty of the City, in which he lives. There were Citadels, erected from Time to Time in *Greek* Cities, to support Tyrants: and they and the Citadels were destroyed together, whenever it could be done.

up Body, its Parts, Riches, Power, Fame, Magistracies, Honours, Children, Brothers, Friends : esteem all these as belonging to others. And, if the Tyrants be turned out from hence, why should I besides demolish the [external] Citadel ; at least, on my own Account ? For what doth it do to *me* by standing ? Why should I turn out the Guards ? For in what Point do they affect *me* ? It is against others they direct their Fasces, their Staves, and their Swords. Have I ever been restrained from what I willed ; or compelled against my Will ? Indeed how is this possible ? I have ranged my Pursuits under the Direction of God. Is it His Will, that I should have a Fever ? It is my Will too. Is it His Will, that I should pursue any Thing ? It is my Will too. Is it his Will that I should desire ? It is my Will too. Is it his Will, that I should obtain any Thing ? It is mine too. Is it not His Will ? It is not mine. Is it his Will, that I should be tortured (g) ? Then it is my Will to be tortured. Is it his Will, that I should die ? Then it is my Will to die. Who can any longer restrain or compel me, contrary to my own Opinion ? No more than *Jupiter* [can be restrained]. It is thus that cautious Travellers act. Doth any hear, that the Road is beset by Robbers ? He doth not set out alone ; but waits for the Retinue of an Ambassador, or Quæstor, or

(g) The Translation here is agreeable to Mr. *Upton's* Copy.

or a Proconsul: and, when he hath joined himself to their Company, goes along in Safety. Thus doth the prudent Man act in the World. There are many Robberies, Tyrants, Storms, Distresses, Losses of Things the most dear. Where is there any Refuge? How can he go along unattacked? What Retinue can he wait for, to go safely through his Journey? To what Company join himself? To some rich Man? To some Consular Senator? And what Good will that do me? He is [often] stripa himself; groans and laments. And what if my Fellow-Travelles himself should turn against me, and rob me? What shall I do? I will be the Friend of *Cæsar*. While I am his Companion, no one will injure me. Yet, before I can become illustrious enough for this, what must I bear and suffer! How often, and by how many, must I be robbed! And then, if I do become the Friend of *Cæsar*, he too is mortal: and if, by any Accident, he should become my Enemy, where can I best retreat? To a Desert? Well: and doth not a Fever come there? What can be done then? Is it not possible to find a Fellow-Traveller, safe, faithful, brave, incapable of being surprized? A Person, who reasons thus, understands and considers, that, if he joins himself to God, he shall go safely through his Journey. — “How do you mean, join himself?” — That whatever is the Will of God, may be his Will.

Will too: whatever is not the Will of God, may not be *his*. — “How then can this be done?” — Why, how otherwise than by considering the Exertions of God’s Power, and his Administration? What hath he given me, my own, and independent? What hath he reserved to himself? He hath given me whatever depends upon Choice. The Things in my Power he hath made incapable of Hindrance or Restraint. But how could he make a Body of Clay (r) incapable of Hindrance? Therefore he hath subjected [that, and] Possessions, Furniture, House, Children, Wife, to the Revolution of the Universe. Why then do I fight against God? Why do I will to retain what depends not on Will? What is not granted absolutely; but how? In such a Manner, and for such a Time, as was thought proper. But he who gave, taken away (s). Why then do I resist? Not to say, that I shall be a Fool in contending with a stronger than myself: what is a prior Consideration, I shall be unjust. For whence had I these Things, when I came into the World? My Father gave them to me. And who gave them to *him*? And who made the Sun? Who, the Fruits? Who, the Seasons? Who, their Connexion and Relations to each other? And, after you have received all, and even
your

(r) See B. I. c. 1. §. 3.

(s) *The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away.* Job
1. 21.

your very Self from another, are you angry with the Giver; and complain, if He takes any thing away from you? Who are you; and for what Purpose did you come? Was it not He who brought you here? Was it not He who showed you the Light? Hath not He given you Assistants? Hath not He given you Senses? Hath not He given you Reason? And as whom did He bring you here? Was it not as a Mortal? Was it not as one to live, with a little Portion of Flesh, upon Earth, and to see his Administration; to behold the Spectacle with him, and partake of the Festival for a short Time? After having beheld the Spectacle, and the Solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart, when He leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and seen? — “No: but I
 “ would enjoy the Feast still longer.” — So would the Initiated too be longer in their Initiation; so, perhaps, would the Spectators at *Olympia* see more Combatants. But the Solemnity is over. Go away. Depart, like a grateful and modest Person: make room for others. Others too must be born, as you were; and, when they are born, must have a Place, and Habitations, and Necessaries. But, if the first do not give way, what [Room] is there left? Why are you insatiable? Why are you unconscionable? Why do you crowd the World? — “Ay: but I would have
 “ my

"my Wife and Children with me too."—Why, are they *your's*? Are they not the Giver's? Are they not His who made *you* also? Will you not quit what belongs to another then? Will you not yield to your Superior? — "Why then did he
 "bring me into the World upon these Condi-
 "ons?" — Well: If it is not worth your while, depart (*t*). He hath no Need of a discontented Spectator. He wants such as may share the Festival; make Part of the Chorus: who may rather extol, applaud, celebrate the Solemnity: He will not be displeased to see the Wretched and Fearful dismissed from it. For, when they were present, they did not behave as at a Festival, nor fill a proper Place; but lamented, found Fault with the Deity, Fortune, their Companions: insensible both of their Advantages, and their Powers, which they received for contrary Purposes; the Powers of Magnanimity, Nobleness of Spirit, Fortitude, and the Subject of our present Enquiry, Freedom.—
 "For

(*s*) And is this all the Comfort, every serious Reader will be apt to say, which one of the best Philosophers, in one of his noblest Discourses, can give to the good Man under severe Distress? "Either tell yourself, that present Suffering, void of future Hope, is no Evil; or give up your Existence, and mingle with the Elements of the Universe!" Unspeakably more rational, and more worthy of infinite Goodness, is our blessed Master's Exhortation to the persecuted Christian: "Rejoice, and be exceeding glad, for great
 "is your Reward in Heaven."

“ For what Purpose then have I received these
“ Things ? ” — To use them. — “ How long ? ” —
As long as He, who lent them, pleases. If then
they are not necessary, do not attach yourself to
them, and they will not be so : do not tell yourself,
that they are necessary, and they are not.

§. 13. This should be our Study from Morn-
ing till Night, beginning from the least and frail-
est Things, from an earthen Vessel, from a Glass.
Afterwards, proceed to a Suit of Clothes, a Dog,
a Horse, an Estate : from thence to your Self,
Body, Parts of the Body, Children, Wife, Bro-
thers. Look every-where around you, and throw
them from yourself. Correct your Principles,
See that nothing cleave to you, which is not your
own ; nothing grow (*u*) to you, that may give
you Pain, when it is torn away. And say, when
you are daily exercising yourself as you do here,
not that you act the Philosopher (admit this to be
an insolent Title), but that you are asserting your
Freedom. For this is true Freedom. This is
the Freedom, that *Diogenes* gained from *Antis-
thenes* ; and declared, it was impossible, that he
should ever after be a Slave, to any one. Hence,
when he was taken Prisoner, how did he treat the
Pirates ? Did he call any of them Master ? (I do
not mean the Name, for I am not afraid of a
Word, but the Disposition from whence the Word
proceeds.)

(*u*) Mr. Upton's Conjecture.

proceeds.) How did he reprove them for feeding their Prisoners ill? How was he sold? Did he seek a Master? (w) No: but a Slave. And when he was sold, how did he converse with his Lord? He immediately disputed with him, that he ought not to be dressed nor shaved in the manner he was; how he ought to bring up his Children. And where is the Wonder? For if the same Master had bought an Instructor for his Children, in the Exercises of the *Palæstra*, would he in those Exercises have treated him as a Servant, or as a Master? And so if he had bought a Physician or an Architect? In every Subject, the Skilful must necessarily be superior to the Unskilful. What else then can he be but Master, who possesses the universal Knowledge of Life? For who is Master in a Ship? The Pilot. Why? Because whoever disobeys him is a Loser.—“But a Master can put me “in Chains.”—Can he do it then without being a Loser?—“So I, among others, used to think.”—But, because he must be a Loser, for that very Reason it is not in his Power: for no one acts unjustly, without being a Loser.—“And what “Loss doth he suffer, who puts his own Slave “in Chains?”—What think you? The very putting him in Chains. This you yourself must grant, if you would preserve the Doctrine, that Man is not a wild, but a gentle Animal. For when

(w) See Vol. I. p. 189. Note (c).

when is it, that a Vine is in a bad Condition?—
 “ When it is in a Condition contrary to its Na-
 “ ture.”—When a Cock?—“ The same.”—
 Therefore a Man too. What then is his Nature? To bite, and kick, and throw into Prison, and cut off Heads? No: but to do good, to assist, to indulge the Wishes of others. Whether you will or not then, he is in a bad Condition, when-ever he acts unreasonably.—“ And so, was not Sa-
 “ crates in a bad Condition?”—No: but his Judges and Accusers.—“ Nor Helvidius, at Rome? —No: but his Murderer.—“ How do you talk?” —(x) Why, just as you do. You do not call that Cock in a bad Condition, which is victorious, and wounded; but that which is conquered, and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a Dog happy, which neither hunts nor toils; but when you see him sweating, and in pain, and panting, with the Chace. In what do we talk Paradoxes? If we say, that the Evil of every thing consists in what is contrary to its Nature, is this a Paradox? Do not you say it with regard to other Things? Why therefore, in the Case of Man alone, do you take a different Turn? But farther: it is no Paradox to say, that by Nature Man is gentle, and social, and faithful.—

VOL. II.

I

“ This

(x) The Translation here follows a different Pointing from Mr. Upton, Πως λεγεις; ως και συ. Αλεκτηριστα, &c.

"This is (y) none neither."—How then [is it a Paradox to say,] that, when he is whipped, or imprisoned, or beheaded, he is not hurt? If he suffers nobly, doth not he come off even the better, and a Gainer? But he is the Person hurt, who suffers the most miserable and shameful Evils: who, instead of a Man, becomes a Wolf, or Viper, or a Hornet.

§. 14. Come then: let us recapitulate what hath been granted. The Man who is unrestrained, who hath all Things in his Power as he wills, is free: but he who may be restrained, or compelled, or hindered, or thrown into any Condition against his Will, is a Slave.—"And who is unrestrained?"—He that desires none of those Things, that belong to others? "And what are those Things, which belong to others?"—Those which are not in our own Power, either to have, or not to have; or to have them of such a Sort, or in such a State. Body, therefore, belongs to another; its Parts, to another; Possessions, to another. If then you attach yourself to any of these as your own, you will be punished, as he deserves, who desires what belongs to others. This is the Way, that leads to Freedom; this the only Deliverance from Slavery: to be able at length to say, from the Bottom of one's Soul, *Conduct?*

(y) This Answer implies a silent Concession, that it is no Paradox to affirm, the Evil of every thing to consist, in what is contrary to its Nature.

*Conduct me, Jove, and thou, O Destiny,
Where-ever Your Decrees have fix'd my Lot.*

§. 15. But what say you, Philosopher? A Tyrant summons you to speak something unbecoming you. Will you say it, or will you not? — “Stay, let me consider.” — Would you consider now? And what did you use to consider, when you were in the Schools? Did not you study what Things are good, and evil, and what indifferent? — “I did.” — Well: and what were the Opinions which pleased us? — “That just and
“(x) fair Actions were good; unjust and base
“ones, evil.” — Is living a Good? — “No.” — Dying, an Evil? — “No.” — A Prison? — “No.” — And what did a mean and dishonest Speech, the betraying a Friend, or the flattering a Tyrant, appear to us? — “Evils.” — Why then are you still considering, and have not already considered, and come to a Resolution? For what Sort of a Consideration is this? *Whether I ought, when it is in my Power, to procure myself the greatest Good, instead of procuring myself the greatest Evil.* A fine and necessary Consideration, truly, and deserving mighty Deliberation! Why do you trifle with us, Man? There never was any such Point considered: nor, if you really imagined what was fair and

I 2

honest

(x) The Translation here follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture.

honest to be good, what base and dishonest, evil, and all other Things indifferent, would you ever be at such a Stand as this, or near it: but you would presently be able to distinguish, by your Understanding, as you do by your Sight. For do you ever consider, whether black is white: or light, heavy? Do not you follow the plain Evidence of your Senses? Why then do you say, that you are now considering, whether Things indifferent are to be avoided, rather than Evils? The Truth is, you have no Principles: for neither doth the one Sort of Things appear to you indifferent, but the greatest Evils; nor the other Evils, but Matters of no Concern to you. For thus you have accustomed yourself from the first.

“ Where am I? In the School? And is there
 “ an Audience? I talk as the Philosophers do.
 “ But am I got out from the School? Away
 “ with this Stuff, that belongs only to Scholars
 “ and Fools. This Man is accused by the Tes-
 “ timony of a Philosopher, his Friend: this Phi-
 “ losopher turns Parasite; that hires himself out
 “ for Money; a third doth it in the very Senate.
 “ Who doth not wish what appears [to himself
 “ to be right]? His (a) Principles exclaim from
 “ within.”

(a) There is much Obscurity, and some Variety of Reading, in several Lines of the Original, in this Place; and I am not certain, whether the Translation hath given the true Sense; but it is the best I could make of it,

“ within.”—You are a poor cold Lump of Opinion, consisting of mere Words ; on which you hang, as by a Hair. But preserve yourself firm, and make a due Use of the Appearances ; remembering, that you are to be exercised in Things. In what manner do you hear, I do not say, that your Child is dead, (for how should you bear that ?) but that your Oil is spilled, your Wine drank out ? That any one, while you are bawling, might only say this ; “ Philosopher, you talk otherwise in the Schools. Why do you deceive us ? Why, when you are a Worm, do you call yourself a Man ? ” I should be glad to be near one of these Philosophers, while he is revelling in Debauchery, that I might see how he exerts himself, and what Sayings he utters ; whether he remembers his Title, and the Discourses which he hears, or speaks, or reads.

§. 16. “ And what is all this to Freedom ? ” — Truly nothing else is, but this, whether you rich People will or not.—“ And who is your Evidence of this ? ” — Who, but yourselves ? Who have a powerful Master, and live by his Motion and Nod, and faint away, if he doth but look sternly upon you : who pay your Court to old Men, and old Women, and say, “ I cannot do this, it is not in my Power.” Why is it not in your Power ? Did not you just now contradict me, and say, you were free ? — “ But

"*Aprylla* (*b*) hath forbid me."—Speak the Truth then, Slave, and do not run away from your Masters; nor deny them; nor dare to assert your Freedom, when you have so many Proofs of your Slavery. One might indeed find some Excuse for a Person, compelled by Love to do something contrary to his Opinion, even when at the same time he sees what is best, and yet hath not Resolution enough to follow it: since he is with-held by something violent, and in some measure, divine. But who can bear you, who are in Love with old Men and old Women; and wipe their Noses, and wash them, and bribe them with Presents, and wait upon them when they are sick, like a Slave; at the same time wishing they may die, and enquiring of the Physician, whether their Distemper be yet mortal? And again, when for these great and venerable Magistracies and Honours, you kiss the Hands of the Slaves of others; so that you are the Slave of those who are not free themselves! And then you walk about in State, a Prætor, or a Consul. Do not I know how you came to be Prætor: whence you received the Consulship; who gave it you? For my own Part, I would not even live, if I must live by *Felicia's* Means, and bear his Pride, and slavish Insolence.

(*b*) Probably some rich old Woman, from whom the Speaker had Expectations.

solence. For I know what a Slave is, blinded by what he thinks good Fortune.

§. 17. Are you free yourself then? (It will be said.) By Heaven I wish and pray for it. But I cannot yet face my Masters. I still pay a Regard to my Body, and set a great Value on keeping it whole; though at the same time it is not whole (c). But I can show you one who was free, that you may no longer seek an Example. *Diogenes* was free.—“How so?”—Not because he was of free Parents, for he was not: but because he was so himself; because he had cast away all the Handles of Slavery; nor was there any Way of getting at him, nor any where to lay hold on him, to enslave him. Every thing sat loose upon him, every thing only just hung on. If you took hold on his Possessions, he would rather let them go, than follow you for them: if on his Leg, he let go his Leg: if his Body, he let go his Body: Acquaintance, Friends, Country, just the same. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom, and upon what Conditions he received them. But he would never have forsaken his true Parents the Gods, and his real Country; nor have suffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he: nor would any one have died more readily for his Country

I 4

than

(c) *Epicteus* here alludes to his own Lameness. See Vol. I. p. 39 and 69.

than he. For he never fought when it would be proper for him to act for the sake of (*d*) any thing else, [except his real Country the Universe ;] but he remembered, that every thing that exists is from thence, and carried on by it, and commanded by its Ruler. Accordingly, see what he himself says and writes. “ Upon this Account, says he, O *Diogenes*, it is in your Power
 “ to converse as you will with the *Persian Monarch*, and with *Archidamus*, King of the *Lacedemonians*.”—Was it because *he* was born of free Parents ? Or was it because *they* were descended from Slaves, that all the *Athenians*, and all the *Lacedemonians*, and *Corinthians*, could not converse with them as they pleased ; but feared and paid Court to them ? Why then is it in *your* Power, *Diogenes* ? “ Because I do not esteem this
 “ sorry Body as my own. Because I want nothing. Because these [Principles,] and nothing
 “ else, are a Law to me.” These were the Things that suffered him to be free.

§. 18. And that you may not think, that I show you the Example of a Man clear of Incumbrances ; without a Wife or Children, or Country, or Friends, or Relations, to bend and draw him aside : take *Socrates*, and consider him, who had

(*d*) This Passage hath great Difficulties in the Original. I have given it what appeared to me the best Sense. But I am still doubtful.

had a Wife and Children, but not as his own ; a Country, Friends, Relations ; but only as long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper ; and all these he submitted to the Law, and to the Obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight, he was the first to go out, and exposed himself to Danger, without the least Reserve. But when he was sent by the Thirty Tyrants to apprehend *Leo* (e) ; because he esteemed it a base Action, he did not deliberate about it ; though he knew, that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that signify to *him* ? For it was something else that *he* wanted to preserve, not his paultry Flesh : but his Fidelity, his Honour, free from Attack, or Subjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a Defence for his Life, doth he behave like one who had Children ? Or a Wife ? No : (f) but like a single Man. And how doth he behave, when he was to drink the Poison ? When he might have escaped, and

I 5

Crito

(e) *Socrates*, with Four other Persons, was commanded by the Thirty Tyrants of *Athens* to fetch *Leo* from the Isle of *Salamis*, in order to be put to Death. His Companions executed their Commission ; but *Socrates* remained at home, and chose rather to expose his Life to the Fury of the Tyrants, than be accessary to the Death of an innocent Person. He would most probably have fallen a Sacrifice to their Vengeance, if the Oligarchy had not shortly after been dissolved. See *PLATO's Apology*.

(f) Mr. *Upton's* Copy.

Crito persuaded him to get out of Prison, for the Sake of his Children, what doth he say? Doth he esteem it a fortunate Opportunity? How should he? But he considers what is becoming, and neither sees nor regards any thing else. "For I am not desirous, says he, to preserve this pitiful Body: but that [Part of me] which is improved and preserved by Justice, and impaired and destroyed by Injustice." *Socrates* is not to be basely preserved. He, who refused to vote for what the *Athenians* commanded: he, who condemned the Thirty Tyrants: he, who held such Discourses on Virtue, and moral Beauty: such a Man is not to be preserved by a base Action: but is preserved by dying, not by running away. For even a good Actor is preserved by leaving off when he ought; not by going on to act beyond his Time. "What then will become of your Children?" "If I had gone away into *Thessaly*, you would have taken care of them; and will there be no one to take care of them, when I am departed to *Hades*?" You see how he ridicules, and plays with Death. But, if it had been you or I, we should presently have proved, by philosophical Arguments, that those, who act unjustly, are to be repaid in their own Way; and should have added, "If I escape, I shall be of Use to many; if I die, to none." Nay, if it had been necessary, we should have crept through a Mouse-

a Mouse-hole to get away. But how should we have been of Use to any? For where must they have dwelt? If we were useful alive, should we not be of still more Use to Mankind, by dying when we ought, and as we ought? And now the Remembrance of the Death of *Socrates* is useless, but even more useful to the World, than that of the Things which he did and said, when alive.

§. 19. Study these Points, these Principles, these Discourses; contemplate these Examples, if you would be free, if you desire the Thing in Proportion to its Value, And where is the Wonder, that you should purchase so good a Thing at the Price of others, so many, and so great? Some hang themselves, others break their Necks, and sometimes even whole Cities have been destroyed, for that which is reputed Freedom: and will not you, for the Sake of the true, and secure, and inviolable Freedom, repay God what he hath given, when he demands it? Will you not study, not only as *Plato* says, to die, but to be tortured, and banished, and scourged; and, in short, to give up all that belongs to others. If not, you will be a Slave among Slaves, though you were ten thousand Times a Consul: and, even though you should rise to the Palace, you will be never the less so. And you will feel, that though Philosophers (as *Cleanthes* says) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common Opinion, yet not contrary to

Reason. For you will find it true in fact, that the Things that are eagerly followed and admired, are of no Use to those, who have gained them : while they who have not yet gained them, imagine, that, if they are acquired, every Good will come along with them : and then, when they are acquired, there is the same Feverishness, the same Agitation, the same Nauseating, and the same Desire of what is absent. For Freedom is not procured by a full Enjoyment of what is desired, but by proving the Desire to be a wrong one. And, in order to know that this is true, take the same Pains about these, which you have taken about other Things. Lie awake to acquire a Set of Principles, that will make you free. Instead of a rich old Man, pay your Court to a Philosopher. Be seen about his Doors. You will not get any Disgrace by being seen there. You will not return empty, or unprofited, if you go as you ought. However, try at least. The Trial is not dishonourable.

C H A P. II.

Of Complaisance (a).

§. 1. **T**O this Point you must attend before all others : Not to be so attached to any one of your former Acquaintance or Friends, as to condescend to the same Behaviour with his ; otherwise you will undo yourself. But, if it comes into your Head, *I shall appear odd to him, and he will not treat me as before*, remember, that there is nothing to be had for nothing : nor is it possible, that he who acts in the same manner, should not be the same Person. Chuse then, whether you will be loved by those you were formerly, and be like your former self ; or be better, and not meet with the same Treatment. For, if this is preferable, immediately incline altogether that Way, and let no other Kinds of Reasoning draw you aside : for no one can improve while he is wavering (b). If then you prefer this to every thing, if you would be fixed only on this, and employ all your Pains about it, give up every thing else. Otherwise this Wavering will affect you both Ways ; you will neither make a due Improvement, nor preserve the Advantages you had

(a) Compare this Chapter with *Matt. vi. 24. No Man can serve two Masters.*

(b) See *James i. 8.*

had before. For before, by setting your Heart intirely on Things of no Value, you were agreeable to your Companions. But you cannot excel in both Kinds : but must necessarily lose as much of the one, as you partake of the other. If you do not drink with those, with whom you used to drink, you cannot appear equally agreeable to them. Chuse then, whether you would be a Drunkard, and agreeable to them, or sober, and disagreeable to them. If you do not sing with those, with whom you used to sing, you cannot be equally dear to them. Here too then, chuse which you will. For if it is better to be modest and decent, than to have it said of you, *What an agreeable Fellow!* give up the rest ; renounce it ; withdraw yourself ; have nothing to do with it. But, if this doth not please you, incline, with your whole Force, the contrary Way. Be one of the Catamites ; one of the Adulterers. Act all that is consequent to such a Character, and you will obtain what you would have. Jump up in the Theatre too, and roar out in praise of the Dancer. But Characters so different are not to be confounded. You cannot act both *Thersites* and *Agamemnon*. If you would be *Thersites*, you must be hump-backed and bald : If *Agamemnon*, tall and handsome, and a Lover of those who are under your Care.

C H A P. III.

What Things are to be exchanged for others.

§. I. WHEN you have lost any thing external, have this always at hand, what you have got instead of it: and, if that be of more Value, do not by any means say, "I am a Loser:" whether it be a Horse for an Ass; an Ox for a Sheep; a good Action for a Piece of Money; a due Composedness of Mind for a dull Jest; or Modesty for indecent Discourse. By continually remembering this, you will preserve your Character such as it ought to be. Otherwise consider, that you are spending your Time in vain; and all that you are now applying your Mind to, you are going to spill and overset. And there needs but little, and a small Deviation from Reason, to destroy and overset all. A Pilot doth not need the same Apparatus to overset a Ship, as to save it; but, if he turns it a little to the Wind, it is lost: even if he should not do it by Design, but only for a Moment be thinking of something else, it is lost. Such is the Case here too. If you do but nod a little, all that you have hitherto collected is gone. Take heed then to the Appearances of Things. Keep yourself awake over them. It is no inconsiderable Matter you have

to guard; but Modesty, Fidelity, Constancy, Enjoyment (*a*), Exemption from Grief, Fear, Perturbation; in short, Freedom. For what will you sell these? Consider what the Purchase is worth. — “But shall I not get such a Thing instead of it?” — Consider, if you do get it (*b*), what it is that you obtain for the other. I have Decency; another the Office of a Tribune; I have Modesty; he hath the Prætorship. But I do not make Acclamations where it is unbecoming: I shall not rise (*c*) up [to do Honour to another] in a Case where I ought not: for I am free, and the Friend of God, so as to obey him willingly: but I must not value any thing else; neither Body, nor Possessions, nor Fame; in short nothing. For it is not His Will, that I should value them. For, if this had been his Pleasure, he would have made them my Good, which now he hath not done: therefore I cannot transgress his Commands. — “In every thing preserve your own proper Good.” — “But what of the rest?” — “Preserve *them* too according as it is permitted,

(*a*) See Vol. II. p. 112. Note (*e*).

(*b*) I suspect, that τυγχαναν should be ου τυγχαναν, and then the Translation will be, — Consider, on the other hand, if you do not get that, what you obtain instead of it.

(*c*) Probably *Epietetus* here alludes to the jumping up in the Theatre, in favour of some Actor, mentioned in the preceding Chapter, and in the fourth Chapter of the third Book.

“ted, and so far as to behave agreeably to Reason in relation to them; contented with this alone. Otherwise you will be unfortunate, disappointed, restrained, hindered.” These are the Laws, these the Statutes, transmitted from thence. Of these one ought to be an Expofitor, and to these obedient, not to those of *Mafurius* (d) and *Cassius*.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning Those who earnestly desire a Life of Repose.

§. I. **R**EMEMBER, that it is not only the Desire of Riches and Power, that renders us mean, and subject to others, but even of Quiet, and Leisure, and Learning, and Travelling. For, in general, valuing any external Thing whatever, subjects us to another. Where is the Difference then, whether you desire to be a Senator, or not to be a Senator? Where is the Difference whether you desire Power, or to be out of Power? Where is the Difference, whether you

(d) Two famous Lawyers. This Passage is an Instance of the manner of Speaking, less usual among the *Greek* and *Romans*, than the *Eastern Writers*; where enjoining one Thing, and forbidding another, means only that the first should be preferred in Case of Competition.

you say, "I am in a wretched Way, I have nothing to do; but am tied down to Books, as inactive as if I were dead;"—or, "I am in a wretched Way, I have no Leisure to read?" For as Levees and Power are among Things external, and independent on Choice, so, likewise is a Book. For what Purpose would you read? Tell me. For if you rest merely in being amused, and learning something, you are insignificant and miserable. But if you refer it to what you ought, what is that but a prosperous Life? And if Reading doth not procure you a prosperous Life, of what Use is it?—"But it doth procure a prosperous Life (say you); and therefore I am uneasy at being deprived of it."—And what sort of Prosperity is that, which every thing, I do not say *Cæsar*, or the Friend of *Cæsar*, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, ten thousand other Things, can hinder? But nothing is so essential to Prosperity, as the being perpetual, and unhindered. I am now called to do something. I now go therefore, and will be attentive to the Bounds and Measures, which ought to be observed; that I may act modestly, steadily, and without Desire or Aversion with regard to Externals (a). In the next place,

(a) The Readers, perhaps, may grow tired, with being so often told; what they will find it very difficult to believe. That, because Externals are not in our own Power; they are nothing to us. But, in Excuse for this frequent Repetition, it

place, I am attentive to other Men; what they say, and how they are moved; and that, not from Ill-nature, nor that I may have an Opportunity for Censure or Ridicule: but I turn to myself, [and ask,] "Am I also guilty of the same Faults; and how then shall I leave them off?"

(b) Once I too was faulty; but, God be thanked, not now. Well; when you have done thus, and been employed in this manner, have not you done as good a Work, as if you had read a thousand Lines, or written as many? For are you uneasy at not reading while you are eating, or bathing, or exercising? Are not you satisfied with performing these Actions conformably to what you have read? Why then do you not think uniformly about every thing? When you approach *Cæsar*, or any other Person, if you preserve yourself un-

passionate,

it must be considered, that the Stoics had reduced themselves to a Necessity of dwelling on this Consequence, extravagant as it is, by rejecting stronger Aids. One cannot indeed avoid highly admiring the very Few, who attempted to amend and exalt themselves, on this Foundation. No one, perhaps, ever carried the Attempt so far in Practice; and no one ever spoke so well in support of the Arguments, as *Epictetus*. Yet, notwithstanding his great Abilities, and the Force of his Example, one finds him strongly complaining of the want of Success: and one sees from this Circumstance, as well as from many others in the Stoic Writings, That Virtue cannot be maintained in the World, without the Hope of a future Reward.

(b) *Tere*, perhaps should be *etere*; and is so translated,

passionate, unalarmed, sedate; if you are rather an Observer of what is done, than-[yourself] observed; if you do not envy those who are preferred to you; if the Materials of Action do not strike you; what do you want? Books? How, or to what End? For is not this a kind of Preparation for Living, but Living itself, made up of Things different? Just as if a Champion, when he enters the Lists, should fall a crying, because he is not exercising without. It was for this, that you used to be exercised. For this, were the Poisers, the Dust (c), the young Fellows, your Antagonists. And do you now seek for these, when it is the Time for Business? This is just as if, in the Topic of Assent, when we are presented with Appearances, of which some are evidently true, others not, instead of distinguishing them, we should want to read Dissertations on Evidence.

§. 2. What then is the Cause of this? That we have neither read nor written, in order to treat the Appearances that occur to us, conformably to Nature, in our Behaviour. But we stop at learning what is said, and being able to explain it at others; at solving Syllogisms, and ranging hypothetical Arguments. Hence, where the Study is, there too is the Hindrance. Do you desire
absolutely

(c) The Olympic Champions used to rub themselves with Dust and Sand: which, as they were anointed, was necessary to give them the better Hold on each other. See Mr. Upton's Note on L. III. c. 15. p. 419. l. 10.

absolutely what is out of your Power? Be restrained then, be hindered, be disappointed. But if we read Dissertations about the Exertion of the Efforts, not merely to see what is said about the Efforts, but to exert them well : on Desire and Aversion, that we may not be disappointed of our Desires, nor incur our Aversions : on the Duties of Life, that, mindful of our Relations, we may do nothing irrationally, nor contrary to them: we should not be provoked at being hindered in our Reading ; but should be contented with the Performance of Actions suitable to us, and should not compute as we have hitherto been accustomed to compute. “ To day I have read so many
“ Lines ; I have written so many ;” but, “ To-
“ day I have used my Efforts as the Philosophers
“ direct. I have restrained my Desires abso-
“ lutely ; I have applied my Aversion only to
“ Things dependent on Choice. I have not
“ been terrified by such a one, nor put out of
“ Countenance by such another. I have exer-
“ cised my Patience, my Abstinence, my Benefi-
“ cence.” And thus we should thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we resemble the Vulgar in another Way also, and do not know it. One is afraid, that he shall not be in Power ; *you (d)*, that you shall. By no means be afraid of it, Man ; but as you laugh at *him*,
laugh

(d) The Translation follows the Conjecture of *Wolfius*.

laugh at *yourself*. For there is no Difference, whether you thirst, like one in a Fever, or dread Water, like him who is bit by a mad Dog. Else, how can you say, like *Socrates*, "If it so pleases God, so let it be?" Do you think that *Socrates*, if he had fixed his Desires on the Leisure of the *Lycæum*, or the Academy, or the Conversation of the Youth there, Day after Day, would have made so many Campaigns as he did so readily? Would not he have lamented and groaned; "How wretched am I! now must I be miserable here, when I might be sunning myself in the *Lycæum*?" Was that your Business in Life then, to sun yourself? Was it not to be prosperous? To be unrestrained? Unhindered? And how could he have been *Socrates*, if he had lamented thus? How could he, after that, have written Pæans in a Prison?

§. 3. In short then, remember this, that whatever external to your own Choice you esteem, you destroy that Choice. And not only Power is external to it, but the being out of Power too: not only Business, but Leisure too.—"Then, must I live in this Tumult now?"—What do you call a Tumult?—"A Multitude of People." And where is the Hardship? Suppose it is the *Olympic Games*. Think it a public Assembly. There too some bawl out one Thing, some do another: some push the rest. The Baths are crowded.

crowded. Yet who of us is not pleased with these Assemblies; and doth not grieve to leave them? Do not be hard to please, and squeamish at what happens. "Vinegar is disagreeable," [says one]; for it is sour. Honey is disagreeable, [says a second]; for it disorders my Constitution. I do not like Vegetables, [says a third]. Thus too [say others] I do not like Retirement; it is a Defect; I do not like a Crowd; it is a Tumult."—Why, if Things are so disposed, that you are to live alone, or with few, call this Condition a Repose; and make use of it as you ought. Talk with yourself: exercise the Appearances presented to your Mind: work up your Preconceptions to Acutacy. But if you light on a Crowd, call it one of the public Games, a grand Assembly, a Festival. Endeavour to share in the Festival with the rest of the World. For what Sight is more pleasant to a Lover of Mankind, than a great Number of Men? We see Companies of Oxen, or Horses, with Pleasure. We are highly delighted to see a great many Ships. Who is sorry to see a great many Men?—"But they stun me with their Noise."—Then your Hearing is hindered; and what is that to you? Is your Faculty of making a right Use of the Appearances of Things hindered too? Or who can restrain you from using your Desire and Aversion, your Powers of Pursuit and Avoidance, conformably

conformably to Nature? What Tumult is sufficient for this? Do but remember the general Rules. *What is mine? What not mine? What is allotted me? What is the Will of God, that I should do now? What is not his Will?* A little while ago it was His Will, that you should be at leisure, should talk with yourself, write about these Things, read, hear, prepare yourself. You have had sufficient Time for this. At present He says to you, “Come now to the Combat! Show us “what you have learned; how you have wrestled.” How long would you exercise by yourself? It is now the Time to show, whether you are of the Number of those Champions who merit Victory, or of those who go about the World, conquered in all the Games round. Why then are you out of Humour? There is no Combat without a Tumult. There must be many preparatory Exercises, many Acclamations, many Masters, many Spectators.—“But I would live “in Quiet.”—Why then, lament and groan, as you deserve. For what greater Punishment is there to the Uninstructed, and Disobedient to the Orders of God, than to grieve, to mourn; to envy; in short, to be disappointed, and unhappy? Are not you willing to deliver yourself from all this?—And how shall I deliver myself?—Have not you heard, that you must absolutely withhold Desire, and apply Aversion to such Things only,

only, as are dependent on Choice? That you must give up all, Body, Possessions, Fame, Books, Tumults, Power, Exemption from Power? For to which soever your Propension is, you are a Slave; you are under Subjection; you are made liable to Restraint, to Compulsion; you are altogether the Property of others. But have that of *Cleanthes* always ready,

Conduct me, Jove; and Thou, O Destiny.

Is it Your Will, that I should go to *Rome*? Conduct me to *Rome*. To *Gyaros*?—To *Gyaros*. To *Athens*?—To *Athens*. To Prison?—To Prison. If you once say, “When is one to go to *Athens*?” You are undone. This Desire, if it be unaccomplished, must necessarily render you disappointed; and, if fulfilled, vain on what ought not to elate you: on the contrary, if you are hindered, wretched, by incurring what you do not like. Therefore give up all these Things. —“*Athens* is a fine Place.”—But it is a much finer Thing to be happy, impassive, tranquil, not to have what concerns you dependent on others. —“*Rome* is full of Tumults and Visits.”—But Prosperity is worth all Difficulties. If then it be a proper Time for these, why do not you withdraw your Aversion from them? (What Necessity is there for you to be made to carry your Burden, by being cudgelled like an Ass?) Other-

wife consider, that you must always be a Slave to him, who hath the Power to procure your Discharge, to every one who hath the Power of hindering you; and must worship him, like your evil Genius.

§. 4. The only Way to real Prosperity (let this Rule be at hand Morning, Noon, and Night,) is, a Resignation of Things independent on Choice; to esteem nothing as a Property; to deliver up all Things to our tutelar Genius, and to Fortune; to make those the Governors of them, whom *Jupiter* hath made so; to be ourselves devoted to that only, which is our Property; to that which is incapable of Restraint; and whatever we read, or write, or hear, to refer all to this.

§. 5. Therefore I cannot call any one industrious, if I hear only that he reads, or writes; nor even if he adds the whole Night to the Day, do I call him so, unless I know to what he refers it. For not even *you* would call Him industrious, who sits up for the Sake of a Girl; nor therefore in the other Case do *I*. But, if he doth it for Fame, I call him ambitious; if for Money, avaritious; if from the Desire of Learning, bookish; but not industrious. But, if he refers his Labour to his ruling Faculty, in order to treat and regulate it conformably to Nature, then only I call him industrious. For never either praise or blame
any

any Person, on account of outward Actions that are common to all; but on the account of Principles. These are the peculiar Property of each Individual, and the Things which make Actions good or bad.

§. 6. Mindful of this, be pleased with the present, and contented with whatever it is the Season for. If you perceive any of those Things, which you have learned and studied, occurring to you in Action, rejoice in them. If you have laid aside Ill-nature and Reviling; if you have lessened your Harshness, indecent Language, Inconsiderateness, Effeminacy; if you are not moved by the same Things as formerly; if not in the same manner as formerly; you may keep a perpetual Festival: To-day, because you have behaved well in one Affair: To-morrow, because in another. How much-better a Reason for Sacrifice is this, than obtaining a Consulship, or a Government? These Things you have from yourself, and from the Gods. Remember this, Who it is that gave them, and to whom, and for what Purpose. Habituated once to these Reasonings, can you still think there is any Difference, in what Place you are to please God? Are not the Gods everywhere at the same Distance? Do not they everywhere equally see what is doing?

C H A P. V.

Concerning the Quarrelsome, and Ferocious.

§. I. A WISE, and good Person neither quarrels with any one himself, nor, as far as possible, suffers another. The Life of *Socrates* affords us an Example of this too, as well as of the other [Virtues]; who not only every-where avoided quarrelling himself, but did not even suffer others to quarrel. See in *Xenophon's Symposium*, how many Quarrels he ended; how, again, he bore with *Thrasymachus*, with *Polus*, with *Callicles*; how, with his Wife, how, with his Son, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled with him. For he well remembered, that no one is Master of the ruling Faculty of another; and therefore he desired nothing but what was his own.—“And what is that?”—Not that this [or that] Person (*a*) should be moved conformably to Nature; for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own Way, as they please, he should nevertheless be affected, and live conformably to Nature, only doing what belongs to himself, in order to make them so live conformably to Nature. For this is the Point, that a wise and good Person hath in view. To have the Command of an Army? No: but if it be wanted for the good of the State, he should be affected with it. (Perhaps for *the good of the State*, should be read, *for the good of the State*, and the Translation follows this Conjecture.

allotted him, to preserve on this Subject of Action, the right Conduct of his own ruling Faculty. To marry? No: but if Marriage be allotted him, to preserve himself, on this Subject of Action, conformable to Nature. But, if he would have his Wife, or his Child, exempt from Fault, he would have that his own, which belongs to others. And being instructed, consists in this very Point, To learn what Things are our own, and what belong to others.

§. 2. What Room is there then for Quarrelling, to a Person thus disposed? For doth he wonder at any thing that happens? Doth it appear new to Him? Doth not he expect worse and more grievous Injuries from bad People, than happen to him? Doth he not reckon it so much gained, as they come short of the last Extremities? Such a one hath reviled you.—You are much obliged to him, that he hath not struck you.—But he hath struck you too.—You are much obliged to him, that he hath not wounded you too.—But he hath wounded you too.—You are much obliged to him, that he hath not killed you. For when did he ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a social Animal: that the very Injury itself is a great Mischief to the Injurious? As then he hath not learned these Things, nor believes them, why should he not follow what appears for his Interest? Your Neighbour

hath thrown Stones. What then? Is it any Fault of *yours*? But your Goods are broken. What then? Are you a Piece of Furniture? No: but your Essence consists in the Faculty of Choice. What Behaviour then is assigned you, in Return? If you consider yourself as a Wolf—to bite again, to throw more Stones. But if you ask the Question, as a Man, examine your Treasure: see what Faculties you have brought into the World with you. Are they Dispositions to Ferocity? To Revenge? When is a Horse miserable? When he is deprived of his natural Faculties. Not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a Dog? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a Man then also unhappy in the same manner? Not he, who cannot strangle Lions, or grasp Statues (*b*), (for he hath received no Faculties for this Purpose from Nature;) but who hath lost his Rectitude of Mind, his Fidelity. Such a one is the Person, who ought to be publicly lamented, for the Misfortunes into which he is fallen: not, by Heaven, either he who is born (*c*) or dies; but he, whom it hath befallen while he

(*b*) Like *Hercules* and *Diogenes*. See p. 46. of this Vol. Note (*b*).

(*c*) An Allusion to a Passage in *Euripides*. The general Sense of which is, That we ought to lament the Person who is born, from a Consideration of the Evils into which he is coming,

he lives to lose what is properly his own: not his paternal Possessions, his paultry Estate, or his House, his Lodging, or his Slaves, (for none of these are a Man's own; but all belonging to others, servile, dependent, and given at different Times, to different Persons, by the Disposers of them;) but his personal Qualifications as a Man, the Impressions which he brought into the World stamp't upon his Mind: such as we seek in Money; and, if we find them, allow it to be good; if not, throw it away. "What Impression hath this Piece of Money?"—"Trajan's." "Give it me."—*Nero's* (*d*). "Throw it away. It is false: it is good for nothing. So in the other Case. "What Impression have his Principles?" "Gentleness, social Affection, Patience, Good-nature." Bring them hither. I receive them. I make such a Man a Citizen; I receive him for a Neighbour, a fellow Traveller. Only see that he hath not the *Neronian* Impression. Is he passionate? Is he resentful? Is he querulous? Would

K 4

he,

coming, and to rejoice over the Dead, who is at rest from his Labours. UPTON.

There is an Account in *Herodotus*, of a People of *Thrace*, who used to assemble, and condole with a Family where any one was born; and, on the contrary, express great Joy and Congratulation where-ever there happened a Death. L.

S. C. A.

(*d*) *Nero* being declared an Enemy by the Senate, his Coin was, in consequence of this, prohibited and destroyed.

He, if he took the Fancy, break the Head of those who fall in his Way? Why then do you call him a Man? For is every thing distinguish'd by a mere outward Form? Then say, just as well, that a Piece of Wax is an Apple, as that which hath the Smell and Taste too. But the external Figure is not enough: nor, consequently, is it sufficient to make a Man, that he hath a Nose and Eyes, if he hath not the proper Principles of a Man. Such a one doth not understand Reason, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is an Ass. Another is dead to the Sense of Shame. He is a worthless Creature (*e*); any thing, rather than a Man. Another seeks whom he may kick or bite: so that he is neither Sheep nor Ass. But what then? He is a wild Beast.

§. 3. "Well: but would you have me despised then?"—By whom? By those who know you? And how can they despise you, who know you to be gentle and modest? But, perhaps, by those who do not know you? And what is that to You? For no other Artist troubles himself about the Ignorant.—"But People will be much the readier to attack me."—Why do you say *me*? Can any one hurt your Choice, or restrain you from treating conformably to Nature, the Appearances that

(*e*) The Name of some Animal would suit better here, than the Epithet *αχρηστος*. But *χοιρος*, a Hog, is a Word too unlike; and I can think of no better.

that are presented to you? Why, then are you disturbed, and desirous to make yourself appear formidable? Why do not you make public Proclamation, that you are, at Peace with all Mankind, however they may act; and that you chiefly laugh at those, who suppose they can hurt you.

“ These Wretches neither know who I am, or
“ in what consist my Good and Evil: or that
“ there is no Access for *them* to what is really
“ *mine*.” Thus the Inhabitants of a fortified City laugh at the Besiegers. “ What Trouble
“ now are these People giving themselves for no-
“ thing? Our Wall is secure; we have Provisions
“ for a very long Time, and every other Prepa-
“ ration.” These are what render a City fortified, and impregnable: but nothing but its Principles render the human Soul so. For what Wall is so strong, what Body so impenetrable, or what Possession so unalienable, or what Dignity so secured against Stratagems? All Things else, everywhere else, are mortal, easily reduced; and whoever, in any Degree, fixes his Mind upon them, must necessarily be subject to Perturbation, Despair, Terrors, Lamentations, disappointed Desires, and incurred Aversions.

§. 4. And will we not fortify then the only Place of Security that is granted us; and, withdrawing ourselves from what is mortal and servile, diligently improve what is immortal, and by Na-

ture

ture, free? Do we not remember, that no one either hurts or benefits another: but the Principle, which we hold concerning every thing, doth it? It is this that hurts us; this that overturns us. Here is the Fight, the Sedition, the War. It was nothing else, that made *Hecacles* and *Polynices* Enemies, but their Principle concerning Empire, and their Principle concerning Exile: that the one seemed the extremest Evil; the other, the greatest Good. Now the very Nature of every one is to pursue Good, to avoid Evil; to esteem him as an Enemy and Betrayer, who deprives us of the one, and involves us in the other, though he be a Brother, or a Son, or Father. For nothing is more nearly related to us, than Good. So that if Good and Evil consist in Externals, there is no Affection between Father and Son, Brother and Brother; but all is every-where full of Enemies, Betrayers, Sycophants. But if a right Choice be the only Good, and a wrong one the only Evil, what further Room is there for quarrelling, for reviling? About what? About what is nothing to us? Against whom? Against the Ignorant, against the Unhappy, against those who are deceived in Things of the greatest Importance?

§. 5. Mindful of this, *Socrates* lived in his own House, patiently bearing a furious Wife, a senseless Son. For what were the Effects of her Fury?

Fury? The throwing as much Water as she pleased on his Head; the trampling (f) a Cake under her Feet. "And what is this to me, if I think such Things nothing to me? This very Point is my Business: and neither a Tyrant, nor a Master, shall restrain my Will; nor Multitudes, though I am a single Person; nor one ever so strong, though I am ever so weak. For this is given by God to every one, free from Restraint."

§. 6. These Principles make Friendship in Families, Concord in Cities, Peace in Nations. They make a Person grateful to God, everywhere in good Spirits, [about Externals,] as belonging to others, as of no Value. But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read these Things, and to praise them when they are read; but very far from being convinced by them. Therefore what is said of the *Lacedemonians*,

Lions at Home, Foxes at Ephesus,

may be applied to us too: Lions in the School, but Foxes out of it.

K 6

CHAP.

(f) *Alcibiades* sent a fine great Cake, as a Present to *Socrates*: which so provoked the Jealousy of the meek *Xantippe*, that she threw it down, and stamp'd upon it. *Socrates* only laughed, and said, "Now you will have no Share in it yourself." UPTON from *ÆLIAN*.

being honoured by you, and being
 C. H. A. P. IV. devoted to the service of the
 with them, and one time
Concerning Those who grieve at being pined.

S. J. **I**T vexes me, say you, to be pited. Is this
 your Affair then, or theirs, who pity you?
 And further: How is it in your Power to prevent
 it?—"It is, if I show them, that I do not need
 "Pity."—But are you now in such a Condition,
 as not to need Pity, or are you not?—"I think
 "I am. But these People do not pity me for
 "what, if any thing, would deserve Pity, my
 "Faults; but for Poverty, and want of Power,
 "and Sickneses, and Deaths, and other Things
 "of that Kind."—Are you then prepared to con-
 vince the World, that none of these Things is
 in Reality an Evil; but that it is possible for a
 Person to be happy, even when he is poor, and
 without Honours, and Power? Or are you pre-
 pared to appear to them, rich and powerful? The
 last of these is the Part of an arrogant, silly, worth-
 less Fellow. Observe too, by what Means this
 Fiction must be carried on. You must hire some
 paultry Slaves, and get possessed of a few little
 Pieces of Plate; and often show them in public;
 and, though they are the same, endeavour to con-
 ceal that they are the same: you must have gay
 Clothes, and other Finery; and make a Show of
 being

were studying was this: to learn to be exempt from Grief, Perturbation, and Meanness, and so be free. Have not you heard then, that the only Way that leads to this is, to give up what doth not depend on Choice: to withdraw from it; and confess, that it belongs to others? What kind of Thing then is another's Opinion about you? — “Independent on Choice.” — Is it nothing then to you? — “Nothing.” — While you are still piqued and disturbed about it then, do you think, that you are convinced concerning Good and Evil?

§. 2. Letting others alone then, why will you not be your own Scholar and Teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their Advantage to think and act contrary to Nature: but no one is nearer to me than myself. What then is the Meaning of this? I have heard the Reasonings of Philosophers, and assented to them: yet, in fact, I am never the more relieved. Am I so stupid? And yet in other Things, that I had an Inclination to, I was not found very stupid: but I quickly learned Grammar, and the Exercises of the *Palestra*, and Geometry, and the Solution of Syllogisms. Hath not Reason then convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other Things, that I so much approved or liked from the very first. And now I read concerning these Subjects, I hear Discourses upon them, I write about them,
and

and I have not yet found any Reasoning of greater Strength than this. What then do I want? Is it not, that the contrary Principles are not removed out of my Mind? Is it not, that I have not strengthened these Opinions by Exercise, nor accustomed them to occur in Action; but, like Arms thrown aside, they are grown rusty, and do not fit me? Yet neither in the *Palæstra*, nor writing, nor reading, nor solving Syllogisms, am I contented with mere Learning: but I turn the Arguments every Way, which are presented to me, and I compose others; and the same of convertible Propositions. But the necessary Theorems, by which I might become exempted from Fear, Grief, Passion, unrestrained and free, I neither exercise, nor study, with a proper Application. And then I trouble myself, what others will say of me; whether I shall appear to them worthy of Regard; whether I shall appear happy.—Will you not see, Wretch, what you can say of *yourself*? What sort of Person you appear to *yourself*, in your Opinions, in your Desires, in your Aversions, in your Pursuits, in your Preparation, in your Intention, in the other proper Works of a Man? But, instead of that, do you trouble yourself, whether *others* pity you?—“Very true. But I am pitied improperly.”—Then are not you *pained* by this? And is not he who is in Pain to be pitied.—“Yes.”—How then are you

you pitied improperly? For you render yourself worthy of Pity by what you suffer upon being pitied.

§. 3. What says *Antisthenes* then? Have you never heard? "It is kingly, O *Cyrus*, to do well, and to be ill spoken of." My Head is well, and all around me think it akes. What is that to me? I am free from a Fever; and they compassionate me, as if I had one. "Poor Soul, what a long while have you had this Fever!" I say, too, with a dismal Countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill.—"What can be the Consequence then?"—What pleases God. And at the same time I secretly laugh at them, who pity me. What forbids then, but that the same may be done in the other Case? I am poor: but I have right Principles concerning Poverty. What is it to me then, if People pity me for my Poverty? I am not in Power, and others are: but I have such Opinions as I ought to have concerning Power, and the want of Power. Let them see to it, who pity me. But I am neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold. But, because they are hungry and thirsty, they suppose me to be so too. What can I do for them? Am I to go about, making Proclamation, and saying, Do not deceive yourselves, good People, I am very well: I regard neither Poverty, nor want of Power, nor any thing else, but right Principles. These

There is no power unrestrained. I care for nothing further. But what is this? How have I right Principles, when I am not contented to be what I am; but am out of my Wits, how I shall appear?—But others will get more, and be preferred to me.—Why, what is more reasonable, than that they who take Pains for any thing, should get most in that Particular, in which they take Pains? They have taken Pains for Power; you, for right Principles: they, for Riches; you, for a proper Use of the Appearances of Things. See whether they have the Advantage of you in that, for which you have taken Pains, and which they neglect: if they assent better, concerning the natural Bounds and Limits of Things; if their Desires are less disappointed than yours, their Aversions less incurred; if they take a better Aim in their Intention, in their Purposes, in their Pursuits: whether they preserve a becoming Behaviour, as Men, as Sons, as Parents, and so on in respect of the other Relations of Life. But, if they are in Power, and you not (b): why will you not speak the Truth to yourself; that you do nothing for the sake of Power; but that they do every thing? And it is very unreasonable, that he who carefully seeks any thing, should be less successful than he who neglects it.—“No: but since

(b) I have translated thus, on the Supposition, that in the Original ought to be repeated.

“ since I take Care to have right Principles, it is
“ more reasonable that I should have Power.”—
Yes, in respect to what you take Care about,
your Principles. But give up to others the
Things, in which they have taken more Care
than you. Else it is just as if, because you have
right Principles, you should think it fit, that when
you shoot an Arrow, you should hit the Mark
better than an Archer, or that you should forge
better than a Smith. Therefore let alone taking
Pains about Principles, and apply yourself to the
Things which you wish to possess, and then fall
a crying, if you do not succeed ; for you deserve
to cry. But now you say, that you are engaged
in other Things ; intent upon other Things ;
and it is a true Saying, that one Business doth
not suit with another. One Man, as soon as he
rises and goes out, seeks to whom he may pay his
Compliments ; whom he may flatter ; to whom
he may send a Present ; how he may please the
Dancer [in Vogue] ; how, by doing ill-natured
Offices to one, he may oblige another. When-
ever he prays, he prays for Things like these :
whenever he sacrifices, he sacrifices for Things like
these. To these he transfers the *Pythagorean*
Precept ;

Let not the stealing God of Sleep surprise, &c.

Where

(c) *Where have I failed* in Point of Flattery? *What have I done?* Any thing like a free, brave-spirited Man? If he should find any thing of this Sort, he rebukes and accuses himself. "What Business had you to say that? For could not you have lied? Even the Philosophers say, there is no Objection against telling a Lie."

§. 4. But on the other Hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing else, but to make a right Use of the Appearance of Things; as soon as you are up in a Morning, consider, what do I want in order to be free from Passion? What, to enjoy Tranquillity? What am I? Am I mere worthless Body? Am I Estate? Am I Reputation? None of these. What then? I am a reasonable Creature. What then is required of me? Recollect your Actions. *Where have I failed, in any Requisite for Prosperity? What have I done, either unfriendly, and unsociable? What have I omitted, that was necessary in these Points?*

§. 5. Since there is so much Difference then in your Desires, your Actions, your Wishes, would you yet have an equal Share with others in those Things, about which you have not taken Pains, and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of Humour, if they pity you? But they are not out of Humour, if you pity them.

(c) See the *Pythagorean Verses* (quoted in B. III. c. 10.) of which these Questions are a Parody.

them. Why? Because they are convinced, that they are in Possession of their proper Good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own Condition; but desire theirs: whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not desire yours. For, if you were really convinced, that it is *you* who are in Possession of what is good, and that *they* are mistaken, you would not so much as think what they say about you.

C H A P. VII.

Of Fearlessness:

§. 1. **W**HAT makes a Tyrant formidable? His Guards, say you, and their Swords; they who belong to the Bed-chamber; and they who shut out those, who would go in. What is the Reason then, that, if you bring a Child to him when he is surrounded by his Guards, it is not afraid? Is it because the Child doth not know what they mean? Suppose then, that any one doth know what is meant by Guards, and that they are armed with Swords; and, for that very Reason, comes in the Tyrant's Way, being desirous, on account of some Misfortune, to die, and seeking to die easily by the Hand of another: Doth such a Man fear the Guards? No: for he
wants

wants the very Thing, that renders them formidable. Well then : if any one, without an absolute Desire to live or die, but, as it may happen, comes in the Way of a Tyrant, what restrains his approaching him without Fear? Nothing. If then another should think concerning his Estate, or Wife, or Children, as this Man doth concerning his Body ; and, in short, from some Madness or Folly, should be of such a Disposition, as not to care whether he hath them, or hath them not ; but, as Children, playing with Shells, make a Difference indeed in the Play, but do not trouble themselves about the Shells ; so he should pay no Regard to the Materials [of Action] ; but apply himself to the playing with, and Management of, them ; what Tyrant, what Guards, or their Swords, are any longer formidable to such a Man?

§ 2. And is it possible, that any one should be thus disposed towards these Things from Madness (a) ; and the Galileans, from mere Habit ; yet that

(a) *Epictetus*, probably, means, not any remaining Disciples of *Judas* of *Galilee*, but the Christians; whom *Julian* afterwards affected to call *Galileans*. It helps to confirm this Opinion, that *M. Antoninus* (L. 9. §. 3.) mentions them, By their proper Name of Christians, as suffering Death out of mere Obstinacy. It would have been more reasonable, and more worthy the Character of these great Men, to have enquired into the Principles, on which the Christians

that no one should be able to learn, from Reason and Demonstration, that God made all Things in the World, and the whole World itself, unrestrained and perfect ; and all its Parts for the Use of the Whole ? All other Creatures are indeed excluded from a Power of comprehending the Administration of the World ; but a reasonable Being hath Abilities for the Consideration of all these Things : both that it [self] is a Part, and what Part ; and that it is fit the Parts should submit to the Whole. Besides, being by Nature constituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it sees, that, of the Things which relate to it, some are unrestrained and in its own Power, some restrained, and in the Power of others : the unrestrained, such as depend on Choice ; the restrained,

Christians refused to worship Heathen Deities, and by which they were enabled to support their Sufferings with such amazing Constancy, than rashly to pronounce their Behaviour the Effect of Obstinacy and Habit. *Epictetus* and *Antoninus* were too exact Judges of human Nature, not to know, that Ignominy, Tortures, and Death, are not, merely on their own Account, Objects of Choice : nor could the Records of any Time or Nation, furnish them with an Example of Multitudes of Persons of both Sexes, of all Ages, Ranks, and natural Dispositions, in distant Countries, and successive Periods, resigning whatever is most valuable and dear to the Heart of Man, from a Principle of *Obstinacy* ; or the mere Force of *Habit* : not to say, that Habit could have no Influence on the first Sufferers.

restrained, such as do not depend on it. And, for this Reason, if it esteems its Good and its Interest to consist in Things unrestrained, and in its own Power, it will be free, prosperous, happy, unhurt, magnanimous, pious; thankful (b) to God for every thing; never finding fault with any thing, never censuring any thing that is brought to pass by him. But, if it esteems its Good, and its Interest, to consist in Externals, and Things independent on Choice, it must necessarily be restrained, be hindered, be enslaved to those who have the Power over those Things which it admires, and fears; it must necessarily be impious, as supposing itself injured by God, and unequitable, as claiming more than its Share; it must necessarily too be abject, and mean-spirited.

§. 3. What forbids, but that he, who distinguishes these Things, may live with an easy and light Heart, quietly expecting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what hath happened? Would you have Poverty [be my Lot]? Bring it; and you shall see what Poverty is, when it hath got one to act it well. Would you have Power? Bring Toils too along with it: Banishment? Where-ever I go, it will be well with me there: for it was well with me *here*, not on account

(b) This agrees with *Eph. v. 20. Giving Thanks always for all Things unto God*—.

count of the Place, but of the Principles, which I shall carry away with me; for no one can deprive me of these: on the contrary, they alone are my Property, and cannot be taken away; and retaining them, suffices me where-ever I am, or what-ever I do.—“But it is now time to die.”—What is it that you call dying (*c*)? Do not talk of the Thing in a Tragedy Strain; but say, as the Truth is, that it is Time for a compound Piece of Matter to be resolved back into its Original. And where is the Terror of this? What Part of the World is going to be lost? What is going to happen new, or prodigious? Is it for this, that a Tyrant is formidable? Is it on this Account, that the Swords of his Guards seem so large and sharp? Try these Things upon others. For my Part, I have examined the Whole. No one hath an Authority over me. God hath made me free: I know his Commands: after this, no one can enslave me. I have a proper Assertor of my Freedom; proper Judges. Is it not of my Body, that you are the Master? What is that to *me* then? Of that Trifle my Estate? What is that to *me* then? Is it not of Banishment and Chains, that you are the Master? Why all these again, and my whole Body I give up to you: when-ever you please, make a Trial of your Power, and you will find how far it extends.

§. 4.

(*c*) The Translation here follows Mr *Upton's* Manuscript, and Emendation.

§. 4. Whom then can I any longer fear? Those who belong to the Bed-chamber? Lest they should do—What? Shut me out? If they find me desirous to come in, let them.—“Why do you come to the Door then?”—Because it is fitting for me, that while the Play lasts, I should play too.—“How then are you incapable of being shut out?”—Because, if I am not admitted, I would not wish to go in; but would much rather, that Things should be as they are: for I esteem what God wills, to be better than what I will (d). I give myself up a Servant and a Follower to him. I pursue, I desire, in short, I *will* along with Him. Being shut out doth not relate to *me*; but to those who push to get in. Why then do not I push too? Because I know, that there is not any Good distributed there to those who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the Favour of *Cæsar*, I say, what hath he got?—“A Province (e).”—Hath he then got such Principles too, as he ought to have?—“A public Charge.”—Hath he then got with it the Knowledge how to use it too? If not, why should I be thrust about any longer to get in? Some one scatters Nuts and Figs. Children scramble and

VOL. II. L quarrel

(d) Nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt. Matth. xxvi. 39.

(e) The Translation of this Passage follows the Conjecture of Wolfius.

quarrel for them; but not Men: for they think them Trifles. But, if any one should scatter Shells, not even Children would scramble for these. Provinces are distributing. Let Children look to it. Money. Let Children look to it. Military Command, a Consulship. Let Children scramble for them. Let these be shut out, be beat, kiss the Hands of the Giver, of his Slaves. But to me, they are but mere Figs and Nuts.—“What then is to be done?”—If you miss them, while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourself about it: but, if a Fig should fall into your Lap, take it, and eat it; for one may pay so much Regard even to a Fig. But, if I am to stoop and throw down one, or be thrown down by another, and flatter those who are got in, a Fig is not worth this, nor any other of the Things which are not really good, and which the Philosophers have persuaded me not to esteem as good.

§. 5. Show me the Swords of the Guards.—“See how big and how sharp they are.”—What then do these great and sharp Swords do?—“They kill.”—And what doth a Fever do?—“Nothing else.”—And a Tile?—“Nothing else.”—Would you have me then be struck with an awful Admiration of all these, and worship them, and go about a Slave to them all? Heaven forbid! But, having once learnt, that
every

every thing that is born must likewise die, (that the World may not be at a Stand, or the Course of it hindered), I no longer make any Difference, whether this be effected by a Fever, or a Tile, or a Soldier: but, if any Comparison is to be made, I know, that the Soldier will effect it with less Pain, and more speedily. Since then I neither fear any of those Things, which he can inflict upon me, nor covet any thing which he can bestow, why do I stand any longer in Awe of a Tyrant? Why am I struck with Astonishment? Why do I fear his Guards? Why do I rejoice, if he speaks kindly to me, and receives me graciously; and relate to others, in what Manner he spoke to me? For is He *Socrates* or *Diogenes*, that his Praise should show what I am? Or have I set my Heart on imitating his Manners? But, to keep up the Play, I go to him, and serve him, as long as he commands nothing unreasonable or improper. But, if he should say to me, "Go to *Salamis*, and bring *Leo* (*f*)," I answer him, seek another, for I play no longer.—"Lead him away."—I follow, in Sport.—"But your Head will be taken off."—And will his own always remain on; or yours, who obey him?—"But you will be thrown out, unburied."—If *I* am the Corpse, *I* shall be thrown out; but if *I* am something else

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than

(*f*) An Allusion to the Story, mentioned in the first Chapter of this Book, p. 177. Note (*e*).

than the Corpse (g), speak more handsomely, as the Thing is, and do not think to fright me. These Things are frightful to Children and Fools. But if any one, who hath once entered into the School of a Philosopher, doth not know what he himself is, he deserves to be frightened, and to flatter what he lately flattered; if he hath not yet learnt, that he is neither Flesh, nor Bones, nor Nerves; but that which makes use of these, and regulates and comprehends the Appearances of Things.

§. 6. "Well: but these Reasonings make Men despise the Laws."—And what Reasonings then render those, who use them, more obedient to the Laws? But the Law of Fools is no Law. And yet, see how these Reasonings render us properly disposed, even towards such Persons, since they teach us, not to claim, in Opposition to them, any thing wherein they have it in their Power to be superior to us. They teach us to give up Body, to give up Estate, Children, Parents, Brothers, to yield every thing, to let go every thing, excepting only Principles; which even *Jupiter* hath excepted, and decreed to be every one's own Property. What Unreasonableness, what Breach of the Laws, is there in this? Where you are superior and stronger, there I give way to you. Where, on the contrary, I am superior, do you submit

(g) See p. 127. of this Vol. Note (w).

submit to *me*; for this hath been my Study, and not yours. Your Study hath been to walk upon a *Mosaic* Floor, to be attended by your Servants and Clients, to wear fine Clothes, to have a great Number of Hunters, Fiddlers, and Players. Do I lay any claim [to these?] but [on the other Hand,] have you then studied Principles, or even your own rational Faculty? Do you know, of what Parts it consists? How they are connected; what are its Articulations; what Powers it hath, and of what Kind? Why then do you take it amiss, if another, who hath studied them, hath the Advantage of you in these Things?—"But" they are of all Things the greatest."—Well: and who restrains you from being conversant with them, and attending to them ever so carefully? Or who is better provided with Books, with Leisure, with Assistants? Only turn your Thoughts now and then to these Matters; bestow but a little Time upon your own ruling Faculty. Consider what it is you have, and whence it came, that uses all other Things, that examines them all, that chuses, that rejects. But while you employ yourself about Externals, you will have those indeed, such as no one else hath; but your ruling Faculty, such as you like to have it, sordid and neglected.

C H A P. VIII.

Concerning such as hastily run into the philosophic Dress.

§. 1. **N**EVER commend or censure any one for common Actions, nor ascribe them either to Skilfulness or Unskilfulness; and thus you will at once be free both from Rashness and Ill-nature. Such a one bathes in a mighty little Time. Doth he therefore do it ill? Not at all. But what? In a mighty little Time.—“Is every thing well done then?”—By no means. But what is done from good Principles is well done; what from bad ones, ill. But till you know from what Principle any one acts, neither commend nor censure the Action. But the Principle is not easily judged of from the external Appearances. Such a one is a Carpenter. Why? He uses an Axe. What signifies that? Such a one is a Musician: for he sings. What signifies that? Such a one is a Philosopher. Why? Because he wears a Cloke and long Hair. What then do Mountebanks wear? And so, when People see any of these acting indecently, they presently say, “See (a) what the Philosopher doth.” But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to say, he is no Philosopher.

(a) Perhaps the true Reading is $\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi\phi$.

pher. For, if indeed the Idea, which we have of a Philosopher, and his Profession, was, to wear a Cloke and long Hair, they would say right: but if it be rather to keep himself free from Faults, since he doth not fulfil his Profession, why do not they deprive him of his Title? For this is the Way with regard to other Arts. When we see any one handle an Axe awkwardly, we do not say, "Where is the Use of this Art? See how all Carpenters perform." But we say the very contrary; "This Man is no Carpenter, for he handles an Axe awkwardly." So, if we hear any one sing badly, we do not say, "Observe how Musicians sing," but rather, "This Fellow is no Musician." But it is with regard to Philosophy alone, that People are thus affected. When they see any one acting contrary to the Profession of a Philosopher, they do not take away his Title; but, laying it down, that he is a Philosopher, and then assuming from the very Fact that he behaves indecently, they infer, that Philosophy is of no Use. *§. 2.* "What then is the Reason of this?" Because we pay some Regard to the Pre-conception which we have of a Carpenter, and a Musician, and so of other Artists; but not of a Philosopher, which being thus vague and confused, we judge of it only from external Appearances. And of what other Art do we take up our Judgment from

the Dress and the Hair? Hath it not Theorems too, and Materials, and an End, [to distinguish it?] What then is the Subject-matter of a Philosopher? Is it a Cloke?—No: but Reason. What his End? To wear a Cloke?—No: but to have his Reason correct. What are his Theorems? Are they how to get a great Beard, or long Hair?—No: but rather, as *Zeno* expresses it, To know the Elements of Reason, what each of them is in particular, and how they are adapted to each other, and what are their Consequences.

§. 3. Why then will you not first see, whether, by acting in an unbecoming Manner, he answers his Profession, and so proceed to blame the Study? Whereas now, when you act soberly yourself, you say, from what he appears to do amiss, “Observe the *Philosopher!*” As if it was decent to call a Person, who doth such Things, a *Philosopher*. And, again, This is *philosophical!*” But you do not say, “Observe the Carpenter, or observe the “Musician,” when you know one of them to be an Adulterer, or see him to be a Glutton. So, in some small Degree, even You perceive, what the Profession of a Philosopher is; but are misled, and confounded by your own Carelessness. But indeed even they, who were called Philosophers, enter upon their Profession by Things which are common to them with others. As soon as they have put on a Cloke, and let their Beard grow, they

they cry, "I am a Philosopher." Yet no one says, "I am a Musician;" because he hath bought a Fiddle and Fiddlestick: nor, "I am a Smith;" because he is drest in the *Vulcanian* Cap and Apron. But they take their Name from their Art, not from their Habit.

§. 4. For this Reason, *Euphrates* was in the Right to say, "I long endeavour'd to conceal my embracing the Philosophic Life; and it was of Use to me. For, in the first Place, I knew that, what I did right, I did it not for Spectators; but for myself. I eat in a proper Manner, for myself. I had a composed Look, and Walk, all for God and myself. Then, as I fought alone, I was alone in Danger. Philosophy was in no Danger, on my doing any thing shameful, or unbecoming: nor did I hurt the rest of the World; which, by offending as a Philosopher, I might have done. For this Reason, they who were ignorant of my Intention, used to wonder, that while I conversed, and lived intirely with Philosophers, I never took up the Character. And where was the Harm, that I should be discovered to be a Philosopher, by my Actions, and not by the usual Badges. See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I bear, how I forbear; how I assist others; how I make use of my Desires, how of my Aversions; how I preserve the natural and ac-

“ required Relations, without Confusion, and with-
 “ out Impediment. Judge of me from hence, if
 “ you can. But, if you are so dead and blind,
 “ that you would not suppose *Vulcan* himself to
 “ be a good Smith, unless you saw the Cap upon
 “ his Head, where is the Harm of not being found
 “ out by so foolish a Judge?”

§. 5. It was thus too that *Socrates* concealed himself from the Generality : and some even came and desired him to recommend them to Philosophers. Did he use to be displeased then, like us ; and say, What ! do not you take me for a Philosopher ? No : he took and recommended them ; contented with only being a Philosopher, and rejoicing in not being vexed, that he was not thought one. For he remembered his Business : and what is the Business of a wise and good Man ? To have many Scholars ? By no means. Let those see to it, who have made this their Study. Well then : is it to be a perfect Master of difficult Theorems ? Let others see to that too. In what then was he and did he desire to be, somebody ? In what constituted his Hurt or Advantage ? “ If, says he, “ any one can hurt me, I am doing nothing. If “ I depend for my Advantage upon another, I “ am nothing. Do I wish for any thing, and it “ doth not come to pass ; I am unhappy.” To such a Combat he invited every one, and, in my Opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think
 it

it was by making Proclamation; and saying, "I am *sacris* one!" Far from it: but by being such a one. For *he*, again, is Folly and Insolence to say, "I am passive and undisturbed." Be it known to you, Mortals, that while you are fluctuating and bustling about for Things of no Value, I alone am free from all Perturbation!" Are you then so far from being contented with having no Pain yourself, that you must needs make Proclamation: "Come hither, all you who have the Gout, or the Head-ach, or a Fever, or are lame, or blind; and see me free from every Distemper!" This is vain and shocking, unless you could show, like *Æsculapius*, by what Method of Cure they may presently become as free from Distempers as yourself, and bring your own Health as a Proof of it.

§. 6. Such is the Cynic, honoured with the Sceptre and Diadem from *Jove*: who says, "That you may see, O Mankind, that you do not seek Happiness and Tranquillity where it is, but where it is not; behold, I am sent an Example to you, from God; who have neither (b) Estate, nor House, nor Wife, nor Children, nor even a Bed, or Coat, or Furniture. And see how healthy I am. Try me: and, if you see me free from Perturbation, hear the Remedies, and by what Means I was cured." This now is benevolent and noble. But confi-

der whose Business it is.—*Jupiter's*, or his whom he judges worthy of this Office; that he may never discover any thing to the World, by which he may invalidate his own Testimony, which he gives for Virtue, and against External.

*No sickly Pale his beauteous Features wear,
Nor from his Cheek he wipes the languid Tear.*

HOMER.

And not only this, but he doth not desire or seek for Company or Place, or Amusement, as Boys do the Vintage Time, or Holy-Days: always fortified by virtuous Shame, as others are by Walls, and Gates, and Centinels.

§. 7. But now they, who have only such an Inclination to Philosophy, as bad Stomachs have to some Kinds of Food, of which they will presently grow sick, immediately run to the Sceptre, to the Kingdom. They let grow their Hair, assume (d) the Cloke, bare the Shoulder, wrangle with all they meet; and even, if they see any one in a thick warm Coat, wrangle with him. First harden yourself against all Weather, Man. Consider your Inclination; whether it be not that of a bad Stomach, or of a longing Woman. First study to conceal what you are; philosophise a little while by yourself. Fruit is produced thus. The Seed must first be buried in the Ground, lie hid there some time, and grow up by degrees, that it
may

(d) Which were the Characteristics of the Cynics.

may come to Perfection. But, if it produces the Ear before the Stalk hath its proper Joints, it is imperfect, and of the Garden of *Adonis* (e). Now you are a poor Plant of this Kind. You have blossomed too soon: the Winter will kill you. See what Countrymen say about Seeds of any Sort, when the warm Weather comes too early. They are in great Anxiety, for fear the Seeds should shoot out too luxuriantly; and then one Frost taking them (f), shows how prejudicial their Forwardness was. Beware you too, Man. You have shot out luxuriantly; you have sprung forth towards a trifling Fame, before the proper Season. You seem to be somebody, as a Fool may among Fools. You will be taken by the Frost: or rather, you are already frozen downward, at the Root: you still blossom indeed a little at the Top, and therefore you think you are still alive and flourishing. Let us, at least, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? Why do you force us?

We

(e) At the Feast of *Adonis*, there were carried about little Earthen Pots, filled with Mould, in which grew several Sorts of Herbs. These were called Gardens: and from thence the Gardens of *Adonis* came to be proverbially applied to Things unfruitful or fading; because those Herbs were only sowed so long before the Festival, as to sprout forth and be green at that Time, and then were presently cast into the Water. See POTTER's *Grecian Antiquities*, Chap. 20. p. 363.

(f) Here is a strong Similitude to the Seed in the Gospels, that sprung up quickly, and withered.

We cannot yet bear the Air. Suffer the Root to grow; then the first, then the second, then the third Joint of the Stalk to spring from it; and thus (g) Nature will force out the Fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is big with, and full of such Principles, doth not perceive too his own Qualifications, and exert his Efforts to correspondent Operations? Not even a Bull is ignorant of his own Qualifications, when any wild Beast approaches the Herd, nor waits for any one to encourage him; nor a Dog, when he spies any Game. And if I have the Qualifications of a good Man, shall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper Operations? But believe me, I have them not yet. Why then would you wish me to be withered before my Time, as you are?

C H A P. IX.

Concerning a Person who was grown immodest.

(a) §. 1 **W**HEN you see another in Power, set against it, that you have the Advantage of not wanting Power. When you see another rich, see what you have instead of Riches: for, if you have nothing in their Stead, you

(g) This Passage hath some Difficulty in the Original; and, probably, may have been corrupted. The Translation hath given what seems to be the Sense.

(a) They, who are desirous of taking Refuge in Heathenism from the Strictness of the Christian Morality, will find no great Consolation in reading this Chapter of *Epictetus*.

you are miserable. But if you have the Advantage of not needing Riches, know, that you have something more than he hath, and of far greater Value. Another possesses a handsome Woman; you the Happiness of not desiring a handsome Woman. Do you think these are little Matters? And what would those very Persons; who are rich, and powerful, and possess handsome Women, give, that they were able to despise Riches and Power, and those very Women whom they love, and whom they acquire! Do not you know of what Nature the Thirst of one in a Fever is? It hath no Resemblance to that of a Person in Health. He drinks, and is satisfied. But the other, after being delighted a very little while, grows sick, turns the Water into Choler, throws it up, hath Pain in his Bowels, and becomes more violently thirsty. Of the same Nature is it to have Riches, or Dominion, or enjoy a fine Woman, with Fondness of any one of these Things. Jealousy takes place; Fear of losing the beloved Object; indecent Discourses, indecent Designs, unbecoming Actions.

§. 2. “And what, say you, do I lose all the “while?”—You were modest, Man, and are so no longer. Have you lost nothing? Instead of *Chrysippus* and *Zeno*, you read *Aristides* (b) and *Euenus* (c). Have you lost nothing then? Instead

of

(b) An indecent Poet of *Miletus*.

(c) A Writer of amorous Verses.

of *Socrates* and *Diogenes*, you admire him who can corrupt and entice the most Women. You set out your Person, and would be handsome, when you are not. You love to appear in fine Clothes, to attract the Eyes of the Women ; and, if you anywhere meet with (d) a good Perfumer, you esteem yourself a happy Man. But formerly you did not so much as think of any of these Things ; but only where you might find a decent Discourse, a worthy Person, a noble Design. For this Reason, you used to sleep like a Man ; to appear in public like a Man ; to wear a manly Dress ; to hold Discourses worthy of a Man. And after this, do you tell me, you have lost nothing ? What then do Men lose nothing but Money ? Is not Modesty to be lost ? Is not Decency to be lost ? Or may he, who loses these, suffer no Damage ? You indeed perhaps no longer think any thing of this Sort to be a Damage. But there was once a Time, when you accounted this to be the only Damage and Hurt ; when you were anxiously afraid, lest any one should shake your Regard from these Discourses and Actions. See, it is not shaken by another ; but by yourself. Fight against yourself, recover yourself to Decency, to Modesty, to Freedom. If you had formerly been told any of these Things of me, that any one prevailed on me to
commit

(d) The Translation follows *Mr. Upton's* Conjecture of *Μυρονισμ.*

commit Adultery, to wear such a Dress as yours, to be perfumed, would not you have gone and laid violent Hands on the Man, who thus abused me? And will you not now then help yourself? For how much easier is that Assistance? You need not kill, or fetter, or affront, or go to Law with any one; but merely to talk with yourself, who will most readily be persuaded by you, and with whom no one hath greater Credit than you. And, in the first Place, condemn your Actions: but when you have condemned them, do not despair of yourself, nor be like those poor-spirited People, who when they have once given Way, abandon themselves intirely, and are carried along, as by a Torrent. Take Example from the wrestling Masters. Hath the Boy fallen down? Get up again, they say; wrestle again, till you have acquired Strength. Be you affected in the same Manner. For, be assured, that there is nothing more tractable than the human Mind. You need but will, and it is done, it is set right: as, on the contrary, you need but nod over the Work, and it is ruined. For both Ruin and Recovery are from within.

§. 3. "And, after all, what Good will this do me?"—(c) What greater Good do you seek?

From

(c) *Epictetus* here asserts, that the only Benefit of Reformation is, being reformed; and that they, who look for
any

From impudent, you will become modest; from indecent, decent; from dissolute, sober. If you seek any greater Things than these, go on as you do. It is no longer in the Power of any God to save you.

C H A P. X.

*What Things we are to despise, and on what to place
a distinguished Value.*

§. 1. **T**HE Doubts and Perplexities of all Men are concerning Externals. What they shall do? How it may be? What will be the Event? Whether this Thing may happen, or that? All this is the Talk of Persons engaged in Things independent on Choice. For who says, How shall I do, not to assent to what is false? How, not to dissent from what is true? If any one is of such a good Disposition, as to be anxious about any other, are incapable of being reformed, even by God himself; and so may go on, and be as bad as they please. Suppose a Prince should publish a Proclamation, that the only Advantage of Loyalty was being loyal; and, if any of his Subjects looked for any other, he might be a Rebel with Impunity: what Effect must this have, compared with the Declaration, Rev. xxii. 11, 12. *He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still: And behold, I come quickly, and my Reward is with Me, to give to every Man, according as his Works shall be.*

about these Things, I will remind him : Why are you anxious? It is in your own Power. Be assured. Do not rush upon Assent before you have applied the natural Rule. Again, if (a) he be anxious, for fear his Desire should be ineffectual and disappointed, or his Aversion incurred, I will first kiss him, because, slighting what others are in a Flutter and terrified about, he takes care of what is his own ; where his very Being is : then I will say to him ; If you will not be disappointed of your Desires, or incur your Aversions, desire nothing that belongs to others ; be averse to nothing not in your own Power ; otherwise your Desire must necessarily be disappointed, and your Aversion incurred. Where is the Doubt here ? Where is the room for, *How will it be ? What will be the Event ? And, Will this happen, or that ?* Now is not the Event independent on Choice ? — “ Yes. ” — And both not the Essence of Good and Evil consist in what depends on Choice ? — “ Yes. ” — It is in your Power then, to treat every Event conformably to Nature ? Can any one restrain you ? — “ No one. ” — Then do not say to me any more, *How will it be ?* For, however it be, you will set it right, and the Event to you will be lucky.

§. 2. Pray what would *Hercules* have been, if he had said, “ What can be done to prevent a

“ great

(a) I read the Text, in this Place, as *Welfus* appears by his Translation to have done.

“ great Lion, or a great Boar, or savage Men, from coming in my Way ?” Why, what is that to you ? If a great Boar should come in your Way, you will fight the greater Combat : if wicked Men, you will deliver the World from wicked Men.—“ But then if I should die by this Means ?”—You will die a good Man, in the Performance of a gallant Action. For since, at all Events, one must die, one must necessarily be found doing something, either tilling, or digging, or trading, or serving a Consulship, or sick of an Indigestion, or a Flux. At what Employment then would you have Death find you ? For my Part I would have it be some humane, beneficent, public spirited, gallant Action. But if I cannot be found doing any such great Things, yet, at least, I would be doing what I am incapable of being restrained from, what is given me to do, correcting myself, improving that Faculty which makes use of the Appearances of Things, to procure Tranquillity, and render to the several Relations of Life their Due ; and, if I am so fortunate, advancing to the third Topic, a Security of judging right. If Death overtakes me in such a Situation, it is enough for me, if I can stretch out my Hands to God, and say, “ The Opportunities which Thou hast given me, of comprehending and following [the Rules] of thy Administration, I have not neglected. As far as in
“ me

“ me lay, I have not dishonoured Thee. See
 “ how I have used my Perceptions : how, my
 “ Pre-conceptions. Have I at any time found
 “ fault with Thee ? Have I been discontented at
 “ Thy Dispensations : or wished them otherwise ?
 “ Have I transgressed the Relations of Life ? I
 “ thank Thee ; that Thou hast brought me into
 “ Being. I am satisfied with the Time that I
 “ have enjoyed the Things, which thou hast given
 “ me. Receive them back again, and assign
 “ them to whatever Place thou wilt ; for they
 “ were (b) all Thine, and Thou gavest them to
 “ me.(c).”

§. 3. Is it not enough to make one's Exit in
 this State of Mind ? And what Life is better, and
 more becoming than that of such a one ? Or
 what Conclusion happier ? But, in order to at-
 tain

(c) *Thine they were, and Thou gavest them me.* John
 xvii. 6.

(c) I wish it were possible to palliate the Ostentation of
 this Passage, by applying it to the ideal perfect Character :
 but it is in a general Way, that *Epictetus* hath proposed
 such a dying Speech, as cannot, without shocking Arro-
 gance, be uttered by any one born to die. Unmixt as it is
 with any Acknowledgment of Faults or Imperfections, at
 present, or with any Sense of Guilt on Account of the past,
 it must give every sober Reader a very disadvantageous Opi-
 nion of some Principles of the Philosophy, on which it is
 founded, as contradictory to the Voice of Conscience, and
 formed on absolute Ignorance, or Neglect, of the Condition
 and Circumstances of such a Creature as Man.

tain these Advantages, there are no inconsiderable Things, both to be taken and lost. You cannot wish both for a Consulship and these too, nor take Pains to get an Estate and these too, or be solicitous both about your Servants and yourself. But, (d) if you wish any thing absolutely of what belongs to others, what is your own is lost. This is the Nature of the Affair. Nothing is to be had for nothing. And where is the Wonder? If you would be Consul, you must watch, run about, kiss Hands, be wearied down with waiting at the Doors of others, must say and do many slavish Things, send Gifts to many, daily Presents to some. And what is the Consequence [of Success]? Twelve Bundles of Rods (e); to sit three or four times on the Tribunal; to give the *Circensian* Games, and Suppers (f) in Baskets to all the World: or let any one show me what there is in it more than this. Will you then be at no Expence, no Pains to acquire Apathy, Tranquillity, to sleep sound while you do sleep, to be thoroughly awake while you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious for nothing? But, if any thing belonging to you be lost, or idly wasted, while you are thus engaged, or another gets what

(d) See *Enchiridion*, c. xiii.

(e) The Ensigns of the Consular Office.

(f) These were distributed by the great Men in *Rome* to their Clients, as a Reward for their Attendance.

what you ought to have had, will you immediately begin fretting at what hath happened ? Will you not compare the Exchange you have made ? How much for how much ? But you would have such great Things for nothing, I suppose. And how can you ? One Business doth not suit with another : you cannot bestow your Care both upon Externals and your own ruling Faculty (g). But, if you would have the former, let the latter alone ; or you will succeed in neither, while you are drawn different Ways, towards both. On the other Hand, if you would have the latter, let the former alone.—“ The Oil will be spilled, the “ Furniture will be spoiled : ”—but still I shall be free from Passion.—“ There will be a Fire when “ I am not in the Way, and the Books will be “ destroyed : ”—but still I shall treat the Appearances of Things conformably to Nature.—“ But “ I shall have nothing to eat.”—If I am so unlucky, dying is a safe Harbour. That is the Harbour for all, Death : that is the Refuge ; and, for that Reason, there is nothing difficult in Life. You may go out of Doors when you please, and be troubled with Smoke no longer.

§. 4. Why then are you anxious ? Why do you keep yourself waking ? Why do not you calculate where your Good and Evil lies : and say, they are both in my own Power ; neither can
any

(g) *You cannot serve God and Mammon. Matt. vi. 24.*

any deprive me of the one, or involve me against my Will in the other. Why then do not I lay myself down and snore? What is my own, is safe. Let what belongs to others look to itself, who carries it off, how it is given away by Him, that hath the Disposal of it. Who am I, to will, that it should be so and so? For is the Option given to me? Hath any one made Me the Dispenser of it? What I have in my own Disposal is enough for me. I must make the best I can of this. Other Things must be as the Master of them pleases.

§. 5. Doth any one, who hath these Things before his Eyes, lie awake [like *Achilles*,] and shift from Side to Side? What would he have, or what doth he want? *Patroclus*, or *Antilochus* (b), or *Menelaus*? Why, did he ever think any one of his Friends immortal? Why, when had not he it before his Eyes, that the Morrow, or the next Day, himself, or that Friend, might die? —“ Ay, very true, says he : but (i) I reckoned, “ that he would survive me, and bring up my “ Son.”—Because you were a Fool, and reckoned upon (k) Uncertainties. Why then do not you blame

(b) *Antilochus* and *Menelaus* are not mentioned, or referred to, in the Passage of *Homer*, to which *Epicætus* alludes.

(i) Ἀδελὰ αὐ, perhaps, should be ἀδελὰ δὲ αὐ.

(k) I hop'd *Patroclus* might survive, to rear

My tender Orphan, with a Parent's Care.

POPE.

blame yourself; but sit crying, like a Girl?—
 “But he used to (l) set my Dinner before me.”
 —Because he was alive, Fool; but now he cannot. But *Automedon* will set it before you; and, if he should die, you will find somebody else. What if the Pipkin, in which your Meat used to be cooked, should happen to be broken; must you die with Hunger, because you have not your old Pipkin (m)? Do not you send and buy a new one?

What greater Evil (says he) could afflict my Breast?

Is *this* your Evil then? And, instead of removing it, do you accuse your Mother, that she did not foretell it to you, that you might have spent your whole Life in grieving from that Time forward?

§. 6. Do not you think now, that *Homer* composed all this on Purpose to show us, that the noblest,

(l) *Thou too, Patroclus, (thus his Heart he vents)*

Hast spread th' inviting Banquet in our Tents. POPE.

(m) This is a wretched Idea of Friendship; but a necessary Consequence of the Stoic System. What a fine Contrast to this gloomy Consolation are the noble Sentiments of an Apostle! Value your deceased Friend, says *Epictetus*, as a broken Pipkin; forget him, as a Thing worthless, lost, and destroyed. *St. Paul*, on the contrary, comforts the mourning Survivors; bidding them, *not sorrow, as those who have no Hope*: but remember, that the Death of good Persons is only a Sleep; from which they shall soon arise to a happy Immortality.

blest, the strongest, the richest, the handsomest of Men, may, nevertheless, be the most unfortunate and wretched, if they have not the Principles they ought to have?

C H A P. XI.

Of Purity and Cleanliness.

§. 1. **SOME** doubt whether Sociableness be comprehended in the Nature of Man : and yet these very Persons do not seem to me to doubt, but that Purity is by all means comprehended in it ; and that by this, if by any thing, it is distinguished from brute Animals. When therefore we see any Animal cleaning itself, we are apt to cry, with Wonder, It is like a human Creature. On the contrary, if an Animal is accused [of Dirtiness], we were presently apt to say, by way of Excuse, that it is not a human Creature. Such Excellence do we suppose to be in Man, which we first received from the Gods. For, as they are by Nature pure and uncorrupt, in proportion as Men approach to them by Reason, they are tenacious of Purity and Incorruption. But, since it is impracticable that their Essence, composed of such Materials, should be absolutely pure, it is the Office of Reason to endeavour to render it as pure as possible.

§. 2.

§. 2. The first and highest Purity, or Impurity, then, is that which is formed in the Soul. But you will not find the Impurity of the Soul and Body to be alike. For what else [of Impurity] can you find in the Soul, than that which renders it filthy with regard to its Operations? Now the Operations of the Soul are its Pursuits and Avoidances, its Desires, Aversions, Preparations, Intentions, Assents. What then is that which renders it defiled and impure in these Operations? Nothing else than its perverse Judgments. So that the Impurity of the Soul consists in wicked Principles; and its Purification in the forming right Principles; and that is pure which hath right Principles; for that alone is unmixed and undefiled in its Operations.

§. 3. Now we should, as far as possible, endeavour after something like this in the Body too. It is impossible but, in such a Composition as Man, there must be a Defluxion of Rheum. For this Reason, Nature hath made Hands, and the Nostrils themselves as Channels to let out the Moisture. If any one therefore snuffs it up again, I say, that he performs not the Operation of a Man. It was impossible, but that the Feet must be bemired and soiled from what they pass through. Therefore Nature hath prepared Water and Hands. It was impossible, but that some Filth must cleave to the Teeth from Eating. There-

fore, she says, wash your Teeth. Why? That you may be a Man, and not a wild Beast, or a Swine. It was impossible, but, from Perspiration, and the Pressure of the Clothes, something dirty, and necessary to be cleaned, should remain upon the Body. For this, there is Water, Oil, Hands, Towels, Brushes, Sope, and other necessary Apparatus, for its Purification.—No: a Smith indeed will get the Rust off his Iron, and have proper Instruments for that Purpose: and you yourself will have your Plates washed before you eat; unless you are quite dirty and slovenly: but you will not wash nor purify your Body.—“Why should I?” (say you.)—I tell you again, in the first place, that you may be like a Man; and, in the next, that you may not offend those with whom you converse. * * * (a) Without being sensible of it, you do something like this. Do you think you deserve to stink? Be it so. But do those deserve [to suffer by] it who sit near you? who are placed at the Table with you? Who salute you? Either go into a Desert, as you deserve, or live solitary at Home, and smell yourself: for it is fit you should enjoy your Nastiness alone. But, to what Sort of Character doth it belong, to live in a City, and behave so carelessly and inconsiderately? If Nature had trusted even a Horse

(a) Something here seems to be lost. Or, perhaps, the Words, *without being sensible of it, you do something like this,* ought to be inserted after, *neglected him.*

Horse to your Care, would you have overlooked and neglected him? Now consider your Body as committed to you, instead of a Horse. Wash (b) it, rub it, take care that it may not be any one's Aversion, nor disgust any one. Who is not more disgusted at a stinking, unwholesome-looking Sloven, than at a Person who hath been rolled in Filth? The Stench of the one is adventitious from without; but that which arises from Want of Care, is a Kind of inward Putrefaction.—“But *Socrates* bathed but seldom.”—But his Person looked clean, and was so agreeable and pleasing, that the most beautiful and noble Youths were fond of him, and desired rather to sit by him, than by those who had the finest Persons. He might have omitted both Bathing and Washing, if he had pleased: and yet Bathing, though seldom, had its Effect.—“But *Aristophanes* calls him, one of the “*squalid slipshod Philosophers*.”—Why, so he says too, that he walked in the Air, and stole Clothes from the *Palæstra*. Besides, all who have written of *Socrates*, affirm quite the contrary; that he was not only agreeable in his Conversation, but in his Person too. And, again, they write the

M 3

same

(b) Here, probably, should be added—if you do not chuse warm Water, with cold. These Words in the *Greek* are transferred to a Place, where they are absolutely unintelligible. They were, probably, at first, omitted by chance; then supplied at the Bottom of the Page; and then transcribed, as if that had been their proper Place.

same of *Diogenes*. For we ought not to fright the World from Philosophy, by the Appearance of our Person ; but to show ourselves chearful and easy, by the Care of our Persons (c), as well as by other Marks. " See, all of you, that I have nothing ;
 " that I want nothing. Without House, without City, and an Exile, (if that happens to be
 " the Case (d),) and without a Home, I live more
 " easily and prosperously than the Noble and
 " Rich. Look upon my Person too, that it is
 " not injured by coarse Fare."—But, if any one should tell me this, with the Habit and the Visage of a condemned Criminal, what God should persuade me to come near Philosophy, while (e) it renders Men such Figures ? Heaven forbid ! I would not do it, even if I was sure to become a wise Man for my Pains. I declare, for my own Part, I would rather that a young Man, on his first Inclination to Philosophy, should come to me finically dressed, than with his Hair spoiled and dirty. For there appears in him some Idea of Beauty, and Desire of Decency : and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his Endeavours.

One

(c) In Times of Mourning or Danger, the Antients expressed their Sense of their Situation by neglecting their Persons.

(d) As it was the Case of *Diogenes*.

(e) For *οὐκ*, perhaps, *οὐ* may be the true Reading ; and it is so translated.

One hath nothing more to do, but to point it out to him, and say, " You seek Beauty, young Man ;
 " and you do well. Be assured then, that it
 " springs from the rational Part of you. Seek it
 " there, where the Pursuits and Avoidances, the
 " Desires and Aversions, are concerned. Herein
 " consists your Excellence : but the poultry Body
 " is by Nature Clay. Why do you trouble your-
 " self, to no Purpose, about it ? You will be con-
 " vinced by Time, if not otherwise, that it is no-
 " thing." But, if he should come to me bemired,
 dirty, with Whiskers down to his Knees, what
 can I say to him ? By what Similitude allure him ?
 For what hath he studied, which hath any Resem-
 blance to Beauty, that I may transfer his Atten-
 tion, and say, that Beauty is not there, but here ?
 Would you have me tell him, that Beauty doth
 not consist in Filth, but in Reason ? For hath he
 any Desire of Beauty ? Hath he any Appearance
 of it ? Go, and argue with a Hog, not to roll in
 the Mire.

§. 4. It was in the Quality of a young Man that
 loved Beauty, that *Polemo* (f) was touched by the
 Discourses of *Xenocrates*. For he entered with
 some Incentives to the Study of Beauty, though
 he sought in the wrong Place. And indeed Na-
 ture hath not made the very Brutes dirty, which
 live with Man. Doth a Horse wallow in the
 M 4 Mire ?

(f) See p. 4. of this Vol. Note (c).

Mire? Or a good Dog? But Swine, and filthy Geese, and Worms, and Spiders, which are banished to the greatest Distance from human Society. Will you then, who are a Man, chuse not to be even one of the Animals, that are conversant with Man; but rather a Worm, or a Spider? Will you not bathe sometimes, be it in whatever Manner you please? Will you never use Water to wash yourself? Will you not come clean, that they who converse with you may have some Pleasure in you? But will you accompany us, a mere Lump of Nastiness, even to the Temples; where it is not lawful for any one so much as to spit, or blow his Nose?

§. 5. What then, would any body have you dress yourself out to the utmost? By no means; except in those Things where our Nature requires it; in Reason, Principles, Actions: but, in our Persons, only as far as Neatness, as far as not to give Offence. But if you hear, that it is not right to wear Purple, you must go, I suppose, and roll your Cloke in the Mud, or tear it.—“But where should I have a fine Cloke?”—You have Water, Man; wash it.—“What an amiable (g) Youth is here? How worthy this old Man, to love, and be loved!”—A fit Person to be trusted with

(g) The Youth, probably, means the Scholar, who neglects Neatness; and the old Man, the Tutor, that gives him no Precept or Example of it.

with the Instruction of our Sons and Daughters, and attended by young People, as Occasion may require,—to read them Lectures on a Dunghill! Every Deviation proceeds from something human: but this approaches very nearly towards being not human.

C H A P. XII.

Of Attention.

§. 1. **W**HEN you let go your Attention for a little while, do not fancy you may recover it when-ever you please: but remember this, That, by means of the Fault of To-day, your Affairs must necessarily be in a worse Condition for the future. First, what is the saddest Thing of all, a Habit arises of not attending; and then a Habit of deferring the Attention, and always driving (a) off from time to time, and procrastinating a prosperous Life, a Propriety of Behaviour, and the Thinking and Acting conformably to Nature. Now, if the Procrastination of any thing is advantageous, the absolute Omission of it is still more advantageous: but, if it be not advantageous, why do not you preserve a constant Attention?—"I would play To-day."—What then? Ought you not to do it, with proper Attention.

M 5

to

(a) *Each* perhaps, should be *advised*.

to yourself?—"I would sing."—Well: and what forbids but that you may sing, with Attention to yourself? For there is no Part of Life exempted, to which Attention doth not extend. For will you do it the worse by attending, and the better by not attending? What else in Life is best performed by inattentive People? Doth a Smith forge the better by not attending? Doth a Pilot steer the safer by not attending? Or is any other, even of the minutest Operations, performed the better by Inattention? Do not you perceive, that, when you have let your Mind loose, it is no longer in your Power to call it back, either to Propriety, or Modesty, or Moderation? But you do every thing as it happens: you follow your Inclinations.

§. 2. To what then am I to attend?

Why, in the first Place, to those universal Maxims, which you must always have at hand; and not sleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, or converse without them: that no one is the Master of another's Choice; and it is in Choice alone that Good and Evil consist. No one therefore is the Master either to procure me any Good, or to involve me in any Evil: but I alone have the Disposal of myself with regard to these Things. Since these then are secured to me, what need have I to be troubled about Externals? What Tyrant is formidable? What Distemper? What Poverty? What Offence?—"I have not pleased such a
"one."

“one.”—Is he my Concern then? Is he my Conscience?—“No.”—Why do I trouble myself any further about him then?—“But he is thought to be of some Consequence.”—Let him look to that, and they who think him so. But I have One, whom I must please, to whom I must submit, whom I must obey; God, and those (b) who are next Him. He hath entrusted me with myself, and made my Choice subject to myself alone, having given me Rules for the right Use of it. If I follow the proper Rules in Syllogisms, in convertible Propositions, I do not regard, nor care for any one, who says any thing contrary to them. Why then am I vexed at being censured in Matters of greater Consequence? What is the Reason of this Perturbation? Nothing else; but that in this Instance I want Exercise. For every Science despiseth Ignorance, and the Ignorant; and not only the Sciences, but even the Arts. Take any Shoemaker, take any Smith you will, and he laughs at the rest of the World, with regard to his own Business.

§. 3. In the first place then, these are the Maxims we must have ready, and do nothing without them; but direct the Soul to this Mark, to pursue
M 6 nothing

(b) The tutelar Genius, and Fortune. Of the former, see B. I. ch. 14. §. 2. Of both, see B. IV. ch. 4. §. 4. By changing *καὶ τοῖς* into *καὶ τοῖ*, the Translation will be; But, next to Him, He hath entrusted me with myself.

nothing external, nothing that belongs to others; but as He, who hath the Power, hath appointed: Things dependent on Choice are to be pursued always; and the rest, as it is permitted. Besides this, we must remember, who we are, and what Name we bear, and endeavour to direct the several Offices of Life to the rightful Demands of its several Relations: what is the proper Time for Singing, what for Play, in what Company: what will be the Consequence of our Performance: whether our Companions will despise us, or we ourselves: when to employ Raillery, and whom to ridicule: upon what Occasions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preserve our own Character.

§. 4. Where-ever you deviate from any of these Rules, the Damage is immediate; not from any thing external, but from the very Action itself.—
 “What then, is it possible, by these Means, to be
 “faultless?” Impracticable: but this is possible, to use a constant Endeavour to be faultless. For we shall have Cause to be satisfied, if, by never remitting this Attention, we shall be exempt at least from a few Faults. But now, when you say, I will begin to attend To-morrow; be assured, it is the same Thing, as if you say, “I will be shame-
 “less, impertinent, base, To-day: it shall be in
 “the Power of others to grieve me: I will be
 “passionate, I will be envious To-day.” See to
 how.

how many Evils you give yourself up.—“ But all “ will be well To-morrow.”—How much better To-day? If it be for your Interest To-morrow, much more To-day, that it may be in your Power To-morrow too, and that you may not defer it again to the third Day.

C H A P. XIII.

Concerning Such as readily discover their own Affairs.

§. 1. **W**HEN any one appears to us to discourse frankly of his own Affairs, we too are some Way induced to discover our Secrets to him; and we suppose this to be acting with Frankness! First, because it seems unfair, that, when we have heard the Affairs of our Neighbour, we should not, in return, communicate ours to him; and, besides, we think, that we shall not appear of a frank Character in concealing what belongs to ourselves. Indeed it is often said, “ I “ have told you all my Affairs; and will you “ tell me none of yours? Where do People act “ thus?” Lastly, it is supposed, that we may safely trust him who hath already trusted us: for we imagine, that he will never discover our Affairs, for fear we, in our Turn, should discover his. It is thus that the Inconsiderate are caught by the Soldiers at Rome. A Soldier sits by you,
in

in a common Dress, and begins to speak ill of *Cæsar*. Then you, as if you had received a Pledge of his Fidelity, by his first beginning the Abuse, say likewise what you think; and so you are led away in Chains to Execution.

§. 2. Something like this is the Case with us in general. But when one hath safely intrusted his Secrets to me, shall I, in Imitation of him, trust mine to any one who comes in my Way? The Case is different. I indeed hold my Tongue, (supposing me to be of such a Disposition) but he goes, and discovers them to every body: and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a Desire of Revenge, I discover his; and asperse, and am aspersed. But, if I remember, that one Man doth not hurt another, but that every one is hurt and profited by his own Actions, I indeed keep to this, not to do any thing like him: yet, by my own talkative Folly, I suffer what I do suffer.

§. 3. “Ay: but it is unfair, when you have
“heard the Secrets of your Neighbour, not to
“communicate any thing to him in return.”—
Why, did I ask you to do it, Sir? Did you tell me your Affairs, upon Condition that I should tell you mine, in return? If you are a Blab, and believe all you meet to be Friends, would you have me too become like you? But, what if the Case be this: that you did right in trusting your Affairs

fairs to *me*, but it is not right that I should trust *you*? Would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is just as if I had a sound Barrel, and you a leaky one: and you should come and deposite your Wine with me to put it into my Barrel; and then should take it ill, that, in my Turn, I did not trust you with my Wine. No. You have a leaky Barrel. How then are we any longer upon equal Terms? You have deposited your Affairs with an honest Man, and a Man of Honour; one who esteems his own Actions alone, and nothing external, to be either hurtful or profitable. Would you have me deposite mine with you: a Man who have dishonoured your own Faculty of Choice, and who would get a poultry Sum, or a Post of Power or Preferment at Court, even if, for the Sake of it, you were to kill your own Children, like *Medea*? Where is the Equality of this? But show me, that you are faithful; a Man of Honour, steady; show me, that you have friendly Principles; show me, that your Vessel is not leaky; and you shall see, that I will not stay till you have trusted your Affairs to me; but I will come and intreat you to hear an Account of mine. For who would not make use of a good Vessel? Who despises a benevolent and friendly Adviser? Who will not gladly receive one to share the Burden, as it were, of his Difficulties; and, by sharing, to make it lighter?—

“ Well:

“ Well : but I trust *you*, and you do not trust “ *me*.”—In the first place, you do not really trust me ; but you are a Blab, and therefore can keep nothing in. For, if the former be the Case, trust *only* me. But now, whomever you see at leisure, you sit down by him, and say, “ My dear Friend, “ there is not a Man in the World that wishes “ me better, or hath more Kindness for me, than “ you ; I entreat you to hear my Affairs.” And this you do to those, with whom you have not the least Acquaintance. But, if you do [really] trust me, it is plainly as [thinking me] a Man of Fidelity and Honour ; and not because I have told you my Affairs. Let me alone then, till I too am of this Opinion [with regard to You]. Show me, that, if a Person hath told his Affairs to any one, it is a Proof of his being a Man of Fidelity and Honour. For, if this was the Case, I would go about and tell my Affairs to the whole World ; if, upon that Account, I should become a Man of Fidelity and Honour. But that is no such Matter ; but requires a Person to have no ordinary Principles.

§. 4. If then you see any one taking Pains for Things that belong to others, and subjecting his Choice to them, be assured, that this Man hath a thousand Things to compel and restrain him. He hath no need of burning Pitch, or the torturing

ing Wheel, to make him tell what he knows ; but the Nod of a Girl for Instance, will shake his Purpose ; the Good-will of a Courtier, the Desire of a public Post, of an Inheritance ; ten thousand other Things of that Sort. It must therefore be remembered in general, that secret Discourses require Fidelity, and a certain Sort of Principles. And where at this time, are these easily to be found ? Pray let any one show me a Person of such a Disposition as to say, I trouble myself only with those Things which are my own, incapable of Restraint, by Nature free. This I esteem the Essence of Good. Let the rest be as it may happen. It makes no Difference to me.

END of the DISCOURSES.



THE
ENCHIRIDION,
OR
MANUAL,
OF
EPICTETUS.





THE ENCHIRIDION.

I.



OF Things, some are in our Power, and others not. In our Power are Opinion, Pursuit, Desire, Aversion, and in one Word, whatever are our own Actions. Not in our Power, are Body, Property, Reputation, Command, and, in one Word, whatever are not our own Actions.

Now, the Things in our Power are, by Nature, free, unrestrained, unhindered : but those not in our Power, weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember then, that, if you suppose Things by Nature slavish, to be free ; and what belongs to others, your own ; you will be hindered ; you will lament ; you will be disturbed ; you will

will find fault both with Gods and Men. But, if you suppose, that only to be your own, which is your own; and what belongs to others, such as it really is; no one will ever compel you; no one will restrain you: you will find fault with no one; you will accuse no one, you will do no one Thing against your Will: no one will hurt you: you will not have an Enemy; for you will suffer no Harm.

Aiming therefore at such great Things, remember, that you must not allow yourself to be carried, even with a slight Tendency, towards the Attainment of the others (*a*): but that you must entirely quit some of them, and for the present postpone the rest. But, if you would both have these, and Command, and Riches, at once, perhaps you will not gain so much as the latter; because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former; by which alone Happiness and Freedom are procured.

Study, therefore, to be able to say to every harsh Appearance, "You are but an Appearance, and not absolutely the Thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those Rules which you have: and first, and chiefly, by this: Whether it concerns the Things which are in our own Power, or those which are not; and, if it concerns any
thing

(*a*) The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Conjecture, of
αλλων for *αυτων*.

thing not in our Power, be prepared to say, that it is nothing to you.

II.

Remember that *Desire* promises the Attainment of that of which you are desirous; and *Aversion* promises the Avoiding of that to which you are averse: that he who fails of the Object of his Desire, is disappointed: and he who incurs the Object of his Aversion, wretched. If then, you confine your Aversion to those Objects only, which are contrary to that natural Use of your Faculties, which you have in your own Power, you will never incur any thing to which you are averse. But if you are averse to Sickness, or Death, or Poverty, you will be wretched. Remove Aversion, then, from all Things that are not in our Power, and transfer it to Things contrary to the Nature of what is in our Power. But, for the present, totally suppress Desire: for, if you desire any of the Things not in our own Power, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are, and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your Possession. (b) Use
only

(b) The Sense is, that he, who is only beginning to philosophise, hath yet nothing right within him to desire, or set his Heart upon; therefore, till he hath, he must not set his Heart upon any thing. But in the mean time, he must make use of the *Pursuits* and *Avoidances*; i. e. perform the common

only [the requisite Acts] of Pursuit and Avoidance; and even these lightly, and with Gentleness, and Reservation.

III.

With regard to whatever Objects either delight the Mind, or contribute to Use, or are loved with fond Affection, remember to tell yourself, of what Nature they are, beginning from the most trifling Things. If you are fond of an Earthen Cup, that it is an Earthen Cup of which you are fond: for thus, if it is broken, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your Child, or your Wife, that you kiss a Being subject to the Accidents of Humanity; and thus you will not be disturbed, if either of them dies.

IV.

When you are going about any Action, remind yourself of what Nature the Action is. If you are going to bathe, represent to yourself the Things, which usually happen in the Bath: some Persons dashing the Water: some pushing and crowding, others giving abusive Language; and others stealing [the Clothes]. And thus you will more safely go about this Action, if you say to yourself, "I will now go bathe, and preserve my own Mind in a State conformable to Nature."

And

more Actions of Life: but these outward Movements must be cautious and gentle; and the inward Movements of Desire be quite restrained.

in the same manner with regard to every other Action. For thus, if any Impediment arises in Bathing, you will have it to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to preserve my Mind in a State conformable to Nature; and I shall not preserve it so, if I am out of Humour at Things that happen."

V.

Men are disturbed, not by Things, but by the Principles and Notions, which they form concerning Things. Death, for Instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to *Socrates*. But the Terror consists in our Notion of Death, that it is terrible. When therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own Principles. It is the Action of an uninstructed Person to lay the Fault of his own bad Condition upon others; of one entering upon Instruction, to lay the Fault on himself; and of one perfectly instructed, neither on others, nor on himself.

VI.

Be not elated on any Excellence not your own. If a Horse should be elated, and say, "I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are elated, and say, "I have a handsome Horse," know, that you are elated on what is, in fact,

only the Good of the Horse. (c) What then is your own? The Use of the Appearances of Things. So that when you behave conformably to Nature, in the Use of these Appearances, you will be elated with Reason; for you will be elated on some Good of your own.

VII.

As in a Voyage, when the Ship is at Anchor, if you go on Shore to get Water, you may amuse yourself with picking up a Shell-fish, or an Onion, in your Way; but your Thoughts ought to be bent towards the Ship, and perpetually attentive, lest the Captain should call; and then you must leave all these Things, that you may not be thrown into the Vessel, bound Neck and Heels, like a Sheep. Thus likewise in Life, if, instead of an Onion, or Shell-fish, such a Thing as a Wife or a Child be granted you, there is no Objection: but if the Captain calls, run to the Ship, leave all these Things, regard none of them. But, if you are old, never go far from the Ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to come in time.

VIII.

Require not Things to happen as you wish; but wish them to happen as they do happen; and you will go on well.

IX.

(c) The Translation follows Mr. Upton's Correction of the Text in this Chapter.

IX.

Sickness is an Impediment to the Body, but not to the Faculty of Choice, unless itself pleases. Lameness is an Impediment to the Leg, but not to the Faculty of Choice : and say this to yourself with regard to every thing that happens. For you will find it to be an Impediment to something else ; but not to yourself.

X.

Upon every Accident, remember to turn towards yourself, and enquire, what Powers you have for making a proper Use of it. If you see a handsome Person, you will find Continence a Power against this : if Pain be presented to you, you will find Fortitude : if Ill-Language, you will find Patience. And thus habituated, the Appearances of Things will not hurry you away along with them.

XI.

Never say of any thing, “ I have lost it ;” but, “ I have restored it.” Is your Child dead ? It is restored. Is your Wife dead ? She is restored. Is your Estate taken away ? Well : and is not that likewise restored ? “ But he who took it away is a bad Man.” What is it to you, by whose Hands He, who gave it, hath demanded it back again ? While He gives you to possess it, take care of it ; but as of something not your own, as Passengers do of an Inn.

XII.

If you would improve, lay aside such Reasonings as these. “ If I neglect my Affairs, I shall
 “ not have a Maintenance : if I do not correct
 “ my Servant, he will be good for nothing.”
 For it is better to die with Hunger, exempt from Grief and Fear, than to live in Affluence with Perturbation : and it is better your Servant should be bad, than you unhappy.

Begin therefore from little Things. Is a little Oil spilt ? A little Wine stolen ? Say to yourself, “ This is the Purchase paid for Apathy, for Tran-
 “ quillity ; and nothing is to be had for no-
 “ thing.” And when you call your Servant, consider, it is possible he may not come at your Call ; or, if he doth, that he may not do what you would have him do. But he is by no means of such Importance (*d*), that it should be in his Power to give you any Disturbance.

XIII.

(*e*) If you would improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to Externals. Do not wish to be thought to know any thing ; and though you should appear to be somebody

(*d*) Thus some MSS. Changing in others ~~sales~~ into ~~sales~~, the Translation will be—It is not so well with Him, and ill with You.

(*e*) There is a great Likeness to Christian Phrases and Doctrines in this Chapter.

body to others, distrust yourself. For, be assured, it is not easy at once to preserve your Faculty of Choice in a State conformable to Nature, and [to secure] Externals: but while you are careful about the one, you must of Necessity neglect the other.

XIV.

If you wish your Children, and your Wife, and your Friends, to live for ever, you are stupid: for you wish Things to be in your Power, which are not so; and, what belongs to others, to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your Servant to be without Fault, you are a Fool; for you wish Vice not to be Vice (*f*), but something else. But, if you wish to have your Desires undisappointed, that is in your own Power. Exercise, therefore, what is in your Power. He is the Master of every other Person, who is able to confer, or remove, whatever that Person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever then would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others; else he must necessarily be a Slave.

XV.

Remember that you must behave [in Life] as at an Entertainment (*g*). Is any thing brought

N 3

round

(*f*) *i. e.* Dependent on Persons own Choice.

(*g*) An Allusion to the Custom, in the antient Entertainments, of carrying round the Dishes to each of the Guests.
UPTON.

round to you ? Put out your Hand, and take your Share, with Moderation. Doth it pass by you ? Do not stop it. Is it not yet come ? Do not stretch forth your Desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. Thus [do] with regard to Children, to a Wife, to public Posts, to Riches ; and you will be some time or other a worthy Partner of the Feasts of the Gods. And if you do not so much as take the Things which are set before you, but are able even to despise them, then you will not only be a Partner of the Feasts of the Gods, but of their Empire also. For, by thus doing, *Diogenes* and *Heracitus* (b), and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine.

XVI.

When you see any one weeping for Grief, either that his Son is gone abroad, or dead, or that he hath suffered in his Affairs ; take heed, that the Appearance may not hurry you away with it. But immediately make the Distinction within your own Mind ; and have it ready to say, “ It “ is not the Accident [itself] that distresses this “ Person, for it doth not distress another Man ; “ but the Judgment which he forms concerning “ it.” As far as Words go, however, do not disdain to condescend to him ; and even, if it should so happen, to groan with him. Take heed, however, not to groan inwardly too.

XVII.

(b) For *Heracitus*, I suspect, should be read *Hercules*.

XVII.

Remember that you are an Actor in a Drama, of such a Kind as the Author pleases to make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it be his Pleasure you should act a poor Man, a Cripple, a Governor, or a private Person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your Business, to act well the Character assigned you: to chuse it, is another's.

XVIII.

When a Raven happens to croak unluckily, let not the Appearance hurry you away with it: but immediately make the Distinction to yourself; and say, "None of these Things is portended to *me*; but either to my poultry Body, or Property, or Reputation, or Children, or Wife. "But to *me* all Portents are lucky, if I will. "For which-ever of these Things happens, it is "in my Power to derive Advantage from it."

XIX.

You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no Combat, in which it is not in your own Power to conquer. When therefore you see any one eminent in Honours, or Power, or in high Esteem on any other Account, take heed not to be hurried away with the Appearance, and to pronounce him happy: for, if the Essence of Good consists in Things in our own Power, there will be no room for Envy, or Emulation. But, for your

Part, do not wish to be a General, or a Senator, or a Consul, but [to be] free : and the only Way to this, is, a Contempt of Things not in our own Power.

XX.

Remember, not he who gives Ill-Language, or a Blow, affronts ; but the Principle, which represents these Things as affronting. When therefore, any one provokes you, be assured, that it is your own Opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first Place, not to be hurried away with the Appearance. For, if you once gain Time and Respite, you will more easily command yourself.

XXI.

Let Death and Exile, and all other Things which appear terrible, be daily before your Eyes ; but chiefly Death : and you will never entertain any abject Thought, nor too eagerly covet any thing.

XXII.

If you have an earnest Desire of attaining to Philosophy, prepare yourself from the very first, to be laughed at, to be sneered by the Multitude, to hear them say, " He is returned to us a Philosopher all at once ;" and, " Whence this supercilious Look ?" Now, for your Part, do not have a supercilious Look indeed ; but keep steadily to those Things which appear best to you, as
one

one appointed by God to this Station. For remember, that, if you adhere to the same Point, those very Persons who at first ridiculed, will afterwards admire you. But, if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double Ridicule.

XXIII.

If you ever happen to turn your Attention to Externals so as to wish to please any one, be assured, that you have ruined your Scheme of Life (*i*). Be contented then, in every thing, with being a Philosopher: and, if you wish to be thought so likewise by any one, appear so to yourself, and it will suffice you.

XXIV.

Let not such Considerations as these distress you.

“ I shall live in Dishonour; and be no-body any-where.” For, if Dishonour is an Evil, you can no more be involved in any Evil by the Means of another, than be engaged in any thing base. Is it any Business of yours then, to get Power, or to be admitted to an Entertainment? By no means. How then, after all, is this a Dishonour? And how is it true, that you will be *no-body any-where*: when you ought to be *some-body* in those Things only, which are in your own Power, in which you may be of the greatest Consequence? “ But my Friends will be unassisted.”—What do you

N 5

mean

(*i*) If I yet pleased Men, I should not be the Servant of Christ. Gal. i. 10.

mean by unassisted? They will not have Money from you; nor will you make them *Roman* Citizens. Who told you then, that these are among the Things in our own Power; and not the Affair of others? And who can give to another the Things which he hath not himself? "Well: but get them then, that we too may have a Share." If I can get them with the Preservation of my own Honour, and Fidelity, and Greatness of Mind, show me the Way, and I will get them: but, if you require me to lose my own proper Good, that you may gain what is no Good, consider how unequitable and foolish you are. Besides: which would you rather have, a Sum of Money; or a Friend of Fidelity and Honour? Rather assist me then to gain this Character, than require me to do those Things by which I may lose it. Well: but my Country, say you, as far as depends upon me, will be unassisted. Here again, what Assistance is this you mean? "It will not have Porticos, nor Baths, of your providing." And what signifies that? Why, neither doth a Smith provide it with Shoes, or a Shoemaker with Arms. It is enough, if every one fully performs his own proper Business. And were you to supply it with another Citizen of Honour and Fidelity, would not (k) he be of Use

(k) I have followed the Conjecture of a Friend, who thinks *ωφελες* should be *ωφελει*, to preserve an Opposition between the Person signified by it, and the *συ αυτος* in the next Sentence.

Use to it? Yes. Therefore neither are you yourself useless to it. "What Place then, say you, shall I hold in the State?" Whatever you can hold with the Preservation of your Fidelity and Honour. But if, by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what Use can you be to your Country, when you are become faithless, and void of Shame?

XXV.

Is any one preferred before you at an Entertainment, or in a Compliment, or in being admitted to a Consultation? If these Things are good, you ought to rejoice, that *he* hath got them: and, if they are evil, do not be grieved, that *you* have not got them. And remember, that you cannot, without using the same Means [which others do] to acquire Things not in our own Power, expect to be thought worthy of an equal Share of them. For how can he, who doth not frequent the Door of any [great] Man, doth not attend him, doth not praise him, have an equal Share with him who doth? You are unjust then, and unsatiable, if you are unwilling to pay the Price for which these Things are sold, and would have them for nothing. For how much are Lettuces sold? A Half-penny, for Instance. If another then, paying a Half-penny, takes the Lettuces, and you, not paying it, go without them, do not imagine,

that he hath gained any Advantage over you. For as he hath the Lettices, so you have the Half-penny, which you did not give. So, in the present Case, you have not been invited to such a Person's Entertainment; because you have not paid him the Price for which a Supper is sold. It is sold for Praise: it is sold for Attendance. Give him then the Value, if it be for your Advantage. But, if you would, at the same time, not pay the one, and yet receive the other, you are insatiable, and a Blockhead. Have you nothing then, instead of the Supper? Yes indeed you have; the not praising him, whom you do not like to praise: the not bearing with his Behaviour at coming in (1).

XXVI.

The Will of Nature may be learned from those Things, in which we do not differ from each other. As, when our Neighbour's Boy hath broken a Cup, or the like, we are presently ready to say, "These are Things that will happen." Be assured then, that when your own Cup likewise is broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's Cup was broken. Transfer this, in like manner, to greater Things. Is the Child or Wife of another dead? There is no one who

would

(1) Or, according to the Reading of *Simplicius*—the Attendants in his Antichamber.

would not say, "This is a human Accident." But if any one's (*m*) own Child happens to die, it is presently, "Alas! how wretched am I!" But it should be remembered, how we are affected in hearing the same Thing concerning others.

XXVII.

As a Mark (*n*) is not set up for the Sake of missing the Aim, so neither doth the Nature of Evil exist in the World.

XXVIII.

If a Person had delivered up your Body to any one, whom he met in his Way, you would certainly be angry. And do you feel no Shame in delivering up your own Mind to be disconcerted, and confounded by any one, who happens to give you Ill-Language?

XXIX.

(*m*) Natural Affection prompts us to grieve for a Wife or a Child, and to sympathize with the Griefs of others: whence Christianity teaches us to *weep with them who weep*: yet forbidding us, in any Case, to *sorrow as without Hope*. Stoicism carries Truth into Absurdity; while Christian Philosophy makes all Truths coincide, uniting Fortitude with Tenderness and Compassion.

(*n*) Happiness, the Effect of Virtue, is the Mark which God hath set up for us to aim at. Our missing it, is no Work of His; nor so properly any Thing real, as a mere Negative and Failure of our own.

XXIX (o).

XXX.

Duties are universally measured by Relations. Is any one a Father? In this are implied, as due, Taking Care of him; submitting to him in all Things; patiently receiving his Reproaches, his Correction. But he is a bad Father. Is your natural Tie then to a *good* Father? No: but to a Father. Is a Brother unjust? Well: preserve your own Situation towards him. Consider not what *he* doth; but what *you* are to do, to keep your own Faculty of Choice in a State conformable to Nature. For another will not hurt you, unless you please. You will then be hurt, when you *think* you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will find, from [the Idea of] a Neighbour, a Citizen, a General, the [corresponding] Duties, if you accustom yourself to contemplate the [several] Relations.

XXXI.

Be assured, that the essential Property of Piety towards the Gods, is, to form right Opinions concerning them, as existing (p), and as governing the

(o) This Chapter, except some very trifling Differences, is the same with the Fifteenth of the Third Book of the Discourses; therefore unnecessary to be repeated here.

(p) *He that cometh to God, must believe that He is; and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.* Heb. xii. 6.

the Universe with Goodness and Justice. And fix yourself in this Resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all Events, as produced by the most perfect Understanding. For, thus you will never find Fault with the Gods, nor accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected any other Way (q), than by withdrawing yourself from Things not in our own Power, and placing Good or Evil in those only which are. For if you suppose any of the Things, not in our own Power, to be either good or evil; when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find fault with, and blame, the Authors. For every Animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor Things that appear hurtful, and the Causes of them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial, and the Causes of them. It is impracticable then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt, should rejoice in the Person who, he thinks, hurts him; just as it is impossible to rejoice in the Hurt itself. Hence, also, a Father is reviled by a Son, when he doth not impart to him the Things which he takes to be good: and the supposing Empire to be a Good, made *Polynices* and *Eteocles* mutually Enemies. On this account the Husbandman, the Sailor, the Merchant; on this account those who

(q) ἄλλως τε, perhaps should be ἄλλως δέ.

who lose Wives and Children, revile the Gods. For where Interest is, there too is Piety placed. So that, whoever is careful to regulate his Desires and Aversions as he ought, is, by the very same Means, careful of Piety likewise. But it is also incumbent on every one to offer Libations, and Sacrifices, and First-Fruits, conformably to the Customs of his Country, with Purity; and not in a slovenly manner, nor negligently, nor sparingly, nor beyond his Ability.

XXXII.

When you have Recourse to Divination, remember, that you know not what the Event will be, and you come to learn it of the Diviner: but of what Nature it is, you know before you come; at least, if you are a Philosopher. For if it is among the Things not in our own Power, it can by no means be either good or evil. Do not, therefore, bring either Desire or Aversion with you to the Diviner, (else you will approach him trembling;) but first acquire a distinct Knowledge, that every Event is indifferent, and nothing to you, of whatever Sort it may be; for it will be in your Power to make a right Use of it; and this no one can hinder: then come with Confidence to the Gods, as your Counsellors: and afterwards, when any Counsel is given you, remember what Counsellors you have assumed; and whose Advice you will neglect, if you disobey.

Come

Come to Divination, as *Socrates* prescribed, in Cases, of which the whole Consideration relates to the Event, and in which no Opportunities are afforded by Reason, or any other Art, to discover the Thing proposed to be learned. When, therefore, it is our Duty to share the Danger of a Friend, or of our Country, we ought not to consult the Oracle, whether we shall share it with them, or not. For though the Diviner should forewarn you, that the Victims are unfavourable, this means no more, than that either Death, or Mutilation, or Exile, is portended. But we have Reason within us: and it directs, even with these Hazards, to stand by our Friend and our Country. Attend therefore to the greater Diviner, the *Pythian* God; who cast out of the Temple, the Person who gave no Assistance to his Friend, while another was murdering him.

XXXIII.

Immediately prescribe some Character and Form [of Behaviour] to yourself, which you may preserve, both alone, and in Company.

Be for the most part silent: or speak merely what is necessary, and in few Words. We may however enter, though sparingly, into Discourse sometimes, when Occasion calls for it: but not on any of the common Subjects, of Gladiators, or Horse Races, or athletic Champions, or Feasts; the vulgar Topics of Conversation: but principally

pally not of Men, so as either to blame, or praise, or make Comparisons. If you are able then, by your own Conversation, bring over that of your Company to proper Subjects : but, if you happen to be taken among Strangers, be silent.

Let not your (r) Laughter be much, nor on many Occasions, nor profuse.

Avoid Swearing, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able.

Avoid public and vulgar Entertainments : but, if ever an Occasion calls you to them, keep your Attention upon the Stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar Manners. For be assured, that if a Person be ever so sound himself, yet, if his Companion be infected, he who converses with him will be infected likewise.

Provide Things relating to the Body no farther than mere Use ; as Meat, Drink, Cloathing, House, Family. But strike off, and reject, every thing relating to Show and Delicacy.

As far as possible, before Marriage, preserve yourself pure from Familiarities with Women : and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfully (s).

But

(r) See *Eccles.* ii. 2. vii. 3—6. *Eccles.* xix. 30. xxi. 20.

(s) Public Prostitutes were allowed by the Laws at *Rome* and in *Greece*. The Mischiefs, occasioned by Persons of this Character, scarcely so much as hinted by the Stoic Philosopher, are the Subject of many beautiful Reflexions in the *Book of Proverbs*.

But do not therefore be troublesome, and full of Reproofs, to those who use these Liberties; nor frequently boast, that you yourself do not.

If any one tells you, that such a Person speaks ill of you, do not make Excuses about what is said of you, but answer; "He doth not know my
" other Faults, else he would not have mentioned
" only these."

It is not necessary for you to appear often at public Spectacles: but if ever there is a proper Occasion for you to be there, do not appear more solicitous for any one, than for yourself; that is, with Things to be only just as they are, and him only to conquer who is the Conqueror; for thus you will meet with no Hindrance. But abstain entirely from Acclamations, and Derision, and violent Emotions. And when you come away, do not discourse a great deal on what hath passed, and what doth not contribute to your own Amendment. For it would appear by such Discourse, that you were immoderately struck with the Show.

Go not [of your own Accord] to the Rehearsals of any [Authors], nor appear [at them] readily. But if you do appear, preserve your Gravity and Sedateness, and at the same time avoid being morose.

When you are going to confer with any one, and particularly of those in a superior Station, represent

represent to yourself how *Socrates* (t), or *Zeno*, would behave in such a Case, and you will not be at a Loss to make a proper Use of whatever may occur.

When you are going to any of the People in Power, represent to yourself, that you will not find him at home: that you will not be admitted [into the House]: that the Doors [of his Apartment] will not be opened to you: that he will take no Notice of you. If, with all this, it be your Duty to go, bear what happens, and never say [to yourself], "It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a Man disconcerted by Externals (u).

In Parties of Conversation, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own Actions, and Dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the Risques you have run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your Adventures. Avoid, likewise, an Endeavour to excite
Laughter.

(t) It should be observed here, that, the Mind being thus naturally affected by the Thought of imitating a superior Character, Christians enjoy a singular Advantage, in not being left to study and copy the imperfect and faulty Patterns of Persons no way particularly related to them; but having an authentic Delineation of divine Excellence, familiarized to their Apprehensions, in Him, who, both in acting and suffering for us, *hath left us an Example, that we should follow his Steps.*

(u) A late Editor of the *Enchiridion* hath proposed to read *διαπεπλεγμεν* instead of *διαβιβλημεν*.

Laughter. For this is a slippery Point, which may throw you into vulgar Manners: and, besides, may be apt to lessen you in the Esteem of your Acquaintance. Approaches to indecent Discourse are likewise dangerous. Whenever, therefore, any thing of this Sort happens, if there be a proper Opportunity, rebuke him who makes Advances that Way: or, at least, by Silence, and Blushing, and a forbidding Look, show yourself to be displeased by such Talk.

XXXIV.

If you are struck by the Appearance of any promised Pleasure, guard yourself against being hurried away by it: but let the Affair wait your Leisure, and procure yourself some Delay. Then bring to your Mind both Points of Time; that in which you shall enjoy the Pleasure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourself, after you have enjoyed it: and set before you, in Opposition to these, how you will rejoice and applaud yourself, if you abstain. And even, though it should appear to you a seasonable Gratification, take heed, that its enticing, and agreeable, and attractive Force may not subdue you: but set in Opposition to this, how much better it is, to be conscious of having gained so great a Victory.

XXXV.

XXXV.

When you do any thing from a clear Judgment that it ought to be done, never shun the being seen to do it, even though the World should make a wrong Supposition about it: for, if you do not act right, shun the Action itself; if you do, why are you afraid of those who censure you wrongly?

XXXVI.

As the Proposition, *Either it is Day, or it is Night*, is extremely proper for a disjunctive Argument, but quite improper in a conjunctive one (*w*): so, at a Feast, to chuse the largest Share, is very suitable to the bodily Appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social Spirit of an Entertainment. When you eat with another, then remember, not only the Value of those Things which are set before you, to the Body; but the Value of that Behaviour, which ought to be observed towards the Person who gives the Entertainment.

XXXVII.

If you have assumed any Character above your Strength, you have both made an ill Figure in that, and quitted one which you might have supported.

XXXVIII.

(*w*) The Stoics were so fond of Logic, that we must not wonder if *Epietetus* took a Simile from thence, which to others must appear a strange one.

XXXVIII.

As, in walking, you take care not to tread upon a Nail, or turn your Foot ; so likewise take care not to hurt the ruling Faculty of your Mind. And, if we were to guard against this in every Action, we should undertake the Action with the greater Safety.

XXXIX.

The Body is to every one the Measure of the Possessions proper for it ; as the Foot is of the Shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the Measure : but, if you move beyond it, you must necessarily be carried forward, as down a Precipice : as in the Case of a Shoe, if you go beyond its Fitness to the Foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple (*), and then studded with Jewels. For to that which once exceeds a due Measure, there is no Bound.

XL.

Women from fourteen Years old are flattered with the Title of Mistresses, by the Men. Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the Men Pleasure, they begin to adorn themselves ; and in that to place all their Hopes. It is worth while, therefore, to fix our Attention on making them sensible, that they are
esteemed

(*) Purple was of high Honour and Price among the Ancients.

esteemed for nothing else, but the Appearance of a decent, and modest, and discreet Behaviour (y).

XLII.

It is a Mark of want of Genius, to spend much Time in Things relating to the Body ; as, to be long in our Exercises, in Eating, and Drinking, and in the Discharge of other animal Functions. These should be done incidentally, and slightly ; and our whole Attention be engaged in the Care of the Understanding.

XLII.

When any Person doth ill by you, or speaks ill of you, remember that he acts, or speaks, from a Supposition of its being his (z) Duty. Now, it is not possible, that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself.

(y) The original Words here, κοσμίαι καὶ αἰδημονες ἢ σωφροσύνῃ, are almost the same with, ἐν καταβολῇ κοσμίῳ μετααἰδούς καὶ σωφροσύνης, 1 Tim. ii. 9.

(z) *Epietetus* seems, in part, to be mistaken here. For, perhaps, it is oftener from having no Thought at all about Duty, or preferring Inclination to it, than from having a wrong Notion of it, that Persons are slanderous and injurious : besides, that wrong Notions often arise from Neglect, or Partiality. Supposing all bad Actions to proceed intirely from Ignorance, or Mistake, puts them on a Level, in Point of Freedom from Guilt, with good ones. But, since many proceed from thence, more or less, the Doctrine of this Chapter is, in a considerable Degree, right : and, so far as it is, very strongly calls to one's Mind that divine Intercession — *Forgive them ! for they know not what they do.*

self. Therefore, if he judges from a wrong Appearance, He is the Person hurt; since He too is the Person deceived. For, if any one should suppose a true Proposition to be false, the Proposition is not hurt; but he who is deceived [about it]. Setting out then from these Principles, you will meekly bear a Person who reviles you: for you will say, upon every Occasion, "It seemed so to him."

XLIII.

Every thing hath two Handles; the one, by which it may be borne; the other, by which it cannot. If your Brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold on the Action by the Handle of his Injustice; for by that it cannot be borne: but by the Opposite, that he is your Brother, that he was brought up with you: and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be borne.

XLIV.

These Reasonings are unconnected: "I am richer than you; therefore I am better: "I am more eloquent than you; therefore I am better." The Connexion is rather this: "I am richer than you; therefore my Property is greater than yours:" "I am more eloquent than you; therefore my Style is better than yours." But *you*, after all, are neither Property, nor Style.

Doth any one bathe (a) in a mighty little Time? Do not say, that he doth it ill; but, in a mighty little Time. Doth any one drink a great Quantity of Wine? Do not say that he doth ill; but, that he drinks a great Quantity. For, unless you perfectly understand the Principle, [from which any one acts], how should you know, if he doth ill? Thus you will not run the Hazard of assenting to any Appearances, but such as you fully comprehend.

XLVI.

Never call yourself a Philosopher, or talk a great deal among the Unlearned about Theorems; but act conformably to them. Thus, at a Feast or Entertainment, do not talk how Persons ought to eat; but eat as you ought. For remember, that in this manner *Socrates* also universally avoided all Ostentation. And when Persons came to him, and desired to be recommended by him, to Philosophers, he took and recommended them; so well did he bear being overlooked. So that if ever any Talk should happen among the Unlearned, concerning [philosophic] Theorems, be you for the most part silent. For there is great Danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if any one tells you, that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you

(a) See B. IV. c. 8. of the Discourses.

you may be sure, that you have begun your Business. For Sheep do not throw up the Grass, to show the Shepherds how much they have eaten: but, inwardly digesting their Food, they outwardly produce Wool, and Milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise, not show Theorems to the Unlearned; but the Actions produced by them, after they have been digested.

XLVII.

When you have brought yourself to supply the Necessities of your Body, at a small Price, do not pique yourself upon it: nor, if you drink Water, be saying upon every Occasion, "I drink Water." But first consider, how much more sparing and patient of Hardship the Poor are, than we. But if at any time you would enure yourself by Exercise to Labour; and bearing hard Trials, [do it] for your own Sake, and for the World: do not grasp at Statues; but, when you are violently thirsty, take a little cold Water in your Mouth, and spit it out, and tell no body.

XLVIII.

The Condition and Characteristic of a vulgar Person is, that he never expects either Benefit or Hurt from himself; but from Externalists. The Condition and Characteristic of a Philosopher is, that he expects all Hurt and Benefit from himself. The Marks of a Proficient are, that he censures no

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one,

(b) See B. III. c. 12. of the Discourses.

one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one; says nothing concerning himself as being any body, or knowing any thing: when he is, in any Instance, hindered, or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs at the Person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no Defence. But he goes about with the Caution of infirm People [after Sickness, or an Accident], dreading to move any thing that is set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses (c) all Desire in himself: he transfers his Aversion to those Things only, which thwart the proper Use of our own Faculty of Choice: the Exertion of his active Powers towards any thing is very gentle: if he appears stupid, or ignorant, he doth not care; and, in a Word, he watches himself as an Enemy, and one in Ambush.

XLIX.

When any one shows himself vain, on being able to understand and interpret the Works of *Chrysippus*, say to yourself, “ Unless *Chrysippus* had
 “ written obscurely, this Person would have had
 “ no Subject for his Vanity. But what do I
 “ desire? To understand Nature, and follow
 “ her. I ask then, who interprets her; and,
 “ finding *Chrysippus* doth, I have Recourse to
 “ him.

(c) See c. 2. Note (b).

“ him. I do not understand his Writings. I
 “ seek therefore one to interpret *them*.” So far
 there is nothing to value myself upon. And when
 I find an Interpreter, what remains is, to make
 use of his Instructions. This alone is the valua-
 ble Thing. But, if I admire nothing but merely
 the Interpretation, what do I become more than
 a Grammarian, instead of a Philosopher? Except,
 indeed, that, instead of *Homer*, I interpret *Chry-*
sippus. When any one therefore desires me to read
Chrysippus to him, I rather blush, when I cannot
 show my Actions agreeable, and consonant to his
 Discourse.

L.

Whatever Rules you have deliberately pro-
 posed to yourself [for the Conduct of Life,] abide
 by them, as so many Laws, and as if you would
 be guilty of Impiety in transgressing any of them :
 and do not regard what any one says of you ; for
 this, after all, is no Concern of yours. How long
 then will you defer to think yourself worthy of
 the noblest Improvements, and, in no Instance,
 to transgress the Distinctions of Reason? You
 have received the Philosophic Theorems, with
 which you ought to be conversant : and you have
 been conversant with them. What other Master
 then do you wait for, to throw upon that the
 Delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer

O 3

a Boy,

a Boy; but a grown Man (*d*). If therefore you will be negligent and slothful, and always add Procrastination to Procrastination, Purpose to Purpose, and fix Day after Day, in which you will attend to yourself; you will insensibly continue without Proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of the Vulgar. This Instant then think yourself worthy of living as a Man grown up, and a Proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best, be to you an inviolable Law. And if any Instance of Pain or Pleasure, or Glory, or Disgrace be set before you, remember, that now is the Combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put off; and that, by once being worsted, and giving way, Proficiency is lost, or [by the contrary] preserved. Thus *Socrates* became perfect, improving himself by every thing; (*e*) attending to nothing but Reason. And though you are not yet a *Socrates*, you ought however to live as one desirous of becoming a *Socrates*.

LI.

(*d*) The same Words, *αὐτὸς τέλειος*, in the same Sense, are used *Eph.* iv. 13. (where they are opposed to *ἄτελος*, v. 14.) *James* iii. 2. and *Αὐτοὶ τέλειοι*, *Col.* i. 28. and *ἑλαιοι*, singly, *1 Cor.* ii. 6. *Phil.* iii. 15. *Heb.* v. 14. where it is opposed to *ἀτελής*, v. 13. Which Word is used also *1 Cor.* iii. as *μετρησιον* is here.

(*e*) *Plato*, in his *Crito*, introduces *Socrates* saying this of himself. UPTON

LI.

The first and most necessary Topic in Philosophy is, that of the Use of [practical] Theorems ; as that, *We ought not to lie* : the second is, that of Demonstrations ; as, *Whence it is, that we ought not to lie* : the third, that which gives Strength and Articulation to the other two ; as, *Whence this is a Demonstration*. For what is Demonstration ? What is Consequence ? What Contradiction ? What Truth ? What Falshood ? The third Topic then is necessary, on the Account of the Second ; and the second, on the Account of the first. But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on the contrary. For we spend all our Time on the third Topic, and employ all our Diligence about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are mighty ready to show how it is demonstrated, that Lying is not right.

LII.

Upon all Occasions, we ought to have these Maxims ready at hand.

Conduct me, Love, and Thou, O Destiny,
Where-ever Your Decrees have fix'd my Station.
I follow chearfully : and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still (f).

O 4

Who-

(f) From a Poem of Cleanthes.

*Who-e'er yields properly to Fate, is deem'd
Wise among Men, and knows the Laws of Hea-
ven (g).*

And this Third :

(b) " O *Crito*, if it thus pleases the Gods, thus
" let it be. *Anytus* and *Melitus* may kill me in-
" deed : but hurt me they cannot."

(g) From *Euripides*.

(b) From *Plato's Crito*, and *Apology*.

The END of the ENCHIRIDION.



FRAGMENTS

OF

EPICTETUS.

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O 5



EXHIBIT

1875

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FRAGMENTS

OF

EPICTEtus,

FROM

STOBÆUS, ANTONIUS, and MAXIMUS (a).

I.



LIFE entangled with Fortune, resembles a wintry Torrent: for it is turbulent, and muddy, and difficult to pass, and violent and noisy, and of short Continuance.

A Soul

(a) According to *Fabricius*, in his *Bibliotheca Græca*; L. V. c. 30. *Stobæus* was a Heathen: at least, he cites only Heathen Authors. He lived about the Beginning of the Fifth Century. *Maximus* was a Christian, of the Seventh: and *Antonius*, surnamed *Melissa*, or the Bee, of the Eighth

A Soul conversant with Virtue, resembles a perpetual Fountain : for it is clear, and gentle, and potable, and sweet, and communicative, and rich, and harmless, and innocent.

H.

If you would be good, first believe that you are bad.

III.

It is better to offend seldom (owning it when we do), and act often wisely, than to say, we seldom err, and offend frequently.

IV.

Chastise your Passions, that they may not punish you.

V.

Be not so much ashamed of what is void of Glory, as studious to shun what is void of Truth.

VI.

If you would be well spoken of, learn to speak well of others. And, when you have learned to speak

Century, or later; some say, of the Twelfth. Their Collections are printed together. The Editions of *Stobæus* are extremely incorrect: and in him and *Maximus*, the Names of the Authors quoted, either were frequently wrong originally, or have been altered since. This may have happened to *Antonius* also: and, consequently, some of the Sayings ascribed to *Epictetus* may not have been his. Indeed, many of these Fragments have very little the Turn of his other Discourses. The two first, particularly, have a much stronger Resemblance of the Style and Manner of *M. Antonius*.

Speak well of them, endeavour likewise to do well to them ; and thus you will reap the Fruit of being well spoken of by them.

VII.

Freedom is the Name of Virtue ; and Slavery of Vice : and both these are Actions of Choice. But neither of them belongs to Things, in which Choice hath no Share. But Fortune (*b*) is accustomed to dispose at her Pleasure of the Body, and those Things relating to the Body in which Choice hath no Share. For no one is a Slave, whose Choice is free. Fortune is an evil Chain to the Body ; and Vice, to the Soul. For he whose Body is unbound, and whose Soul is chained, is a Slave. On the contrary, he whose Body is chained, and his Soul unbound, is free. The Chain of the Body, Nature unbinds by Death ; and Vice, by (*c*) Money : the Chain of the Soul, Virtue unbinds, by Learning, and Experience, and philosophic Exercise.

VIII.

If you would live with Tranquillity and Content, endeavour to have all who live with you, good. And you will have them good, by instructing the Willing, and dismissing the Unwilling.

(*b*) The Sense absolutely requires, that *luxu* should be *luxu* ; and it is so translated.

(*c*) Perhaps, by bribing a Judge, or a Jailor. However, the Sense is not clear.

ing (d). For together with the Fugitives, will Wickedness and Slavery fly : and with those who remain with you, will Goodness and Liberty be left.

IX.

(e) It is scandalous, that he who sweetens his Drink by the Gifts of the Bees, should, by Vice, embitter Reason, the Gift of the Gods.

X.

No one, who is a Lover of Money, a Lover of Pleasure, or a Lover of Glory, is likewise a Lover of Mankind : but only he who is a Lover of Virtue.

XI.

As you would not wish to sail in a large, and finely decorated, and gilded Ship, and sink : so neither is it eligible to inhabit a grand and sumptuous House, and be in a Storm [of Passions and Cares].

XII.

When we are invited to an Entertainment, we take what we find : and, if any one should bid the Master of the House set Fish, or Tarts, before him, he would be thought absurd. Yet, in the World, we ask the Gods for what they do not give.

(d) The Translation omits *scilicet corruptive*, which is in *Antonius* and *Maximus*, but not in *Stobaeus*.

(e) This Sentence is ascribed to *Pythagoras*, by *Antonius* and *Maximus de rationali*. *Serm.* 27. p. 75.

give us; and that, though they have given us so many Things.

XIII.

They are pretty Fellows indeed, said he, who value themselves on Things not in our own Power. I am a better Man than you, says one; for I have many Estates, and you are pining with Hunger. I have been Consul, says another: I am a Governor, a third; and I have a fine Head of Hair, says a fourth. Yet one Horse doth not say to another, "I am better than you; for I have a great deal of Hay, and a great deal of Oats; and I have a Gold Bridle, and embroidered Trappings:" but, "I am swifter than you." And every Creature is better or worse from its own good or bad Qualities. Is Man, then, the only Creature, which hath no natural good Quality? And must we consider Hair, and Clothes, and Ancestors, [to judge of him]?

XIV.

Patients are displeased with a Physician, who doth not prescribe to them; and think he gives them over. And why are none so affected towards a Philosopher, as to conclude, he despairs of their Recovery to a right Way of Thinking, if he tells them nothing, which may be for their Good?

XV.

XV.

They who have a good Constitution of Body, support Heats and Colds : and so they, who have a right Constitution of Soul, bear [the Attacks of] Anger, and Grief, and immoderate Joy, and the other Passions.

XVI.

Examine yourself, whether you had rather be rich, or happy : and, if rich, be assured, that this is neither a Good, nor altogether in your own Power : but, if happy, that this is both a Good, and in your own Power : since the one is a temporary Loan of Fortune (*f*), and the other depends on Choice.

XVII.

As when you see a Viper, or an Asp, or a Scorpion, in an Ivory or Gold Box, you do not love, or think it happy, on Account of the Magnificence of the Materials, in which it is inclosed ; but shun and detest it, because it is of a pernicious Nature : so likewise, when you see Vice lodged in the midst of Wealth ; and the swelling Pride of Fortune, be not struck by the Splendour of the Materials, with which it is surrounded ; but despise the base Alloy of its Manners.

XVIII.

(*f*) *Τῆς ευδαιμονίας* seems to be merely an Interpolation, and is omitted in the Translation.

XVIII.

Riches are not among the Number of Things, which are good : Prodigality is of the Number of those, which are evil : Rightness of Mind, of those which are good. Now Rightness of Mind invites to Frugality, and the Acquisition of Things that are good : but Riches invite to Prodigality, and seduce from Rightness of Mind. It is difficult therefore for a rich Person to be right-minded; or a right-minded Person, rich (g).

XIX.

~~(h) as~~ Just as you had been bred and born in a Ship, you would not be eager to become the Pilot. For neither would the Ship have any natural and perpetual Connexion (i) with you there, nor have Riches here ; but Reason every where. That therefore, which is natural and congenial to you, Reason, think likewise to be in a peculiar Manner your own, and take care of it.

XX.

If you were born in *Perſia*, you would not endeavour to live in *Greece* ; but to be happy in the Place where you are. Why then, if you are born in

(g) *How hardly shall they that have Riches, enter into the Kingdom of God ?* Mark x. 23.

(h) The former Part of the Sentence seems to be wanting ; in which, probably, the Author had said, That they who have hereditary Wealth, should not think the Management of it their chief Concern : Just as, &c.

(i) *Zurca* should, perhaps, be *overrated*.

in Poverty, do you endeavour to be rich, and not to be happy in the Condition where you are.

XXI.

As it is better to lie straitened for Room upon a little Couch in Health, than to toss upon a wide Bed in Sickness; so it is better to contract yourself within the Compass of a small Fortune, and be happy, than to have a great one, and be wretched.

XXII.

It is not Poverty that causes Sorrow; but covetousness (*k*) Desires: nor do Riches deliver from Fear; but Reasoning. If, therefore, you acquire a Habit of Reasoning, you will neither desire Riches, nor complain of Poverty.

XXIII.

A Horse is not elated, and doth not value himself on his fine Manger or Trappings, or Saddle-cloths: nor a Bird, on the warm Materials of its Nest: but the former, on the Swiftness of his Feet; and the latter, of its Wings. Do not you, therefore, glory in your Eating, or Dress; or, briefly, in any external Advantage; but in Good-nature and Beneficence.

XXIV.

There is a Difference between living well, and living profusely. The one arises from Contentment,

(*k*) The *Latin* Translator supposes, that *avaritia* should be *aviditas*, which the Sense requires.

ment, and Order, and Decency, and Frugality : the other from Dissoluteness, and Luxury, and Disorder, and Indecency. In short, to the one belongs true Praise ; to the other, Censure. If, therefore, you would live well, do not seek to be praised for Profuseness.

XXV.

Let the first satisfying of Appetite be always the Measure to you of eating and drinking ; and Appetite itself the Sauce and the Pleasure. Thus you will never take more [Food] than is necessary, nor will you want Cooks : and you will be contented with whatever Drink falls in your way.

XXVI.

Be careful not to (*m*) thrive by the Meats in your Stomach ; but by Cheerfulness in the Soul. For the former, as you see, are evacuated, and carried off together ; but the latter, though the Soul be (*n*) separated, remains uncorrupted, and sincere.

XXVII.

(*l*) I have not translated the Fragment which follows this in Mr. Upton, because I do not understand it.

(*m*) There are various Readings of this Fragment ; but none which makes the Sense very clear.

(*n*) It is doubtful whether the Meaning be, that the Effect of a cheerful Behaviour will remain after the Person is dead, or after he is separated from the Company.

XXVII.

In every Feast remember, that there are two Guests to be entertained, the Body, and the Soul: and that what you give the Body, you presently lose; but what you give the Soul, remains for ever.

XXVIII.

Do not mix Anger with Profusion, and set them before your Guests. Profusion makes its Way through the Body, and is quickly gone: but Anger, when it hath penetrated the Soul, abides for a long Time. Take care, not to be transported with Anger, and affront your Guests, at a great Expence; but rather delight them at a cheap Rate, by gentle Behaviour.

XXIX.

Take care at your Meals, that the Attendants be not more in Number than those whom they are to attend. For it is absurd, that many Persons should wait on a few Chairs.

XXX.

It would be best, if both while you are personally making your Preparations, and while you are feasting at Table, you could give among the Servants Part of what is before you (a). But, if such a Thing be difficult at that Time, remember, that you, who are not weary, are attended by

(a) *Gesner*, for *ut supra*, reads *anywhere*, which seems the best Sense, and is followed in the Translation.

by those who are; you, who are eating and drinking, by those who are not; you who are talking, by those who are silent; you who are at Ease, by those who are under Constraint (p): and thus you will never be heated into any unreasonable Passion yourself; nor do any Mischief, by provoking another.

XXXI.

Strife and Contention are always absurd; but particularly unbecoming at Table Conversations. For a Person warmed with Wine will never either teach, or be convinced by, one who is sober. And where-ever Sobriety is wanting, the End will show, that you have exerted yourself to no Purpose.

XXXII.

Grasshoppers are musical; but Snails are dumb. The one rejoice in being wet; and the others, in being warm. Then the Dew calls out the one; and for this they come forth: but, on the contrary, the Noon-day Sun awakens the other; and in this they sing. If, therefore, you would be a musical and harmonious Person, whenever, in Parties of Drinking, the Soul is bedewed with Wine, suffer her not to go forth, and defile herself. But when, in Parties of Conversation, she glows by the Beams of Reason, then command her

(p) There is something strikingly beautiful and humane in this Consideration about Servants.

her to speak from Inspiration, and utter the
Oracles of Justice.

Consider him, with whom you converse, in
one of these three Ways, either as superior to
you [in Abilities], or inferior, or equal. If su-
perior, you ought to hear him, and be convinced:
if inferior, to convince (9) him; if equal, to agree
with him: and thus you will never be found
guilty of Litigiousness.

XXXIV.

It is better, by yielding to Truth, to conquer
Opinion; than by yielding to Opinion, to be
defeated by Truth.

XXXV.

If you seek Truth, you will not seek to con-
quer by all possible Means: and, when you have
found Truth, you will have a Security against
being conquered.

XXXVI.

Truth conquers by itself; Opinion, by foreign
Aids.

XXXVII.

It is better, by living with one free Person,
to be fearless, and free, than to be a Slave in
Company with many.

XXXVIII.

(9) *Agrippa*, probably, should be *arguing*; and is so tran-
slated. The *a* seems to have been added from the preceding
Word.

What you avoid suffering yourself, attempt not to impose on others. You avoid Slavery, for instance, take care not to enslave. For, if you can bear to exact Slavery from others, you appear to have been first yourself a Slave. For Vice hath no Communication with Virtue; nor Freedom with Slavery. As a Person in Health would not wish to be attended by the Sick, nor to have those who live with him be in a State of Sickness; so neither would a Person who is free, beg to be served by Slaves, or to have those who live with him in a State of Slavery.

XXXIX.

Whoever you are, that would live at a Distance from Slaves, deliver yourself from Slavery. And you will be free, if you deliver yourself from [the Power of] Appetite. For neither was *Arifides* called Just, nor *Epaminondas*, Divine, nor *Lycurgus*, a Preserver, because they were rich, and were served by Slaves; but because, being poor, they delivered Greece from Slavery.

XL.

If you would have your House securely inhabited, imitate the Spartan *Lycurgus*. And as he did not inclose his City with Walls, but fortified the Inhabitants with Virtue, and preserved the City always free; so do you likewise: not surround

surround yourself with a great Court-yard, nor raise high Towers; but strengthen those that live with you by Benevolence, and Fidelity, and Friendship. And thus nothing hurtful will enter, even if the whole Band of Wickedness was set in Array against it.

XLI.

Do not hang your House round with Tablets, and Pictures; but adorn it with Sobriety. For those are merely foreign, and a (r) fading Deception of the Eyes: but this, a congenial, and indelible, and perpetual Ornament to the House.

XLII.

Instead of Herds of Oxen, endeavour to assemble Flocks of Friends about your House.

XLIII.

As a Wolf resembles a Dog, so doth a Flatterer, and an Adulterer, and a Parasite, resemble a Friend. Take heed, therefore, that instead of Guardian Dogs, you do not inadvertently admit ravening Wolves.

XLIV.

He is void of true Taste, who strives to have his House admired, by decorating it with a showy Outside: but to adorn our Characters by the Gentleness

(r) In *Stobæus*, the Word is *εἰκασμός*. *Gesner*, whom *Mr. Upton* follows, guessed it should be *εἰκασμός*, *εἰκασμός*, which the Translation supposes, is a less Alteration, and makes a proper Opposition to what follows.

teness of a communicative Temper, is at once a Proof of good Taste, and Good-nature.

XLV.

If you admire little Things, in the first Place, you will never (s) be thought to deserve great ones : but, if you despise little Things, you will be greatly admired.

XLVI.

Nothing is meaner than the Love of Pleasure, the Love of Gain, and Insolence. Nothing is nobler than Magnanimity, Meekness, and Good-nature.

XLVII.

——Producing the Sentiments of those intractable Philosophers, who do not think [the Enjoyment of] Pleasure to be [in itself] the natural State of Man; but merely an adventitious Circumstance of those Things, in which his natural State consists, Justice, Sobriety, and Freedom. For what manner of Reason then should the Soul rejoice, and feel a Serenity from the lesser Good of the Body, as *Epicurus* says [it doth]; and not be pleased with its own Good, which is the very greatest? And yet Nature hath given me likewise a Sense of Shame : and I am covered with Blushes, when I think I have uttered any indecent

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Expression.

(s) *πρωτον μεγαλην αξιωθησιν* is the Text of *Stobæus*. Mr. *Upton* puts in *ων*, which the Translation follows. *Απαξιωθησιν* is a smaller Change, and the same Sense.

Expression. This Emotion will not suffer me to lay down Pleasure as [in itself] a Good, and the End of Life.

XLVIII.

The Ladies at *Rome* have *Plato's Republic* in their Hands, because he allows a Community of Wives : for they attend merely to the Words of the Author, and not to his Sense. For he doth not first order one Man and one Woman to marry and live together, and then allow a Community of Wives : but he abolishes that kind of Marriage, and introduces one of another kind (*t*). And, in general, Men are pleased in finding out Excuses for their own Faults. Yet Philosophy says, it is not fit even to move a Finger without some Reason.

XLIX.

The more rarely the Objects of Pleasure occur, the more delightful they are.

L.

Whenever any one exceeds Moderation, the most delightful Things may become the most undelightful.

LI.

Agrippinus was justly entitled to Praise on this Account, that, though he was a Man of the highest Worth, he never praised himself; but blushed,
even

(c) This, and other shocking Things in *Plato's Republic*, shew how apt even wise Men are to err, without a Guide.

even if another praised him. And he was a Man of such a Character, as to write in Praise of every harsh Event that befel him : if he was feverish, of a Fever ; if disgraced, of Disgrace ; if banished, of Banishment. And, when once, as he was going to dine, a Messenger brought him Word, that *Nero* ordered him to Banishment ; Well then, says *Agrippinus*, we will dine at *Aricia* (u).

LII.

Diogenes affirmed no Labour to be good, unless the End was a due State and Tone of the Soul, and not of the Body.

LIII.

As a true Balance is neither set right by a true one, nor judged by a false one : (w) so likewise a just Person is neither set right by just Persons, nor judged by unjust ones.

LIV.

As what is straight hath no need of what is straight, so neither what is just, of what is just, [to assist or amend it].

LV.

Do not give Judgment from another Tribunal, before you have been judged yourself at the Tribunal of Justice (x).

P 2

LVI.

(u) See Discourses, B. I. c. 1.

(w) Compare this and the next Fragment with 1 Cor.

ii. 15.

(x) See *Rom.* xiv. 10.

LVI.

If you would give a just Sentence, mind neither Parties nor Pleaders ; but the Cause itself.

LVII.

You will commit the fewest Faults in judging, if you are faultless in your own Life.

LVIII.

It is better, by giving a just Judgment, to be (y) blamed by him who is deservedly condemned, than by giving an unjust Judgment, to be justly censured by Nature.

LIX.

As the Touch-stone which tries Gold, is not itself tried by the Gold ; such is he, who hath the Rule of judging.

LX.

It is scandalous for a Judge to be judged by others.

LXI.

As nothing is straighter than what is straight, so nothing is juster than what is just (x).

LXII.

Who among you do not admire the Action of *Lycurgus the Lacedemonian* ? For when he had been

(y) The Antithesis seems to require, that *αἴτιος* should be *αἴτιος*, and the Translation—unjustly blamed by him, who is condemned.

(x) The Stoics held all Virtues, and all Faults to be equal : and this Fragment is one of their Illustrations of that Paradox.

been deprived of one of his Eyes, by one of the Citizens, and the People had delivered the young Man to him, to be punished in whatever Manner he should think proper; *Lycurgus* forbore to give him any Punishment. But, having instructed, and rendered him a good Man, he brought him into the Theatre: and, while the *Lacedaemonians* were struck with Admiration; "I received," says he, "this Person from you, injurious and violent, and I restore him to you gentle, and a good Citizen."

LXIII.

When *Pittacus* had been unjustly treated by some Person, and had the Power of chastising him; he let him go; saying, "Forgiveness is better than Punishment: for the one is the Proof of a gentle, the other of a savage Nature."

LXIV.

—But, above all, this is the Business of Nature, to connect and mutually adapt the Exertion of the active Powers (a) to the Appearance of what is fit and beneficial.

LXV.

It is the Character of the most mean-spirited and foolish Men, to suppose they shall be despised

P 3 by

(a) The Text has *της—φαιλαςιας*; but the true Reading seems evidently to be *τη φαιλαςιν*; and this the Translation follows.

by others; unless, by every Method, they hurt those who are first their Enemies (b).

LXVI.

When you are going to attack any one with Vehemence and Threatning, remember to say first to yourself, that you are [by Nature] a gentle Animal, and that by doing nothing violent; you shall live without Repentance, and without need of being set right.

LXVII.

We ought to know, that it is not easy for a Man to form a Principle of Action, unless he daily speaks and hears the same Things, and, at the same time, accommodates them to the Use of Life.

LXVIII.

Nicias was so intent on Business, that he often asked his Domesticks, whether he had bathed, and whether he had dined.

LXIX.

While *Archimedes* was intent on his *Diagrams*, his Servants drew him away by Violence, and anointed.

(b) Το δε ομοῖσαι ευκαταφρονητοῦς τοῖς ἀλλοιῶν ομοῖσαι, ἐν μὴ τοὺς πρῶτους ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ βλαψάμεν, σφοδρὰ ἀγνοῖαν καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων. Φαμὲν γάρ τινι ευκαταφρονητοῦ, νοεῖσθαι μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι βλάψαι. Ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον νοεῖται κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι ἀφελεῖν.

This is the Whole of the Fragment: of which only the first Part, which is too good to be omitted, is translated. The rest I do not understand.

anointed (c) him, and, after his Body was anointed, he traced his Figures upon *that*.

LXX.

When *Lampis*, the Sea Commander, was asked how he acquired Riches: "A great deal," said he, "without Difficulty, but a little with Labour."

LXXI.

Solon, when he was silent at an Entertainment, being asked by *Periander*, whether he was silent for want of Words, or from Folly; "No Fool," answered he, "can be silent at a Feast."

LXXII.

Consult nothing so much, upon every Occasion, as Safety. Now it is safer to be silent, than to speak: and omit speaking whatever is not accompanied with Sense and Reason.

LXXIII.

As Light-hooper in Havens, by kindling a great Flame from a few Faggots, afford a considerable Assistance to Ships wandering on the Sea: so an illustrious Person, in a State harrassed by Storms, while he is contented with little himself, confers great Benefits on his Fellow-Citizens.

LXXIV.

—As you would certainly, if you undertook to steer a Ship, learn the Steersman's Art. For it will be in your Power, as in that Case, to steer the whole Ship: so, in this, the whole State.

P 4

LXXV.

(c) The Ancients anointed the Body every Day.

LXXV.

If you have a mind to adorn your City by consecrated Monuments, first consecrate in yourself the most beautiful Monument of Gentleness, and Justice, and Benevolence.

LXXVI.

You will confer the greatest Benefits on your City, not by raising the Roofs, but by exalting the Souls [of your Fellow-Citizens]. For it is better, that great Souls should live in small Habitations, than that abject Slaves should burrow in great Houses.

LXXVII.

Do not variegate the Structure of your Walls with *Eubean* and *Spartan* Stone : but adorn both the Minds of the Citizens, and of those who govern them, by the *Grecian* Education. For Cities are made good Habitations by the Sentiments of those who live in them ; not by Wood or Stone.

LXXVIII.

As, if you were to breed Lions, you would not be solicitous about the Magnificence of their Dens, but the Qualities of the Animals [themselves] : so, if you undertake to preside over your Fellow-Citizens, be not so solicitous about the Magnificence of the Buildings, as careful of the Fortitude of those who inhabit them.

LXXIX.

LXXIX.

As a skilful Manager of Horses doth not feed the good Colts, and suffer the unruly ones to starve ; but feeds them both alike ; only whips one more, to make him draw equally with his Fellow : so a Man of Care, and Skill in the Art of Civil Government, endeavours to do (d) Good to the well-disposed Citizens, but not at once to destroy those that are otherwise. He by no means denies Subsistence to either of them : only he disciplines and urges on, with the greater Vehemence, him who resists Reason and the Laws.

LXXX.

As neither a Goose is alarmed by Gaggling, nor a Sheep by Bleating : so neither be you terrified by the Voice of a senseless Multitude.

LXXXI.

As you do not comply with a Multitude, when it injudiciously asks of you any Part of your own Property : so neither be disconcerted by a Mob, when it endeavours to force you to any unjust Compliance.

P. 5

LXXXII.

(d) The *Latin* Version supposes that *boni* should be *summi*. This the Sense seems to require ; and it is so translated.

LXXXII.

Pay in, before you are called upon, what is due to the Public, and you will never be asked for what is not due.

LXXXIII.

As the Sun doth not wait for Prayers and Incantations, to be prevailed on to rise, but immediately shines forth, and is received with universal Salutation; so neither do you wait for Applauses, and Shouts, and Praises; in order to do Good; but be a voluntary Benefactor; and you will be beloved like the Sun (e).

LXXXIV.

A Ship ought not to be fixed by one Anchor; nor Life on a single Hope (f).

LXXXV.

We ought not to stretch either our Legs or our Hopes to a Point they cannot reach.

LXXXVI.

Thales, being asked, what was the most universally enjoyed of all Things, answered, "Hope: for they have it, who have nothing else."

LXXXVII.

It is more necessary for the Soul to be cured, than the Body: for it is better to die, than to live ill.

LXXXVIII.

(e) This Simile is peculiarly Beautiful; and hath the Force of an Argument in the Discourse of a Stoic, who held the Sun to be animated, and intelligent.

(f) This Fragment, in *Stobæus*, is ascribed to *Socrates*.

LXXXVIII.

Pyrro used to say, There is is no Difference "between living and dying." A Person asked him; Why then do not you die? "Because," answered *Pyrro*, "there is no Difference (g)."

LXXXIX.

Nature is admirable; and, as *Xenophon* says, fond of Life. Hence we love, and take Care of the Body, which is of all Things the most unpleasant and squalid. For if we were obliged, only for five Days, to take care of our Neighbour's Body, we could not support it. For only consider what it would be, when we get up in a Morning, to wash the Teeth of others, and do all requisite Offices besides. In reality, it is wonderful we should love a Thing, which every Day demands so much Attendance. I stuff this Sack, and then I empty it again. What is more troublesome? But I must obey God. Therefore I stay, and bear to wash, and feed, and clothe this poultry, miserable Body. When I was younger, he commanded me something still more, and I bore it. And will you not, when Nature, which gave the Body, takes it away, bear that? "I love it;" say you. Well: this is what I have just been observing: and this very Love hath Nature given you: but she also says, "Now let it go, and have no farther Trouble."

P 6

XC.

(g) See Discourses, B. I. c. 27. Note (a)

XC.

When a young Man dies, [an old one] accuses the Gods, that, at the Time when he ought to be at rest, he is incumbered with the Troubles of Life. Yet, (b) nevertheless, when Death approaches, he wishes to live; and sends for the Physician, and intreats him to omit no Care or Pains. It is marvellous, that Men should not be willing either to live, or die.

XCI.

To a longer and worse Life, a shorter and better is by all Means to be preferred by every one.

XCII.

When we are Children, our Parents deliver us to the Care of a Tutor: who is continually to watch over us, that we get no Hurt. When we are become Men, God delivers us to the Guardianship of an implanted Conscience. We ought by no means then to despise this Guardian: for it will both displease (i) God, and we shall be Enemies to our own conscious Principle.

XCIII.

Riches ought to be used as the Materials of some Action; and not upon every Occasion alike.

XCIV.

All Men should rather wish for Virtue than Wealth; which is dangerous to the Foolish: for
Vice

(b) *ΗΤΕΡ* is dropt out of the Text, probably, by Reason of the Similitude of the next Word *ΕΤΕΡ*.

(i) *ΑΠΑΙΣΙΩ*, perhaps, should be *ΑΠΑΙΣΩ*.

Vice is increased by Riches. And in proportion as any one is destitute of Understanding, into the more injurious Excess he flies out, by having the Means of gratifying the Rage of his Pleasures.

XCV.

What ought not to be done, be not even suspected [or, entertain not even a Thought] of doing (#).

XCVI.

Deliberate much before you say and do any thing: for it will not be in your Power to recal what is said or done.

XCVII.

Every Place is safe to him who lives with Justice.

XCVIII.

Crows pick out the Eyes of the Dead, when they are no longer of any Use. But Flatterers destroy the Soul of the Living, and blind its Eyes.

XCIX.

The Anger of a Monkey, and the Threats of a Flatterer, deserve equal Regard.

C.

Kindly receive those, who are willing to give good Advice: but not those, who upon every Occasion are eager to flatter. For the former truly see what is advantageous: but the latter consider only the Opinions of their Superiors; and imitate the

(A) This Fragment is ascribed to Pythagoras, Stron. Serm. I.

the Shadows of Bodies, by nodding Assent to what they say.

CI.

A Monitor ought, in the first Place, to have a Regard to the Delicacy and Sense (1) of Shame of the Person admonished. For they, who are hardened against a Blush, are incorrigible.

CII.

It is better to admonish than reproach: for the one is mild and friendly; the other, harsh and affronting: and the one corrects the Faulty; the other only convicts them.

CIII.

(m) Communicate to Strangers, and Persons in Need, according to your Ability (n). For he who gives nothing to the Needy, shall receive nothing in his own Need.

CIV.

A Person once brought Clothes to a Pirate, who had been cast ashore, and almost killed by the Severity of the Weather; then carried him to his House, and furnished him with other Conveniences.

(1) *ἔμφρων* in *Antonius* and *Maximus* is *αἰσχυρός*. And it is so translated here.

(m) This and the following Fragment are from *Antonius* and *Maximus*, and in the Margin stand there, *Democriti*, *Isocratis*, & *Epieteti*: so, probably, they ought to be put in the second Class.

(n) The Expression in the Original is the same with *Luke xi. 41*.

cies. Being reproached by some Person, for doing Good to bad People; "I have paid this Regard," answered he; "not to the Man, but to human Nature."

CV.

We ought not to chuse every Pleasure: but that, which tends to something good.

CVI.

It is the Character of a wise Man, to resist Pleasure; and of a Fool, to be enslaved by it.

CVII.

In all Vice, Pleasure being presented like a Bait, draws sensual Minds to the Hook of Perdition.

CVIII.

Chuse rather to punish your Appetites, than to be punished by them.

CIX.

No one is free, who doth not command himself.

CX.

The Vine bears three Clusters. The first, of Pleasure; the second, of Intoxication; the third, of Outrage (o).

CXI.

Do not talk much over Wine, to show your Learning: for your Discourse will be loathsome.

CXII.

(o) This Saying is likewise ascribed to Pythagoras.

CXII.

He is a Drunkard, who takes more than three Glasses: and though he be not drunk, he hath exceeded Moderation.

CXIII.

(p) Let Discourse of God be renewed every Day, preferable to our Food.

CXIV.

Think oftener of God, than you breathe.

CXV.

If you always remember, that God stands by, an Inspector of whatever you do, either in Soul or Body: you will never err, either in your Prayers or Actions; and you will have God abiding with you.

CXVI.

As it is pleasant to view the Sea from the Shore; so it is pleasant to one who hath escaped, to remember his past Labours.

CXVII.

The Intention of the Law is, to benefit human Life: but it cannot, when Men themselves chuse to suffer: for it discovers its proper Virtue in the Obedient.

CXVIII.

As Physicians are the Preservers of the Sick; so are the Laws, of the Injured.

CXIX.

(p) See *Deut.* vi. 7. *Psal.* lxxi. 15, 24. *cv.* 2.

CXIX.

The justest Laws are the truest.

CXX.

It is decent to yield to a Law, to a Governor, and to a wiser Man.

CXXI.

Things, done contrary to Law, are the same as if they were undone.

CXXII.

In Prosperity, it is very easy to find a Friend ; in Adversity, nothing is so difficult.

CXXIII.

Time delivers Fools from Grief : and Reason, wise Men.

CXXIV.

He is a Man of Sense, who doth not grieve for what he hath not ; but rejoices in what he hath.

CXXV.

Epictetus being asked, how a Person might grieve his Enemy, answered, " By doing as well " as possible himself."

CXXVI.

Let no wise Man estrange himself from the Government of the State: for it is both impious to withdraw from being useful to those that need it, and cowardly to give way to the Worthless. For it is foolish to chuse rather to be governed ill, than to govern well.

CXXVII.

CXXVII.

Nothing is more (q) becoming a Governor, than to despise no one, nor be insolent; but to preside over all impartially.

CXXVIII.

Any Person may live happy in Poverty; but few, in Wealth and Power. So great is the Advantage of Poverty, that no (r) Man, observant of the Laws of Life, would change it for disreputable Wealth: unless, indeed *Themistocles*, the Son of *Neocles*, the most wealthy of the *Athenians*, in a Poverty of Virtue, was better than *Aristides* and *Socrates*. But both himself and his Wealth are perished, and without a Name. For a bad Man loses all in Death; but Virtue is eternal.

CXXIX.

[Remember] that such is, and was, and will be, the Nature of the World; nor is it possible that Things should be otherwise, than they now are: and that not only Men, and other Animals upon Earth, partake of this Change and Transformation, but the Divinities also. For indeed even the four Elements are transformed and changed up and down: and Earth becomes Water, and Water Air, and this again is transformed into other

(q) $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron$ seems a false Reading for $\mu\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\tau$.

(r) If any one thinks this Sense of $\nu\omicron\mu\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma$ harsh, or unsuitable, he may read, $\phi\omicron\sigma\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma$, prudent.

other Things. And the same Manner of Transformation happens from Things above to those below. Whoever endeavours to turn his Mind towards these Points, and persuade himself to receive with Willingness what cannot be avoided, he will pass his Life with Moderation and Harmony.

CXXX.

He who is discontented with Things present, and allotted by Fortune, is unskilful in Life. But he who bears them, and the Consequences arising from them, nobly and rationally, is worthy to be esteemed a good Man.

CXXXI.

All Things obey, and are subservient to, the World^(u); the Earth, the Sea, the Sun, and other Stars, and the Plants and Animals of the Earth. Our Body likewise obeys it, in being sick, and well, and young, and old, and passing thro' the other Changes, whenever That decrees. It is therefore reasonable, that what depends on ourselves, that is, our Judgment, should not be the only Rebel to it. For the World is powerful, and superior, and consults the best for us, by governing us in Conjunction with the Whole. Farther: Opposition, besides that it is unreasonable, and produces nothing except a vain Struggle, throws us likewise into Pain and Sorrows.

That

(u) The Stoics often confound the Idea of God with that of the World.

(a) *The following FRAGMENTS are ascribed jointly to EPICTETUS and other Authors.*

I.

CONTENTMENT, as it is a short and delightful Way, hath much Gracefulness and little Trouble.

II.

Fortify yourself with Contentment : for this is an impregnable Fortrefs.

III.

Prefer nothing to Truth, not even the Choice of Friendship, lying within the Reach of the Passions: for by them Justice is both confounded and darkened.

IV.

Truth is an-immortal and an eternal Thing. It bestows, not a Beauty which Time will wither, nor a Boldness of which the Sentence of a Judge can (b) deprive us ; but [the Knowledge of] what is just and lawful, distinguishing from them, and confuting what is unjust.

V. We

(a) I have followed Mr. Upton's Division : but many Fragments in the foregoing Class properly belong to this.

(b) *Ἀφαίρεσις* τῆς, probably, should be *ἀπαίρεσις*, and is so translated.

V.

We should have neither a blunt Sword, nor an
(c) ineffectual Boldness of Speech.

VI.

Nature hath given Man one Tongue, but two
Ears, that we may hear twice as much as we
speak.

VII.

Nothing is in reality either pleasant or unplea-
sant by Nature ; but all Things are effected by
Custom.

VIII.

Chuse the best Life : for Custom will make it
pleasant.

IX.

Chuse rather to leave your Children well in-
structed, than rich. For the Hopes of the Learned
are better than the Riches of the Ignorant.

X.

A Daughter is a Possession to a Father ; which
is not his own.

XI.

The same Person advised the leaving Modesty
to Children, rather than Gold.

XII.

(b) This saying is ascribed by *Stobæus* to *Socrates*. *Ατακτος*,
disorderly, is there *αυγατος*, ineffectual ; which I have pre-
ferred.

XII.

The Reproach of a Father is an agreeable Medicine : for the Profit is greater than the Pain.

XIII.

He who succeeds in a Son-in-Law, finds a Son : he who fails in one, loses likewise a Daughter.

XIV.

The Worth of Learning, like that of Gold, is esteemed in every Place.

XV.

He who exercises Wisdom, exercises the Knowledge of God.

XVI.

There is no Animal so beautiful, as a Man adorned by Learning.

XVII.

We ought to fly the Friendship of the Wicked, and the Enmity of the Good.

XVIII.

Necessitous Circumstances prove Friends, and detect Enemies.

XIX.

We ought to do well by our Friends, when they are present ; and speak well of them, when they are absent.

XX.

Let not him think he is loved by any, who loves none.

XXI.

XXI.

We ought to chuse both a Physician and a Friend, not the most agreeable, but the most useful.

XXII.

If you would lead a Life without Sorrow, consider Things which will happen, as if they had already happened.

XXIII.

Be exempt from Grief; not like irrational Creatures, from Insensibility; nor from Inconsiderateness, like Fools: but like a Man of Virtue, making Reason the Remedy for Grief.

XXIV.

They whose Minds are the least grieved by Calamities, and whose Actions struggle the most against them, are the greatest both in public and in private Life.

XXV.

They who are well instructed, like those who are exercised in the *Palestra*, if they happen to fall, quickly and dextrously rise again from Misfortunes.

XXVI.

We ought to call in Reason, like a good Physician, to our Assistance in Misfortunes.

XXVII.

A Fool intoxicated by a long Course of good Fortune, as by one of Drinking, becomes more senseless.

XXVIII.

XXVIII.

Envy is the Adversary of the Fortunate.

XXIX.

He who remembers what Man is, is discontented at nothing which happens.

XXX.

A Pilot and a fair Wind are necessary to a happy Voyage: Reason and Art, to a happy Life.

XXXI.

Good Fortune, like ripe Fruit, ought to be enjoyed while it is present.

XXXII.

He is unreasonable, who is displeased at Events, which happen from natural Necessity.



The following FRAGMENTS are omitted by Mr. UPTON : but as they stand under the Name of ARRIAN, and seem to be in the Spirit of EPICETUS, they are added here.

(a) **W**HAT does it signify to me, says he, whether the Universe is composed of Atoms or (b) uncompounded Substances, or of Fire and Earth ? Is it not sufficient to know the Essence of Good and Evil, and the proper Bounds of the Desires and Aversions ; and, besides those, of the active Powers ; and by the making use of these as so many certain Rules, to order the Conduct of Life, and bid these Things, which are above us, farewell : which, perhaps, are incomprehensible to human Understanding : but, if one should suppose them ever so comprehensible, still, what is the Benefit of them, when comprehended ? And must it not be said, that He gives Himself

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Q

Trouble

(a) *Stob. de Diis & Physicis. Serm. 211. p. 714. Ed. Francof. 1581.*

(b) I have translated *αμεγαν* as it stands in the Text ; but, possibly, it might originally be no more than a marginal Interpretation of *ατομων*, changing the Full Point into a Comma ; or, according to *Gesner's* Translation, a Corruption of *αμεσολαλειαν*.

Trouble to no Purpose, who allots these Things as necessary to the Character of a Philosopher.—
 “What then, is the *Delphic* Admonition, *Know Thyself*, superfluous?”—“No, surely, says he.”—“What then doth it mean?” If any one should admonish a Performer in a Chorus to *know himself*, would not he attend to it as a Direction about his (c) Motions—

II.

(d) The same Person being asked, Wherein the Diligent have the Advantage of the Slothful? answered, Wherein the Pious have the Advantage of the Impious; in good Hopes.

III.

(e) Walls give to Cities, and Cultivation of the Understanding to Minds, Ornament and Security.

IV.

(f) When a young Man was giving himself Airs in a public Place; and saying, that he was grown wise, by conversing with many wise Men; I have conversed too, answered somebody, with many rich Men, but I am not grown rich.

V.

(g) The Sentence seems imperfect.

(d) *Maximus*, περὶ φιλοπονίας. *Serm.* 118. p. 374.

(e) *Ant. & Max. de disciplinâ.* *Serm.* 210. p. 704.

(f) *Ibid.*

V.

(g) *Socrates*, being sent for by (h) *Archelaus*, as designing to make him a rich Man, returned him this Answer: "Four Quarts of Meal are sold
 " at *Athens* for five Farthings, and the Fountains
 " run with Water. If what I have is not sufficient for me, yet I am sufficiently able to
 " make a shift with that; and thus it becomes
 " sufficient for me. Do not you perceive, that
 " it makes no Difference in the Goodness of
 " *Polus* [the Player's] Voice, whether he performs the Part of *Oedipus* in his regal State, or
 " when he is a Wanderer, and a Beggar at
 " *Colonus*? And shall a brave Man appear worse
 " than *Polus*, and not perform well in whatever
 " Personage is imposed upon him by the Deity?
 " Shall he not imitate *Ulysses*, who made no
 " worse Figure in Rags than in a fine purple
 " Robe (i)?"

Q 2

V.

(g) *Stobæus*, *Compar. Paupertatis & Divitiarum. Serm.* 237. p. 778.

(h) *Archelaus*, the Philosopher, was the Master of *Socrates*: but the Person here mentioned was King of *Macedon*, who vainly endeavoured to get *Socrates* to his Court. The Envy of *Aristophanes* upon this Occasion is said to have produced that infamous Piece of Scurrility and Buffoonery his *Comedy of the Clouds*. See *Bayle*, in the Article *Archelaus*.

(i) *Stobæus. Quod Eventus, &c.* p. 324, 329.

VI.

There are some Persons who are calmly of a high Spirit, and do all the same Things quietly, and 'as it were without Anger, which those do who are hurried with strong Passion. We are to guard, therefore, against the Faults of such Persons, as being much worse than that of violent Anger. For People of the latter Character are quickly fatiated with Vengeance; whereas the others extend it to a longer Time, like Persons in a slow Fever.



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A P P E N -



A P P E N D I X.

THE learned Dr. TAYLOR, Editor of *Lyfias* and *Demosthenes*, having honoured me with his Opinion, concerning some Passages, about which he was consulted, I am enabled by his Observations to make the following Improvements to this Work.

Vol. I. Page 45. Add to Note (b)—It seems probable, that a great deal is wanting; and that *οτι ανθρωποι* belongs to one Story, and *τι ουκ, εφη*, to another.

P. 93. But how then came any such Suspicions . . . Perhaps the Sense is, 'Whence arise our Suspicions, Jealousies, and Fears, concerning our Children, if we have no natural Affection towards them?'

P. 121. Add to Note (d)—Or, perhaps, *μυθος* should be *μυθος*.

P. 141. This your Victory, this your Conclusion . . . Perhaps *Victory* and *Conclusion* should change Places.

P. 173. To note (b) add—But, as *διατλλω* occurs not elsewhere; and reading it here will make an improper Repetition of nearly the same Sense, and *διαθωω* *τινα* signifies, to do something to another, L. 4. c. 7. p. 628. edit. *Upt.* and in *Lyfias*, *Apol. in. Sim.* p. 79. *contra Agorat.* p. 235, it will be best to preserve the present Reading, and to translate it—What doth he lose, who makes him such?

P. 205. To Note (i) add—*Prov.* viii. 34. and *Eccles.* xiv. 23. speak of waiting and bearkening at the Doors
of

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of *Wisdom*. Yet the Passage, to which Mr. *Upton* refers, p. 577, of his Edition, and Vol. II. p. 180, of this Translation, favours the received Reading.

P. 207. To Note (I) add—Probably there is an Allusion to the Proverb, cited by *Wolffius*, *ἐν βουρῶν καθίσταται*, of which see *Snidas*.

P. 222. To Note (c) add—Yet possibly the Sense of *ἐν* may be couched under *ἐν*.

Vol. II. P. 22. To Note (b) add—But a much better, and almost certain Conjecture is, to read *ἀπαλλαγόμενος* instead of *ἐλαττωμένος*. And then the Translation will be—Concerning those, who return, or, were returning home, on account of Sickness.

P. 41. To Note (b) add—But, on farther Consideration, the Sense of returning or departing, which *ἀναλυν* hath, *Luke* xii. 36. *Phil.* i. 23. and *παραλυσίς*, 2 *Tim.* iv. 6. seems proper here: and the Translation may be—You go to the Theatre, or thence to some other Place. For Persons often move from one Place to another, merely because they are amused in none.

P. 44. To Note (f) add—But probably it should be changed into *μεθου*, and the Translation be—What Occasion for Anger, for Desire . . . These two Greek Words are confounded elsewhere. And the same Alterations seem needful in *Porphyr. de Abst.* L. I. §. 2.

P. 47. To Note (c) add—He is sensible however, that *ἀνατοίχην* is not exactly to throw one's self on one Side; and stands condemned by *Phrynicius*, as a low Expression.

P. 67. To Note (a) add—Or we may suppose *ἡ* to be a Gloss, or a casual Repetition of the same Word occurring in the Line before: and so translate, *there exists the Knowledge, &c.*

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P. 102. To note (d) add—Or, perhaps, rather the former οὐτος should be left out.

P. 115. To Note (b) add—Yet, possibly, the present Reading may stand, and be translated, *But your Life is a perpetual Magistracy.*

P. 141. To Note (c) add—Or τὸ φιλοσοφῆν may mean, *Of the philosophic Principle.*

P. 150. To note (b) add—Or the latter σου διὰ may be a Repetition of the Transcriber.

P. 176. To Note (d) add—For ὅλως, I have taken the Reading of Mr. Upton's Copy, ἁλλῶν.

P. 184. To Note (b) add—Yet I would not insert a Negative unnecessarily.

P. 188. Note (c). For, *rub themselves with*, put, *thrown on their Antagonists.*

P. 200. To Note (c) add—Perhaps also what follows, and particularly εἰς ὑπερβατον, is corrupt.

P. 205. To Note (a) add—But this Omission was probably owing to the Transcribers skipping from ~~παύειν~~ to the like Word μαρτυρεῖν. Possibly, instead of leaving out καὶ, we should rather suppose, that something before it is left out. And in all Likelihood the true Translation of οὐκ ἐχὼς αὐτῷ κατῶ, instead of *should not you, &c.* is the following: *is not this, i. e. undertaking to convince others instead of yourself, inverting the Order of Things?*

P. 240. The Notes (b) and (i) should change Places.

P. 244. Add to Note (a)—Or rather, after the next Word: and the Translation should be, *Yet now, without being sensible of it, you do something like this, even in the present Case. Consider your Body, &c.* But still the Separation of οὐκ from καὶ οὖν is somewhat unnatural, and takes off from the Spirit and Quickness of the Repartee.

P. 245. Squalid The original Word signifies, in general, pale. And, probably, *Aristophanes*

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meant the Palenefs, which proceeds from a sedentary studious Life. But *Epicætus* plainly understood him, of that unwholesome Look, which Want of Cleanliness gives.

P. 249. To Note (a) add—Or, as *Casaubon* conjectures, ἀπῶδιν. Or, perhaps, as Mr. *Upton* proposes, υπερτιθιμνος should be υπερτιθιματος.

P. 251. Is he my Conscience *Kpma* signifies, p. 652. l. 6. and p. 660. l. 5. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition, the Judgment, which any one passes in his own Mind.

P. 270. To Note (b) add—For nothing appears, to support so great an Encomium of that Philosopher: whereas *Hercules* and *Diogenes* were Favourites of the Stoics, and particularly of our Author; and the latter professed himself an Imitator of the former. But then he was never deified. And therefore may we not put in his stead, Διονυσος, *Bacchus*? They are joined by the Antients. See *Qu. Curt. L. VIII. c. 5.* and *Hör. Epist. II. 1, 5, 10.* And they will stand here in their proper Order. But this may be thought too licentious a Change. And, to say nothing of *Hercules*, *Bacchus* was by no means remarkable for Abstemiousness.

P. 284. To Note (u) add—This Reading he hath taken from an Edition in 1554, said to be made from a better Manuscript than the common Editions. He understands it to mean, *struck and affected over-strongly by Externals.* Διαβέβληματος—means, averse from, *L. II. c. 26.* in the Beginning, and *Philostat. vit. Apollon: VIII. 7, 3.* But from the vulgar Sense, *calumniated*, it may mean here, one to whom Externals have been misrepresented, who hath a Misconception of the World.

P. 301. And Vice, by Money Perhaps for κενος should be read ευτυχια, a Turn of good Fortune.

F I N I S.

